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In this dissertation, I conduct a cross-national comparison of three community 
organizations in the US, UK, and Germany and show how these models of collective 
representation have been able to sustain their original goals of mobilizing people and 
building power for social change. Based on participant observation, interviews, and 
archival analysis, I show, first, how the community organizations emerged in each 
context. Here, I emphasize the political opportunity structure as well as the strategic 
capacities of the founders. Second, I show that despite being embedded in very 
different institutional contexts, each organization has a strong capacity of mobilizing 
its members. To account for this similarity, I argue that the organizations develop a 
similar “hybrid logic of organizing” combining elements from a bureaucracy and from 
a social movement within their structure and culture. Differences in terms of 
membership growth, however, come to the forefront as well. Being embedded in a 
different context is not a sufficient explanation, but I argue it is important to 
understand the mechanisms of creative borrowing. Each organizer had to creatively 
adapt the model to make it work within the context. Finally, I illustrate under which 
conditions an organization can maintain its vitality and its capacity to mobilize its 
members over time. Again, I show the importance of agency or corrective mechanisms 
that come into play in the form of reflection and deliberation between the members 
and the organizers to make sure the organization sticks to its original mission. This 
 dissertation contributes to the theoretical debates on the role of alternative forms of 
collective representation, the development of organizations, and the factors affecting 
their relative success. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF COMMUNITY 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
We are in the midst of many battles. Over the last year we have witnessed a 
proliferation of new movements: from the Arab Spring, to the occupation of the 
squares in Spain by the indignados, and more recently the Occupy Wall Street 
movement. It has been a challenge, however, for these movements to maintain their 
vitality and remain sustainable over time. At the same time, traditional forms of 
collective representation, such as trade unions, have lost their grassroots base, 
suffering a continuous decline in membership, not just in the US and the UK, but even 
in strongholds like Germany. On some occasions, they have been portrayed as special 
interest groups, locked into highly bureaucratic organizations that lost the power to 
act. In this dissertation, I conduct a cross-national comparison of three community 
organizations in the US, UK, and Germany and show how these alternative forms of 
representation – lying somewhere between a social movement and a full-blown 
bureaucratic organization – have been able to sustain their original goals of mobilizing 
people and building power for social change.  
Community organizing has been defined in many different ways (e.g., 
Milofsky 1988; Marwell 2007), but in general, it refers to a process and strategy of 
engaging people and communities to build political power with the goal of improving 
the living and working conditions of the people within those communities. 
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Community organizations operate mainly at a local level by confronting, negotiating, 
and working with public and private actors (Orr 2007a). These organizations should be 
distinguished from trade unions in that they can’t negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement with the employer. That being said, they do “bargain” in the broader sense 
of the word, or negotiate with policy makers or employers. Finally, community 
organizations aren’t political parties or lobby groups, but work with the community to 
hold political actors accountable for their actions. 
 
Why focus on community organizations? 
Almost two centuries ago, the French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville was 
awestruck when he observed the high levels of “associationalism” and civic 
participation in the United States. According to Tocqueville, the weakness of a 
decentralized state brought with it a strong civil society, as opposed to the European 
system, in which a strong state perpetuated a weak civil society. In Democracy in 
America, he wrote that “Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions 
constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing 
companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, 
moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or tiny” (de Tocqueville 2002 
[1835]: 181). In a similar vein, about one hundred years later, Arthur Schlesinger 
called America “a nation of joiners” (1944). Contemporary scholars, however, have 
taken contrasting positions on the matter. Concerns about the decline of civic 
engagement in the United States have been the topic of many highly contested 
scholarly debates. While some have highlighted a decline in American civic 
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engagement since the 1960s (Putnam 1995, 2000; Skocpol 1999), others have 
indicated the surge and importance of local grassroots organizations in American 
cities, illustrating their fundamental role in reinvigorating American democracy and 
equality from below (Fine 2006; Orr 2007b; Swarts 2008). 
If we now switch the lens to Europe, powerful traditional anchor institutions, 
on the one hand, such as trade unions, political parties, and (Christian) faith 
organizations, have been suffering from a weakened grassroots base. Trade unions 
suffer a continuous decline in membership, churches remain largely empty, and 
political parties inspire little trust and confidence in their citizens (Visser 2006; 
European Commission 2011). These institutions, once perceived as the backbones of 
society in addressing and articulating the people’s interests, have in many cases 
become bureaucratic structures unable to mobilize their constituents (Turner 1996; 
Wills 2012). On the other hand, over the last three decades, new forms of civil society 
organizations have emerged, taking on new roles under the framework of “activating 
the welfare state” or helping to build a “Big Society” (Alcock 2010; Eick 2011). In the 
UK, for example, Heery, Abbot and Williams (2010) point out how civil society 
organizations are becoming increasingly active in employment relations while the 
traditional trade unions are losing ground. In Germany as well, civil society 
organizations have been increasingly involved in labor, poverty, or even security 
issues – previously a concern of the traditional welfare state actors – and leading 
therefore to critical debates about their function in society (Mayer 1994). Compared to 
the US, however, most of these “new actors” have focused on advocacy and servicing 
rather than organizing or mobilizing people. 
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In this dissertation, I compare a similar model of civic engagement in the US, 
UK, and Germany that focuses on organizing and mobilizing its members, rather than 
advocacy or servicing. More specifically, I focus on three community organizations 
affiliated with the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) – a network of community 
organizations that started under Saul Alinsky in 1930s Chicago. These IAF 
organizations did not simply “emerge” in a new context but are the result of explicit 
strategies to diffuse this organizing model across different settings. Although 
community organizing is commonplace in the US, it is a rather new phenomenon in 
Europe and as such, these organizations are quite different from the service-oriented 
civil society organizations described by Heery et al. (2010) or Mayer (1994).  
Over the last decade, studies on community organizing in the United States 
have proliferated, covering a broad range of topics (Wood 2010). Scholars have 
examined the policy impact of community organizations (e.g., Hart 2001; Speer 2002; 
Osterman 2002), the importance of social capital in building power (e.g., Warren 
2001; Orr 2007b; Swarts 2008), and the role of religious actors within the 
organizations (e.g., Wood 2002; McRoberts 2003). Although this American style of 
organizing has spread to other countries, most studies have been limited to community 
organizing within the American context1, and comparative analyses have been 
restricted to cases within the United States (e.g., Swarts 2008; Ganz 2009; for 
exceptions, see Warren 2009).  
                                                
1 Studies on community organizing outside the US have mainly highlighted the potential for trade unions to work 
together with those organizations. Please see, for example, Holgate and Wills (2007) on coalitions between unions 
and a community organization in the UK, and Tattersall (2006) on community unionism in Australia. 
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By conducting a systematic comparative analysis of London Citizens (LC)2, 
the Greater Boston Interfaith Organization (GBIO), and the German Institute for 
Community Organizing (DICO) – all affiliated with the IAF – I expand this body of 
research and examine the relative success of community organizations as well as their 
impact on established institutional structures. This comparative analysis will further 
our understanding regarding the impact of the context on community organizing and 
the role these organizations play in the US, the UK and Germany.  
I am particularly interested in the following questions: how can I explain the 
organizations’ sustained mobilization capacity? Here I don’t refer to uninterrupted or 
permanent mobilization, but rather the capacity of an organization to mobilize its 
members when necessary. In other words, when an action or a meeting takes place, it 
gets its members out. In terms of sustained mobilization capacity, I focus on two 
dimensions: member mobilization and membership growth over time. Furthermore, 
which factors explain the differences and similarities across the cases? Does the 
mobilization capacity differ, considering the distinct national contexts, or is it rather 
similar due to the direct propagation of a similar American IAF model? Are there 
strategic or tactical differences, and how do these factors relate to the mobilization 
capacity?  
But first, to really understand how these organizations function, it is important 
to take a step back and comprehend how they came into being. I examine therefore 
how and why this type of community organization emerged in each setting, and, 
                                                
2 I use the London Citizens, although the organization started out as The East London Citizens Organization, or 
TELCO. The organization expanded to the West, the South, and recently the North of London, and its umbrella 
name became London Citizens. 
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consequently, I examine what accounts for their sustained mobilization capacity.  
 
My Argument 
To understand the emergence of the community organizations in each context, I show 
how critical both the political opportunity structure and the strategic capacity of the 
founders were in creating the space and building these alternative models.  I expand on 
the classic notion of “political opportunity structure,” emphasizing how the change 
from an open to an apparently hostile political setting actually provided an opportunity 
– rather than a threat – for these organizations to emerge. I operationalize hostile 
political climate by examining whether there is a perceived hostility within the 
political setting towards particular constituencies, especially in terms of access to 
policymakers or resources (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Organizational formation or 
mobilization is assumed to be less likely when there is a perceived hostility towards 
these groups than when there is a perceived openness towards these groups.  In 
addition, I link the external structure to the actual organizational formation by 
emphasizing the strategic capacities (biography, network, and organizational context) 
of the founders. While the founders were confronted with different challenges, I 
illustrate how in each case the institutional context as well as the presence of key 
actors explain why the organizations emerged when they did.  
My goal is to explain what accounts for their sustained mobilization capacity, 
focusing on member mobilization and membership growth. Member mobilization, or 
the organizations’ ability to mobilize their constituents, is a fundamental source of 
power and key to their success. Indeed, since these community-based organizations 
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are non-bargaining actors, they rely on powerful grassroots mobilization to fight for 
social change (e.g., Osterman 2002; Swarts 2008; Warren 2001). Based on my 
interviews, participant observation, and newspaper articles, I examined members’ 
participation in actions, meetings, trainings, or campaigns and was struck by the stark 
similarity across the cases: despite being embedded in very different institutional and 
socio-economic contexts, each organization has a strong capacity of mobilizing its 
members. What accounts for this similarity? Here, I show that the organizations share 
a similar “hybrid logic of organizing,” combining bureaucratic and social movement 
approaches in their structure and culture. I show how this hybrid logic of organizing is 
likely to lead to a strong mobilization capacity and is dynamic and flexible enough to 
adjust to different institutional contexts. 
Second, I examine membership growth. Organizational growth and decline is 
an important element of an organization’s development over time (Kriesi 1996). Here 
I encounter significant differences between the cases. While the community 
organization in London has grown exponentially, doubling in membership over the 
past decade, the one in Berlin has had a much more moderate growth rate, while the 
Boston organization has actually declined in membership over the past 10 years. How 
can I explain these differences? Being embedded in a different context is not a 
sufficient explanation and I show how the organizations are the result of “creative 
borrowing” by the organizers. Their creativity and resourcefulness is, however, bound 
and shaped by the external context in which the organization is embedded. As a 
consequence, I show how in these three cases temporal, geographic, and strategic 
differences affect membership growth.  
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Finally, I illustrate under which conditions an organization can maintain its 
vitality and its capacity to mobilize its members over time. While there are structural 
forces that will push the organizations towards greater conservatism – abandoning its 
original goals in favor of organizational maintenance – I show how agency comes into 
play in the form of reflection and deliberation between the members and the 
organizers to ensure the organization stays focused on its original mission. 
To summarize, I illustrate why the organizations emerged when they did, 
emphasizing the importance of the change from an open to a rather hostile 
environment as well as the strategic capacities of the founders. Furthermore, I explain 
what accounts for the organizations’ similarities, in terms of their strong mobilization 
capacity, and what accounts for their differences, in terms of membership growth. I 
show how all three organizations adapt a similar model of organizing that travels 
across contexts and encourages member mobilization. In addition, I explain that the 
differences in membership growth can be attributed not just to a different context but 
also to the organizers’ creative adaptation of the model. Finally, I show how the 
organizations over time are able to stick to their original mission of mobilizing 
members by emphasizing the deliberation and reflection that takes place between the 
members and organizers. 
 
Methodology 
I conduct a cross-national comparison of community organizations in Boston, London, 
and Berlin. I selected these cases based on the following reasons: First, the three 
organizations are all affiliated with the same IAF network, which is the oldest network 
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of community organizations in the US and the only one that has such a strong 
international presence.  Second, all three of the organizations were created during the 
same time frame, the 1990s, and all are set in a global city. Third, the organization in 
London and the one in Berlin are the only IAF organizations in Europe. And although 
there are many IAF community organizations in the US, I selected the organization in 
Boston because it shares many characteristics with the other American IAF affiliates 
and could therefore be considered a representative American model. In addition, the 
organizations in Boston, London, and Berlin are part of the same regional IAF 
network, or METRO IAF, and have collaborated on campaigns, albeit on a limited 
scale. 
My data collection is structured around three different methods: participant 
observation, interviews, and archival analysis, increasing the validity of my findings 
(please see Appendix for more details). First, as a participant observer I was involved 
in the activities of GBIO, London Citizens, and DICO, generating field notes and 
documenting my direct experiences (Whyte 1943). I have spent 2 summers in London 
with London Citizens, six weeks in Boston working with GBIO, and six weeks in 
Berlin with DICO. I attended internal meetings of GBIO and London Citizens and 
participated in intensive training sessions (3-5 days) of the three organizations. 
Second, I conducted “structured and focused” interviews, or in other words ask a set 
of standardized, general questions while focusing on the specific research objective, to 
enhance the systematic comparison of my cases (George and Bennett 2005). I have 
conducted between 30-40 interviews with key actors at each site, including the 
director, lead organizers, and members of the organizations. To understand more about 
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the “organizing environment” I interviewed trade union representatives, organizers 
from other organizing networks, and scholars as well. Finally, I use archival 
documents to construct a historical record based on written documents. In addition to 
the internal organizational reports, I coded and analyzed over 600 newspaper articles 
that have been published on the organizations between 1997 and 2012.  
During the process of data collection and analysis, I adopted the “grounded 
theory” approach developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and refined by Corbin and 
Strauss (2008), collecting and analyzing the data simultaneously, rather than 
sequentially. I conducted “constant comparisons,” going back and forth between my 
codes, renaming and modifying my concepts. In addition, I used “theoretical 
sampling” or, in other words, the direction of my data collection is determined by 
ongoing interpretation and emerging conceptual categories, rather than a priori 
hypotheses (Suddaby 2006).  
Through systematic case study analysis (Yin 2003) and process-tracing 
(George and Bennett 2005), I try to identify the underlying causal processes that 
explain the emergence, the relative mobilization capacity and development of these 
three organizations. Finally, my data analysis occurs at two levels: Since my research 
design is based on a small-N case study approach, I combine cross-case comparisons 
and within-case analysis, trying to identify causal variables through process-tracing.  
Finally, considering the independence of my case studies, in statistical studies, 
if a correlation is the result not of the hypothesis but of learning or diffusion from one 
case to the others, then the additional cases do not provide substantially new info and 
there are fewer degrees of freedom than the researcher thought. In case studies, 
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process-tracing can inductively uncover linkages between cases, taking learning and 
diffusion processes into account. Process-tracing can allow the researcher to estimate 
how much of the variance in outcome is explained by learning or diffusion and how 
much is explained by other variables. A lack of independence can be useful to test 
whether the lessons in an earlier case played a causal role in a later one (George and 
Bennett, 2005, chapter 1). 
To a certain extent, the three organizations in my study can be regarded as 
independent cases. There are no direct linkages in terms of resources or people 
between the three cases.  The three organizations have taken on the IAF principles but 
have not learned any particular practices directly from one another.  Indirectly, 
however, the European organizations have learned from the American IAF 
organizations. As such, I consider the American organization GBIO as the original 
IAF model. In that case, I would expect that the GBIO is more likely to follow the IAF 
principles than the European organizations. Indeed, as I will show, the European 
organizations have learned from the US model and have deviated from it where 
necessary. As a consequence, the European organizations were able to innovate, e.g., 
by diversifying their membership. This lack of independence among the case studies 
has therefore uncovered the learning or adaptation processes. 
 
Overview of the chapters 
Chapter 2 draws on the literature within social movement, industrial relations, and 
organization studies and builds a theoretical framework to explain the emergence and 
success of similar organizations across different countries. I show the importance of 
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linking institutions with agency, or more specifically, the importance of the external 
environment in which the organizations are embedded as well as the strategic capacity 
of the key actors. 
 Part two focuses on the dynamics of diffusion, or how the organizations 
emerged in each context. I describe the history of IAF community organizing and its 
vast spread in chapter three, and zoom in on the diffusion of the IAF model to Boston, 
London, and Berlin in chapter 4. 
Part three contains the three in-depth case studies, illustrating in more detail 
how the IAF organizations function in each context and what the challenges are. 
Chapter 5 illustrates how the Boston organization maintained its capacity to mobilize 
members over time, and the mechanisms that come into play when the organization 
has been tempted to drift away towards servicing rather than organizing its members. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the community organization in London, showing how it has been 
able to grow exponentially over the past two decades. Chapter 7 describes the 
founding process of a community organization in Berlin, emphasizing how the 
structure and the culture of IAF organizing are created from the outset, as well as the 
challenges in finding the right translation of the IAF principles. 
Part four, provides a comparative analysis of the three cases and evaluates 
community organizing within a broader context. Chapter 8 illustrates how adopting a 
hybrid logic of organizing encourages member mobilization. The development of a 
mobilizing structure and culture accounts therefore for important underlying 
similarities across the organizations, despite being embedded in different contexts. On 
the other hand, important differences in terms of membership growth come to the 
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forefront as well. Here, temporal, geographic, and strategic dimensions explain the 
differences across the cases. Chapter 9 evaluates the role of community organizations 
and their potential as a driver for social change.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BUILDING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ORGANIZATIONAL 
EMERGENCE AND SUCCESS 
 
 
The rise and fall, the success or failure, the growth and decay of an organization can 
be considered outcomes of an organizational transformation process. In order to 
persist over time, an organization must be able to adapt to a changing environment. 
Not only external changes but also internal pressures, such as membership decline, 
must be surmounted. Indeed, in order to survive and grow, an organization is 
constantly challenged to overcome these internal and external pressures. 
 This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I examine the literature on 
organizational emergence, emphasizing the political opportunity structure and the 
strategic capacities of the founders. Next, I focus on member mobilization and 
membership growth, illustrating the importance of a hybrid logic of organizing, 
accounting for the similarities of my cases, and mechanisms of creative borrowing, 
accounting for the differences. Finally, I show, according to the literature, what the 
potential challenges are for these types of organizations to remain sustainable over 
time.  
 
Organizational Emergence 
To fully comprehend how the organizations function, it is important to take a step 
back and understand how they came into being. Over the past three decades, over 50 
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new IAF organizations have emerged in over 20 US States as well as abroad. What 
accounts for this vast spread of similar organizations? How and when were these 
organizations created, and what were some of the challenges? I emphasize the 
importance of two factors: the political opportunity structure and the strategic capacity 
of the lead organizers.  
 Arthur Stinchcombe, in his seminal paper Social Structure and Organizations, 
coined the term “liability of newness”: new organizations fail more easily than old 
ones, especially new organizational forms (1965), because they have to invest in 
education, in new roles; they have to build new trust relationships with strangers, and 
they do not have a base of customers or social resources for support. I show, however, 
how London Citizens, GBIO, and DICO have been able to emerge, co-exist with the 
established institutions, and be relatively successful. According to Thelen (2004), 
institution building is the result of “strategic interactions.” In explaining the 
emergence of distinct national systems of vocational training, Thelen argues that 
coalitions will be built and key actors will mobilize to support a particular institutional 
configuration (31). While Thelen focuses on one dominant practice within national 
systems, vocational training, I look at alternative arrangements that have emerged next 
to the main models of representation. Trade unions, especially in Europe, are still the 
dominant form of collective representation, with community organizations therefore 
representing alternative ways of organizing workers and citizens. Considering the 
historical circumstances, I show how shifts in the political settings led to an opening in 
the civic engagement sphere. 
In line with political opportunity structure theory (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 
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2011), I describe how an opening in the institutional context allowed the organizations 
to emerge, or how changes in opportunity translated into organizational formation. 
The political opportunity structure theory takes into account the specific historical and 
institutional contexts in explaining the emergence of social movements and shows 
why people mobilize during certain historical periods rather than others, or why 
mobilization is more intense in some countries than in others. 3 While Eisinger (1973) 
was the first to use the political opportunity framework, explaining why, during the 
1960s, some American cities witnessed riots and others didn’t, the concept “political 
opportunity structure” has been widely applied since then to explain the emergence 
and development of protest movements  (e.g., Tilly 1978; Tarrow 2011). As Meyer 
and Minkoff (2004) point out, however, the concept lacks theoretical clarity, and 
similar terms have been used to express different factors. As a consequence, one of the 
questions we need to address is:  Political opportunity for whom? Indeed, as my data 
show, change in opportunities provoked the organizational formation of some while 
depressing others. 
Tarrow defines political opportunities as “consistent – but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to 
engage in contentious politics” (Tarrow 1998: 19-20). Expanding on this “classic” 
notion of political opportunity structure, I show that for each case, the political context 
had actually become quite hostile when the organizations emerged, even though 
“openness” of the government has often been described as a critical factor for 
opportunity (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Koopmans 1996). To a certain extent, the 
                                                
3 In line with Minkoff (1995), my dependent variable in this section is organizational formation rather than 
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“community organizing space” was already filled by the labor movement or social 
movements, and only once these forms of civic engagement had started to dwindle or 
prove ineffective was space carved out for the IAF community organizations to 
emerge. In other words, a seemingly hostile political structure might be a threat for 
some, but an opportunity for others.  
 While the change in the institutional context proved important, it is not 
sufficient to explain the outcome. How did these opportunities turn into organizational 
formation? How can we link the external context to the actual action that took place? 
The emergence of the IAF organizations in London, Boston, and Berlin is therefore 
also a story of strong individuals, enriched by their own biography, their networks, 
and the organizational context in which they were embedded, that shows why they 
decided at those times to build organizations in these cities. Building on Marshall 
Ganz’ concept of “strategic capacity” (2000) I show how these leaders’ own personal 
experiences, as well as their ties to the IAF network or other key actors in the field, 
explain the emergence of these alternative organizations in their distinct contexts.  
 
Process of Diffusion 
It is important to consider the processes of diffusion. These IAF organizations did not 
simply “emerge” in a new context, but are rather the result of explicit strategies for 
diffusing this model into different settings. According to Rogers (1995) “diffusion is 
the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over 
time among the members of a social system” (5).  Classical diffusion studies focus on 
                                                                                                                                       
mobilization. 
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communication channels, such as mass media or relational networks, as necessary 
conditions for adopting innovative practices (e.g. Ryan and Gross 1943, Katz and 
Lazarsfeld 1944, Coleman et al. 1966, Hagerstrand 1967). Within the social 
movements literature, diffusion has been defined as “normal learning and influence 
processes as mediated by the network structures of everyday life” (McAdam 1995, 
231). Going beyond innovation per se, this literature emphasizes the spread of protest 
tactics or collective action “repertoires” (e.g., McAdam and Rucht 1993,  Giugni 1995, 
Soule 1997). In the literature, three main questions are posed (eds. Givan, Soule and 
Roberts, 2011): What is being diffused? Which mechanisms of diffusion can be 
discerned? What is the outcome of the diffusion process? Concerning the second 
question, the mechanisms of diffusion, three main pathways can be discerned: 
relational (through interpersonal networks), non-relational (use of mass media or the 
internet), and the brokerage mechanism (a third party that links the transmitter to the 
adopter).4 According to Tarrow (2006, 2011), these mechanisms lead to different 
outcomes: diffusion through relational mechanisms will be narrow in scope, but with a 
high level of trust between the actors, whereas the spread of tactics through non-
relational mechanisms can have a much broader and further reach, but will not 
develop the same sense of trust; diffusion through brokerage will spread rapidly, but 
the intermediary party has the ability to change the content of the message.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 In the literature the terms transmitter and adopter have been used to indicate the two main actors between whom 
the diffusion occurs.  
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Diffusion as a Process but not an Explanation 
 
To what extent, however, does the diffusion literature explain the emergence of 
community organizations in Boston, London, and Berlin? Even though the 
mechanisms of diffusion are different – London Citizens is the result of non-relational 
diffusion, whereas the Berlin and Boston affiliates are both examples of direct, 
relational diffusion – these differences don’t seem to affect the outcomes.  
Second, according to Snow and Benford (1999), it is important to specify the 
role of “agency” in the diffusion process. The GBIO is the result of “reciprocation;” 
both the adopter and the transmitter actively promoted the diffusion. London Citizens 
is the result of “adaptation;” diffusion happened through the efforts of an active 
adopter and a rather passive transmitter. Finally, the German IAF organization is the 
result of “accommodation,” an active transmitter but a rather passive adopter. But 
again, while these differences are clear, the types of agency don’t seem to affect the 
emergence or further development of the organization. 
 
Sustained Mobilization Capacity  
In terms of mobilization capacity, I focus on two dimensions: member mobilization 
and membership growth (see also, e.g., Swarts 2008). Mobilization, according to Tilly 
(1978), refers to “the process by which a group acquires collective control over the 
resources needed for action” (7), or the ways in which individuals are transformed into 
a collective actor. Membership growth refers to the change in size, in terms of 
members and resources (Kriesi 1996). Social movement scholars have highlighted 
three distinct factors in explaining mobilization capacity: organizational resources, 
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political opportunities, and framing processes (McCarthy and Zald 1973; McAdam 
1982; Tarrow 2011; Snow and Benford 1988).  
 To explain how a social movement emerges and develops, social movement 
scholars have emphasized the ability of groups to accrue the necessary resources, 
illustrating that at least a minimal form of organization is required as a tool for 
mobilizing (McCarty and Zald, 1973). The logic of this resource mobilization 
paradigm rejected moreover Piven and Cloward’s thesis that organizations and mass 
disruption are irreconcilable (1977). According to resource mobilization scholars, 
however, if social movements become too institutionalized, they manifest only weak 
conservative tactics. With my case studies I illustrate how the IAF organizations, 
despite a certain level of institutionalization, still manage to mobilize their grassroots.  
The overemphasis on rational actors and the disregard of the broader political 
and structural environment in which the movement takes place, led to a new paradigm: 
the political opportunity structure or the political process theory (Tilly, 1978; 
McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 2011). This theory emphasizes that social movements do not 
operate in a vacuum, but rather emerge in specific political and institutional settings. 
As a consequence, the political system in which the movement is embedded will shape 
the opportunities for mobilization. In line with Rucht (1996), to examine the 
institutional context in which the organization is embedded, I focus on the 
organization’s access to policy makers, its alliance structure, and conflict structure.  
The emphasis on the external context, however, has often been regarded as too 
static or missing agency (e.g., Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattra, 1999). The cultural 
framework, grounded in the symbolic interaction and social construction perspectives 
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developed by Mead (1934), Blumer (1969), and Berger and Luckmann (1966), came 
out as a critique to the overly structural and deterministic political opportunity 
literature. As social movement studies took a “cultural turn,” scholars have shown 
how movements use symbols, identity, emotions, or other cultural dimensions, which 
in turn produce solidarity, motivate participants, and thus spur collective action (e.g., 
Goffman, 1974; Snow et al., 1986; Polletta, 2006; Valocchi, 2008). To examine the 
organization’s strategies in building a “mobilizing culture,” I focus on the rituals, the 
use of a certain language, and the role of building a collective identity (Pettigrew, 
1978; Meek, 1988; Collins 2004) and the extent to which these factors foster feelings 
of shared responsibility and commitment, which will enhance members’ mobilization 
(Kanter 1968; Lawler, Thye and Yoon, 2009). 
Although this cultural framework is significant, it cannot be studied in 
isolation from the broader context in which a movement takes place. Otherwise, as 
Tarrow (2011) points out, “it risks becoming every bit as deterministic as its 
structuralist predecessor” (267). Indeed, a dynamism exists between the structural and 
the cultural dimensions; they are interconnected, shape and reshape each other (Barley 
and Tolbert 1997). 
 
Going beyond social movement studies 
Comparative studies within the industrial relations literature will typically emphasize 
the differences in practices or organizations across countries. The Varieties of 
Capitalism framework, for example, bundles the coordinated market economies 
together, with Germany as the prototype, on the one hand, and on the other, liberal 
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market economies such as the UK and the US. Because firms are embedded in distinct 
institutional environments (coordinated versus liberal economies), they will behave 
differently in the US and Germany (Hall and Soskice 2001). In linking social 
movement studies to institutional theory, Baccaro, Hamann, and Turner (2003) show 
that in countries in which unions enjoy only weak institutional or political support, 
unions have a greater incentive to organize their members and shift towards rank-and-
file mobilization or social movement unionism. Unions in the US and the UK, for 
example, emphasize grassroots mobilization and coalition building as a result of their 
weak institutional position. Unions in countries such as Germany, Italy, or Spain, 
however, rely on a social partnership approach; their strong institutional position 
actually prevents them from mobilizing members or building coalitions, which could 
be detrimental in the long run. In line with Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism 
(2001), Baccaro, Hamann, and Turner’s analysis shows how “the degree and type of 
institutional embeddedness help account for the strategies unions adopt” (129), 
showing, in other words, the importance of institutions in shaping behavior. Going 
back to my cases, considering the distinct institutional environments in which they are 
embedded, I would have expected strong differences. I would expect it to be more 
difficult for a new community organization to mobilize its members in Germany, than 
in the US or the UK.  
 In comparing international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) – the 
French Medécins Sans Frontières, British Oxfam, and American CARE – Stroup 
(2012) shows how the structures and strategies of these INGO’s are still closely tied to 
their original national environments and are driven by the home countries’ resources, 
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institutions, and norms. Consequently, the national origin of each INGO shapes its 
identity and specific practices, resulting into “varieties of activism.” In the literature 
on multinational companies (MNCs) mixed results can be found. On the one hand, 
scholars have shown how core organizational practices of the MNCs are shaped by the 
host country, reflecting the norms of that foreign country (e.g., Whitley 1999; Maurice 
et al. 1986). They emphasize the “business system” in which the firm is embedded or 
the “societal effects” of the local institutions on the firm. Others, however, have 
illustrated how firm strategies can trump the national institutions. Examining the labor 
and human resources practices of American fastfood companies, such as McDonalds 
and Burger King, in Germany and Spain, Royle (2004) founds that despite the national 
context, the companies were able to pursue a US-based “low-road” model based on 
not-unionized, low-wage, and low-skilled labor. Royle emphasized the importance of 
the sectoral “logic” of the fastfood sector, outweighing both the host-country and 
country-of-origin effect.    
Studies, such as the Varieties of Capitalism, use a comparative institutional 
framework, emphasizing the role of macro-institutions in explaining union or firm 
behavior. This conceptual framework, however, often overlooks the role of agency 
and runs the risk of becoming too deterministic.  In my study, I illustrate the 
importance of taking a comparative institutional lens, without, however, neglecting the 
power of agency or, more specifically, the strategic capacities of the founders.  To a 
certain degree, three very similar IAF organizations have been created, despite the 
differences in context. To explain the striking similarity among my cases, I cannot turn 
to the local institutions, but instead, I emphasize the importance of agency, or the 
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organizations’ adopting a similar “hybrid logic of organizing.”  
 
Accounting for the Similarities: A hybrid logic of organizing 
While early institutional theorists focused on the organization as the main institution 
or locus of action (Selznick 1948), “new institutionalism” locates individual and 
organizational behavior in a broader social and institutional context as a way to 
understand their actions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
As part of the development of new institutional theory, the concept of institutional 
logic emerged, providing a bridge between institutions and actions (Thornton and 
Ocasio 2008). According to Friedland and Alford’s seminal essay, “society is 
composed of multiple institutional logics which are available to individuals and 
organizations as bases for actions” (1991: 253). Institutional logics are then defined as 
“the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, 
beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” 
(Thornton and Ocasio 1999: 804) or put more simply, society comprises different 
institutional orders, such as the state, the market, civil society, and family, and each 
order consists of material practices and symbolic systems available to individuals and 
organizations. As recent studies have shown, organizations will often draw from 
multiple logics. Whereas some scholars have pointed to potential conflicts resulting 
from competing logics, e.g., the tensions that derive from nonprofits’ attempts to 
combine for- profit business practices and social services (Cooney 2006), others have 
shown how competing logics can co-exist, e.g., the logic of medical professionalism 
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and business in the Alberta health care system (Reay and Hinnings 2009).  
I show that the IAF organizations share a similar “hybrid logic of organizing,” 
combining bureaucratic and social movement approaches. This logic is noticeable in 
the organizational structure that they adapt – the IAF organizations fall somewhere 
between full-blown bureaucratic organizations and social movement organizations 
(SMOs) – as well as their organizational culture – the IAF organizations foster a 
relational culture, strengthening member commitment, as well as a more pragmatic 
culture, strengthening member accountability (Table 1). By adopting this hybrid logic 
the organizations are able to transcend to a certain extent contextual differences.  
I don’t mean that social movements can’t be pragmatic or that bureaucratic 
organizations can’t be ideological. I tried, however, to construct conceptual categories 
or ideal types that would be helpful in analyzing my cases. Based on the literature of 
institutional logics, I argue that the logic of civil society (what I more narrowly call 
the logic of social movements) in most cases is characterized by an emphasis on its 
mission. A bureaucracy, as defined by Weber (1947), relies on formal rules, functional 
specialization, professionalization, and hierarchy. The logics of bureaucracy and social 
movements are ideal types and are not always contradictory but can be 
complementary. 
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Table 1. Hybrid Logic of Organizing 
 Logic of Bureaucracy Logic of Social Movements 
Structure - Office; paid staff 
- Hierarchy  
- Consultancy contract IAF 
 
- Volunteers 
- Grassroots networks 
- Part of IAF network 
Culture - Pragmatic; strategic 
- Rules and procedures 
- Accountability 
- Values; Mission 
- One-to-one relationship  
- Commitment 
 
 
Accounting for the Differences: Mechanisms of Creative Borrowing 
In his article on the transnational diffusion of the “Gandhian repertoire,” Sean Chabot 
(2000) explains how its spread in the US was blocked by sentiments of ‘hyper-
difference’ on the one hand, or ‘over-likeliness’ on the other. The former refers to 
exaggerating the differences between the cultural and environmental context, whereas 
the latter concerns underestimating these differences. These obstacles, however, were 
overcome by the employment of ‘intellectual dislocation’ and ‘creative relocation’. 
The adopters recognize that the repertoire can be relevant in other settings as well 
(dislocation); at the same time, they realize that the adaptation needs to be translated 
or reinvented to fit the new context (relocation). These processes occurred as well in 
the adaptation of the IAF model. The organizers couldn’t just take a carbon copy of 
the model and plunge it in each context, but they had to be creative and resourceful to 
make it work.  
 The strategic decisions that the organizers make, however, are bound by the 
realities of the external context in which the organization is embedded and, as a result, 
important differences come to the forefront.  I will illustrate specifically how 
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temporal, geographic, and strategic differences have influenced the development of 
each organization. First, community organizing started in the US in the 1930s; in 
Britain and Germany, however, not until the 90s. As a consequence, it is much more 
deeply rooted in American society, since it has a longer tradition. This temporal 
difference sheds light on two important consequences: first, the organizers in the UK 
and Germany learned not only from US successes; they learned from the mistakes as 
well, enabling them to innovate and not merely imitate. In a sense, however, being 
away from the “mother ship” has allowed the IAF organizations in the UK and 
Germany to develop in their own way, without being stuck to the traditional IAF 
model, and has been translated moreover into a much more diverse membership base 
in London and Berlin than in Boston. Tapping into diverse types of organizations 
instead of limiting themselves to faith-based groups has partly contributed to 
membership growth in the UK and Germany. In addition, the issue of competition 
comes into play. In the UK and Germany, these IAF organizations are unique. And as 
population ecology theorists have shown, organizations that can establish a niche for 
themselves are more likely to survive than organizations that can’t (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977, 1989).  
 Second, in terms of geographical differences, the organizations are based in 
very different political structures, which have an impact on their development and 
success. All three organizations have organized and campaigned at a local, borough 
level, but the organization in London, in particular, has been able to take advantage of 
its geographic location. Indeed, being located in a small country with a highly 
centralized government structure, has allowed the organization to influence national 
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policymaking. Finally, strategic leadership decisions play a key role as well. 
Membership diversification, for example, is not just a function of the temporal or 
geographic dimensions, but in each case, the organizers still had to make the strategic 
decision to diversify its membership group.  
 In sum, these temporal, geographic, and strategic dimensions will shed a light 
on the differences, especially in membership growth, between the three organizations. 
 
How remain sustainable? The presumed evolutionary trajectories of a social 
movement 
Finally, I emphasize the sustained mobilization capacity of the organizations. As many 
scholars have argued, social movements tend to go through different stages: 
emergence, coming together through protests and demonstrations, bureaucratization or 
formalization, and, finally, decline (Blumer, 1969; della Porta and Diani, 2006). 
Decline may occur due to success or failure in achieving specific goals, repression of 
the movement, or cooptation (Miller, 1999). Indeed, sticking to the original mission is 
particularly problematic for social movement, political, or “collectivist” organizations 
(Michels 1959; Rothschild-Whitt 1979). 
Robert Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” (1959) represents the classical 
approach to the sociological study of organizational transformation. According to this 
model, over time, leadership oligarchization, processes of bureaucratization, and goal 
displacement occur, transforming a social movement organization into a conservative, 
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accommodative and highly bureaucratic structure.5  In his study of the German Social 
Democratic party, Michels argued that “[t]he party, … is not necessarily identified 
with the totality of its members, and still less so with the class to which these belong. 
The party is created as a means to secure an end. Having, however, become an end in 
itself, endowed with aims and interests of its own, it undergoes detachment, from the 
teleological point of view, from the class which it represents. In a party, it is far from 
obvious that the interests of the masses which have combined to form the party will 
coincide with the interests of the bureaucracy in which the party becomes personified” 
(Michels 1959: 389).  
This theory has triggered a plethora of studies, with most scholars emphasizing 
the internal or external structures to explain the conditions under which the Michels 
model does or does not occur. The seminal work of Lipset, et al. (1956), Union 
Democracy, describes the internal democracy of the International Typographical 
Union (ITU) as a marked exception to Michel’s “iron law”.  The authors emphasize 
the internal structure, the institutionalization of a two-party system, as the main factor 
in explaining how union democracy arose and was able to persist over time. They 
support Michels’ iron law and consider the ITU a deviant case. Voss and Sherman 
(2000), on the other hand, show that even when an organization has become 
bureaucratic, it can still break out of its conservatism, using radical, disruptive tactics. 
The authors focus on the internal union structure as well – a crisis within the local 
union, resulting in a change in leadership; the presence of activists with social 
movement experience; support from the international union – to explain how to “break 
                                                
5 When using the term conservative or conservatism, I refer to an organization’s abandoning of its original goals in 
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out” of organizational conservatism.  
Another structural analysis disproving Michels’ model is that of Dieter Rucht 
(1999), who links protest events to the structural characteristics of new social 
movement groups in Germany, arguing that although the results support Michels’ iron 
law (movements are inclined to become bureaucratic and centralized over time; formal 
groups tend to use more moderate forms of action than informal groups), forms of 
protest are not determined by the organizational structure. There is no indication of an 
“iron law”, and Rucht concludes that informal, decentralized groups may use more 
moderate tactics than formal, centralized groups. It is not clear, however, which 
variables and causal mechanisms explain how an organization is able to overcome this 
propensity. 
Mayer Zald and Patricia Denton’s study on organizational change, examining 
the transformation of the YMCA from a social movement to a service organization 
(1963), specify four primary structural factors under which organizational adaptation 
is most likely to occur successfully: 1) when the organization has a federated structure 
with decentralized, autonomous chapters; 2) it has broadly defined goals and rules; 3) 
it has a low development of professional ideology; and finally 4) it is dependent upon 
paying clientele. Sheldon Messinger (1955), for example, describes how, over time, 
the leadership of the Townsend movement deflects from its original mission of social 
change in order to survive as an organization. Philip Selznick (1943) recognizes as 
well the tension between pursuing certain goals and the organizational adaptation in 
order to survive. In line with Michels, the author argues that organizations are likely to 
                                                                                                                                       
favor of goal maintenance (cfr. Michels 1959; Leach 2005). 
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undergo processes of bureaucratization. While Selznick argues this is the general 
tendency, he concludes by stating – without specifying though – the possibility of 
“counter-pressure” or “techniques for blocking the bureaucratic drift.” 
Finally, whereas according to the Michels’ model, a social movement will 
always evolve towards greater conservatism, several scholars have shown that other 
transformation processes are possible as well. One of the key articles, by Zald and Ash 
(1966), shows that bureaucratization, tactical conservatism, or oligarchization are not 
predetermined, and a movement may become more radical rather than less depending 
on an inclusive or exclusive membership structure. In a similar vein, Kriesi (1996) 
argues that, over time, at least four possible transformations can occur: the 
organization can institutionalize, becoming a party or interest group; it can 
commercialize, transforming into a service-oriented organization; it can turn into a 
club or voluntary organization through the process of involution; and finally, it can 
radicalize, developing into an exclusive mobilizing organization.  The direction of the 
goal transformation can be determined by internal factors, such as the movement type 
and the sources of revenue.6 Kriesi adds, however, that these structural data are not 
optimal and, as a consequence, explain the goal transformation to only a limited 
extent.  
Thus, much of the literature has emphasized structural factors, such as the type 
of movement and membership requirements, to illustrate the specific direction of 
                                                
6 Instrumental movements, or movements that are inclusive, focus on specific collective goods, are not concerned 
with collective identity, and require only a low level of member commitment, tend to institutionalize. Subcultural 
movements, or movements that are exclusive, identity oriented, and maintain intense levels of member 
commitment, are more likely to commercialize or become clubs or voluntary groups. Finally, countercultural 
movements, or movements that are exclusive, identity oriented, often in stark conflict with authorities, and 
maintain intense levels of member commitment, are more likely to radicalize. 
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change, or the evolution, from a social movement into an either more conservative or a 
radical organization. Limited attention has been given to the process of organizational 
change or, as Minkoff and McCarthy argue, “the ‘black box’ processes within social 
movement organizations” (2005: 289).7 I focus, therefore, not just on the external and 
internal structure, but on the intentional creation of a mobilizing culture within the 
organization, drawing attention to the internal processes of decision-making and 
change. 
 
A brief summary  
The political opportunity structure as well as the strategic capacities of the founders 
are critical to explain why the community organizations emerged when they did. The 
dwindling of the labor movement and social movements allowed for a shift in the 
political setting, creating an opportunity for these new community organizations to 
emerge. In addition, the founders, enriched by their previous experience and networks, 
were able to take advantage of this opportunity and create the organizations. 
 Furthermore, despite the different contexts, these IAF organizations act very 
similar in terms of their capacity to mobilize members. The development of a hybrid 
model of organizing, combining elements from bureaucracy and social movements in 
their structure and culture, encourages member mobilization and, in addition, this 
                                                
7 An important exception, however, is the study by Paul Osterman (2006), emphasizing agency and a culture of 
contestation that is created within the organization to show how a mass-membership organization can have an 
oligarchic leadership structure while avoiding the negative consequences of goal displacement and loss of 
membership commitment. Osterman uses a community organization in Texas, the Southwest Industrial Areas 
Foundation (SWIAF), as his exemplar. SWIAF falls under the same national umbrella organization, the Industrial 
Areas Foundation (IAF), as my three case studies. Osterman, however, focuses on the internal organizational 
processes, without paying too much attention to the external environment, whereas I draw links between the 
internal and external processes. 
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model is flexible enough to function across distinct contexts. Nonetheless, differences, 
in terms of membership growth, come to the forefront. While the context partly 
contributes to these differences (temporal and geographic dimensions), it is important 
to take into consideration the strategic dimension, or the mechanism of creative 
borrowing.  Each organizer had to creatively adapt this model in the context to make it 
work.  
 Finally, starting with Robert Michels, the literature has shown how over time 
an organization focused on mobilizing members is likely to transform into a more 
conservative organization. Scholars mainly emphasize the importance of the structure, 
such as the movement type or the funding sources, to indicate why and how an 
organization drifts from its original mission of mobilizing to becoming, more often 
than not, a service provider. Here, I try to identify the underlying processes, such as 
the development of a mobilizing culture, to explain how these organizations are able 
to stick to their original mission of mobilizing, remaining dynamic and sustainable 
over time. 
 In the next chapters, I provide a historic overview of IAF organizing and 
explain how the IAF model diffused to Boston, London, and Berlin. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
A HISTORY OF IAF COMMUNITY ORGANIZING  
 
With the 2008 election of President Barack Obama, “community organizing” has 
become the new buzzword. Its roots, however, go back to 1930s Chicago when Saul 
Alinsky founded his first organization the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council 
(BYNC). Over the past decades, Alinsky himself, often portrayed as a radical, has 
been the subject of many studies and heated debates. In 1969, Hilary Rodham Clinton 
wrote her senior thesis on Alinsky at Wellesley College; more recently, right-wing Tea 
Partiers have used Alinsky’s writings Reveille for Radicals and Rules for Radicals as 
strategic and tactical rulebooks for grassroots organizing; and in January, 2012, 
Republican Presidential candidate Newt Gingrich praised his campaign as one based 
on “American exceptionalism” as opposed to one based on the “radicalism of Saul 
Alinsky.”  
Today there are over 6,000 community organizations in the US, ranging from 
local organizations affiliated with one of the leading national networks to independent 
organizations (Orr 2007b; Warren and Wood 2001). There are at least four US 
national networks of congregation-based community organizing, the Industrial Areas 
Foundation (IAF), the Pacific Institute for Community Organization (PICO) national 
network, the Direct Action and Research Training Center (DART), and Gamaliel. The 
IAF of Saul Alinsky is the oldest, and the founders of the other three had ties with IAF 
or with Saul Alinsky before starting up. In addition, there are secular-based networks 
such as the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) and 
the Center for Third World Organizing (CTWO), both recruiting dues-paying 
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individual members. 
 In this chapter, I go back to the roots of IAF organizing and provide a historic 
overview. 
 
A History of US community organizing 
Saul Alinsky has often been considered the “modern” father of community organizing. 
Focusing on skill capacity and leadership building, Alinsky’s “Iron Rule” was “never 
do for others what they can do for themselves” (Alinsky 1971). He aimed to address 
the powerlessness of poor urban neighborhoods by organizing people around their 
interests and working with them rather than for them (Furbey et al. 1997). In 1939, 
when the Congress for Industrial Organizations (CIO) under the leadership of John L. 
Lewis was trying to organize the meatpacking district in Chicago, Alinsky founded his 
first organization, the Back of Yards Neighborhood Council (BYNC) as a platform to 
support the workers.8  The BYNC was revolutionary bringing together the CIO and 
Catholic priests from the neighborhood in order to help organize the workers. When 
Alinsky died in 1972, Ed Chambers took over and built a more modern, 
institutionalized community organization network, the Industrial Areas Foundation 
(IAF). The first three modern IAF groups were the Citizens Organized for Public 
Service (COPS), in San Antonio, Texas; Baltimoreans United in Leadership 
Development (BUILD), in Maryland; and the Queens Citizens Organization (QCO), in 
Queens, New York. Leadership development and training are at the heart of the effort 
to organize the communities and to work on such issues as health and housing. Today 
there are 56 IAF affiliates organizing in 22 US states, as well as in Australia, Canada, 
Germany and the UK. The member organizations include faith-based organizations, 
                                                
8 The twelve square-mile area located on Chicago’s southwest side, commonly known as "Back of the Yards," 
suffered from social disorganization, poor housing, and juvenile delinquency. BYNC was created in response to 
these growing social issues. 
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trade unions, schools, universities, immigrant societies, parent associations (IAF 
2012).  
  
Saul Alinsky and the IAF Origins  
Born in Chicago in 1909 and growing up in a close-knit Jewish community as a child 
of Russian Jewish immigrants, Alinsky was exposed to the traditions of self-
organization and mutual care (Cutler 1996). This model of Jewish self-organizing, 
which contrasted sharply with the settlement houses emerging at the time, was a key 
influence in shaping Alinsky’s political vision (Bretherton 2009). Whereas the system 
of communal self-help encouraged leadership development and mobilization among 
the people, the settlement houses were run by highly educated upper and middle-class 
white people servicing the poor, rather than effectively addressing the roots of the 
socio-economic problems. Alinsky’s background as a sociology student and his focus 
on urban ethnography as a fundamental research method made clear that 
transformations of communities can be done only through interacting with the people, 
living in the places they live, and developing an account of their relationships 
(Bretherton 2009). This method of urban ethnography was developed by Ernest 
Watson Burgess and Robert Ezra Park at the University of Chicago in the 1920s. 
Burgess’ zonal hypothesis showed how social disorganization, rather than human 
genetics, is the cause of such slum life features as disease and crime. As a student and 
graduate student, Alinsky took Burgess’s courses and spent large amounts of time in 
the “field,” studying organized crime and Al Capone’s gang on the West side of 
Chicago (Horwitt, 10-33). Alinsky’s experience as a “participant observer,” 
developing detailed pictures of people’s lives, their relationships, and their 
communities, laid the groundwork for future IAF organizing. In 1926, Alinsky started 
working for Clifford Shaw at the Institute for Juvenile Research and was sent to 
  37 
Chicago’s Back of the Yards during the late 1930s. The Back of the Yards was a poor, 
mainly Polish and Catholic neighborhood, located right behind the union stockyards, 
or America’s most centralized meatpacking industry. Although Upton Sinclair’s The 
Jungle (1906) had exposed the horrible conditions of the slaughterhouses, apart from 
some federal legislation, little had changed by the end of the 1930s. 
Under the powerful leadership of John L. Lewis, the CIO was now directly 
involved in organizing Sinclair’s infamous meatpacking industry.9 Inspired by the 
structure and tactics of the labor movement, Alinsky founded the BYNC. Similar to 
local union representatives, all the delegates on the council were representatives of 
specific groups, clubs or churches from the neighborhood. Successful sit-down strikes 
and demonstrations led by the industrial trade unions had taught Alinsky to use the 
public stage to pressure decision-makers.10 Although the BYNC was initially part of 
Shaw’s project, Alinsky continued the work with BYNC independently from Shaw, 
envisioning place-based, neighborhood organizing complimenting workplace-based, 
union organizing. Alinksy believed that “organized poor people might wrest a higher 
standard of living as a matter of right instead of waiting passively for the crumbs of 
charity.”11 In working with Catholic priests and labor leaders, and using labor 
techniques such as picketing, boycotts, rent strikes and sit-downs, Alinsky was able to 
organize slum communities.   
As a result of this success, money came in from philanthropists, such as 
Marshall Field III of the Field retailing business, as well as from the Catholic church, 
thanks to the crucial relationship with Chicago’s auxiliary Bishop Bernard J. Sheil. In 
1940, Alinsky set up the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) with a diverse board of 
                                                
9 The CIO was formed in 1930 and “remade” the labor movement (Fantasia and Voss 2005). The CIO was a 
militant industrial model of unionism opposed to the sole existing craft-based, conservative model, the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL). Thanks to the birth of the CIO, union membership had spiked by the 1940s. 
10 For example, Lewis’ leadership was critical during the GM sit-down strike in Flint, Michigan, in 1936-37. 
11 New York Times. October 9, 1966. “Making Trouble is Alinsky’s Business” by Patrick Anderson. 
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trustees, including Democrats, Republicans, Catholics, and important Chicago 
businessmen.  Alinsky’s goal was to organize “natural” areas or neighborhoods, 
addressing the industrial working and living conditions of those neighborhoods, hence 
the name Industrial Areas Foundation. Alinsky called this one-man organization a 
“foundation” to give the institute more clout and respectability in the eyes of the 
business community and potential funders (von Hoffman 2010). Newspapers 
throughout the country proclaimed Alinsky’s success: the Chicago Daily Times called 
Alinsky’s achievements as “the Miracle of Democracy”; the New York Herald 
Tribune editorialized on “Democracy in the Jungle”; other headlines would state 
“How Czechs and Poles and Germans and Irish Learned to Work Together” and 
trumpet “Democracy at Work: Cleaning up Chicago’s ‘Packingtown’ Slums” (Horwitt 
1989, 102-105). Alinsky became a public figure, feeding the press interviews, 
focusing on concepts such as “democracy” and “unity.”  
 
First Attempts to Diffuse the BYNC Model 
BYNC’s success, with the sense of “joint responsibility for the common welfare” was 
considered a “significant step in the evolution of American democracy.”12 As a result, 
in 1940, Alinsky decided to spread this model to two more slum communities, 
Armourdale in Kansas City, Kansas, and South St.Paul, Minnesota. The similarities 
with Back of the Yards were striking: both were stockyards and packinghouse 
communities, had strong CIO presence, large immigrant populations, and faced similar 
social problems such as delinquency and high unemployment. On the other hand, 
critical elements were missing: strong leadership, an influence comparable to Bishop 
Sheil’s over Chicago, and a strong Catholicism. Alinsky worked from Chicago, 
traveling to Kansas city and St.Paul to meet with dozens of priests, ministers, and 
                                                
12 New York Herald Tribune, August 21, 1940. “Democracy in the Jungle.” 
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others to sell the idea of BYNC’s success and its transferability. The meetings would 
be tailored to these people’s self-interests and promoted at the same time as an 
opportunity to be part of a mission to save democracy. Kansas City newspapers began 
covering this road to active citizenship, and soon committees on unemployment, 
housing, and health were formed, similar to those of the BYNC (Horwitt 110-112). 
Although Alinsky’s model of organizing had successfully taken off in these two cities, 
trouble was looming: key leaders had to resign to join the Navy and work at a defense 
plant as World War II intensified.  
Between the 1940s-70s, Alinsky continued his attempts to replicate the IAF 
experience in Los Angeles, New York City, the Woodlawn area in Chicago, and 
Rochester, among other cities. Two prime sources encouraged the diffusion: Alinsky’s 
Reveille for Radicals (1946), explaining how to build people’s organizations, was a 
clear effort to spread the IAF vision nation wide. Up until that point, however, Alinsky 
could refer only to the success of the BYNC and his seminal efforts in Kansas City 
and St.Paul. Nearly two decades later, Charles Silberman’s Crisis in Black and White 
(1964) diffused Alinsky’s strategy and tactics on a national scale, using Alinsky’s 
Woodlawn experience as the example of how poor black people can take control of 
their own lives. To a certain extent, these books formulated a model of community 
organizing in an abstract way – theorization – enhancing the diffusion of the praxis 
(Strang and Meyer 1993; Tarrow 2006). In addition, throughout the years, Alinsky 
was able to hire skilled organizers such as Nicholas von Hoffman, Ed Chambers, Fred 
Ross, and César Chávez to lead the different projects. 
In 1947, Alinsky hired Fred Ross – who at that time was organizing Latinos in 
the barrios of Southern California – to be his key organizer on the West Coast. 
According to Alinsky, the decision-making centers in the United States were located 
mainly in the North and in the West of the country, in cities such as Chicago, New 
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York City, and Los Angeles. These places were on the brink of class warfare and thus 
in urgent need of Alinsky-style organizing (von Hoffman 2010). On the eastside of 
Los Angeles, Ross set up the Community Service Organization (CSO), organizing 
mainly Mexican Americans and registering them to vote. As a result, in 1949, Edward 
R. Roybal was the first Latino elected to the Los Angeles City Council. Ross moved 
from LA to Northern California to start up more CSO chapters, encouraging civic 
participation in communities predominantly of Mexican Americans.  Near San José he 
came in contact with César Chávez, at that time a civic-minded young apricot picker 
who “insisted on reading more than the sporting page or the funnies – he read the 
whole paper.”13 Under Ross’s auspices, Alinsky hired Chávez in the early 1950s. For a 
decade, Ross and Chávez organized Mexican American neighborhoods across 
California. By the 1960s, thirty-four chapters had been established across the 
Southwest, characterizing the CSO as the first enduring civil rights organization for 
the largest urban Mexican American population (Bernstein 2011). In 1962, when 
Chávez’ proposal to organize farm workers was voted down by the CSO, he resigned 
from the organization, left Los Angeles and moved to Delano to build up a farm 
workers movement, or what would become the United Farm Workers Union (UFW). 
Soon thereafter, Dolores Huerta – the first woman to join the IAF staff – and Fred 
Ross left the CSO as well, joining Chávez in organizing boycotts and strikes. The Rev. 
Jim Drake, who would later become the lead organizer of the Boston IAF, the Greater 
Boston Interfaith Organization, started his career under César Chávez.  Drake, a 
middle-class white guy in his early 20’s, graduated from the Union Theological 
Seminary and was assigned by the California Migrant Ministry to Chávez for training. 
Over the years, Drake became one of Chávez’ key organizers and strategists, playing a 
                                                
13 Chicago Tribune, July 14, 1987. “41 years in the grass roots: Organizer Fred Ross, 76, still has work to do” by 
Todd Eisenstadt. 
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critical role during the famous Delano grape strike of 1965-66.   
The Temporary Woodlawn Organization (TWO), created in 1961, became a 
powerful organization fighting such big players as the University of Chicago and the 
City (i.e., Mayor Daley). During the 1950s, Woodlawn, located in the Southwest of 
Chicago, had dramatically shifted from being a predominantly middle class, white 
neighborhood to a virtually all-black community. The University and the mayor had 
plans to extend Hyde Park into that area and therefore wipe out part of the black 
community. TWO mobilized, agitated the residents, spurring them to demonstrate and 
make their voices heard. Eventually Alinsky was able to transform a real estate issue 
into a moral issue (Horwitt, 392-393). In addition, while TWO was gaining public 
attention, the Freedom Riders, traveling mainly through Southern states, came up to 
Woodlawn, attracting a huge crowd. As a result, von Hoffman, TWO’s main 
organizer, told Alinsky “I think that we should toss out everything we are doing 
organizationally and work on the premise that this is the moment of the whirlwind, 
that we are no longer organizing but guiding a social movement” (Horwitt, 401). This 
decision to latch on to the Civil Rights Movement, however, rather than deepen the 
organization, left TWO in a relatively undeveloped and undisciplined state. 
Fortunately, when Ed Chambers took over from von Hoffman in 1962, he was able to 
re-structure TWO, by, among other things, getting the necessary funding through 
mandatory dues from the member organizations. 
Another famous Alinsky experiment is FIGHT in Rochester. During the early 
1960s, many white people in Rochester were shocked by the racial violence and riots 
in their streets. The black population in Rochester, however, had increased by over 
500% in the last decade, with soaring unemployment and a housing shortage as its 
consequence (Wadhwani 1997). In 1964, a group of clergy invited, or in other words, 
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paid Alinsky to organize in Rochester;14 Alinsky famously called Rochester “a 
Southern plantation transported to the North” and appointed Ed Chambers as his main 
organizer.  Alinsky and Chambers, together with community and religious leaders, 
established “FIGHT” (Freedom, Integration, God, Honor, Today), and Franklin 
Florence, a black minister, was asked to be the main leader. One of their main targets 
was Rochester’s largest employer, KODAK, of which they demanded a training and 
employment program for the poor black people from the inner-city. FIGHT got broad 
media attention, as one of its innovative tactics was to acquire KODAK stock to gain 
access to its annual shareholders’ meeting. FIGHT managed to acquire a tiny fraction 
of the shares, mobilize massive church and clergy support, and after a couple of years 
of harsh battles claim victory (for further reading see for example, Wadhwani, 1997; 
Horwitt 1989). 
Other attempts, however, never really took off. During the 1940s and 50s, 
Alinsky tried to organize Puerto Ricans in Chelsea, New York City. Alinsky, regarded 
by the funders as an outsider, could not be the lead organizer but rather a “consultant” 
to the project. Once the Chelsea Community Council was established, issues regarding 
continued financing, finding talented organizers, and control over the project soon 
made it very hard to continue. In addition, New York City was a welfare city, 
spending a huge amount of its budget, in comparison to other cities such as Chicago, 
on social welfare programs. Funders were not used to donating money to this type of 
community work instead of to the more classic social work. Finally, within the 
Chelsea neighborhoods, there were deep divisions among races and classes, 
precluding the identification of common issues that could bridge those divides. 
 In sum, under which conditions did the diffusion occur successfully? These examples 
                                                
14 According to Horwitt, clergy from San Francisco, Buffalo, and Kansas City, Missouri also tried to recruit 
Alinsky at about the same time, but Rochester came up with $100,000 for a two year contract, and this is among the 
reasons why Alinsky decided on Rochester (Horwitt, 456-459). 
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emphasize two important factors: the context in which the organization was embedded 
as well as the presence of skilled IAF organizers. The projects started to fail when the 
IAF organizers backed down, or when the context was rather hostile to this type of 
organizing. In New York City, for example, Alinsky had to stand by the sidelines as a 
consultant and was not able to take a leadership position. In addition, the city was a 
welfare city and did not leave any room for a community organization to emerge. On 
the contrary, cities like St.Paul, Kansas City, L.A., or Rochester were in desperate 
need of any kind of organizing. But without skillful IAF leadership even some of these 
projects struggled to survive.15  
 
Saul Alinsky versus Modern IAF Organizing 
By the end of the 1960s, organizers Ed Chambers and Richard Harmon convinced 
Alinsky to set up an IAF training institute, changing the Alinsky-style model of 
organizing – often resulting in burned-out organizers – into a more sustainable 
profession. The institute was considered significant in the formation and training of 
professional organizers, of which there was a real dearth. According to Chambers, 
transforming the IAF organizing work into a more institutionalized, decent profession 
was the only way to save Alinsky’s insights in the long run (Chambers 2003).  
On June 12, 1972, Alinksy died of a heart attack on a street corner in Carmel, 
California. Ed Chambers took over as national director refining and modernizing the 
IAF in order to adapt to a changing environment. Ed Chambers had started organizing 
for Alinsky at the age of 26 in Lackawanna, near Buffalo, NY. Chambers, a Roman 
Catholic born and raised in rural Iowa, went through theological seminary and nearly 
became a priest, but instead hitchhiked to Harlem, ending up at a settlement house, the 
                                                
15 While the spread of Alinsky’s writings encouraged the diffusion, these did not per se affect the success of 
diffusion. 
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Friendship House, and selling Dorothy Day’s newspaper, The Catholic Worker. In 
1957, Chambers was hired by von Hoffman and sent to Lackawanna. After spending 
two years in this Buffalo suburb setting up the Lackawanna Citizens Federation, 
Chambers went on to Chicago, organizing the Southwest side. Eventually, during the 
mid-1960s, he was assigned the lead organizer of FIGHT in Rochester.  
Two major differences can be found between Alinsky-style organizing and 
modern IAF organizing: the degree of engagement and the level of professionalism 
(Table 2). First, Alinksy was predominantly issue-oriented. He emphasized the people’ 
s self interest as a means to identify the issues, and he worked together with religious 
groups out of pragmatic, rather than vocational, reasons. The hired organizers were 
supposed to train and coach the volunteer leaders but were then limited to carrying out 
the will of those leaders. There was a real danger in this, however, that revealed itself 
with his very first organization, the BYNC. By the 1960s, that organization had 
democratically decided to transform itself into a white-exclusionist group, doing 
everything possible to keep the black population out of the community.  Similarly, in 
California, volunteer leaders of the CSO chapters were increasingly middle-class, such 
as small businessmen and lawyers, and had no interest in using the success of the CSO 
as the base for organizing poor farm workers. As a consequence, lead organizers Fred 
Ross and César Chávez decided to leave the IAF organization.  
The modern IAF is much more relationally oriented; relationships, rather than 
issues, are what bring people together. It places a strong emphasis on broad-based 
organizing, rather than limiting itself to turf-oriented issues, resulting in a significant 
change in the size and scale of the organizations. Its aim is to build lasting 
organizations that do not fade away once the issues are resolved. Furthermore, Ed 
Chambers’ theological roots have caused IAF organizing to be grounded in a strong 
religious commitment. To sustain members’ participation, each IAF organization tries 
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to organize on a platform combining their practical self-interest with a deep 
commitment to religious traditions and values, or what Mark Warren calls a “theology 
of organizing” (Warren 2001, 40-72). The organizers themselves are considered 
organization-builders with a degree of decision-making power as well as 
accountability towards the volunteer leaders, rather than offstage coaches who blindly 
carry out the will of those leaders. 
Second, Alinsky’s method was to send an organizer to a city and then pull him 
out after three years and send him to another city.16 The community organization was 
supposed to stand on its own feet, guided by leaders of the member institutions rather 
than outside organizers. In practice, however, these organizations barely survived 
without close IAF mentoring and had trouble remaining self-sufficient in terms of 
either funding or personnel (Horwitt 1989). Alinsky’s goal was to create people’s 
organizations that “determine their own destiny.” But what if the members make 
democratic decisions that are blatantly wrong in the mind of the organizer? The failure 
of the BYNC and the missed opportunities of the CSO are clear examples: the BYNC 
became racially exclusive, and the CSO did not care to fight for the poor farm 
workers. Today, the IAF vision is to build long lasting organizations. There is a much 
more systematic and strategic course to it, with a strong focus on training and 
mentoring. First, on a yearly basis there are intense five and ten-day training seminars 
offered to clergy and lay volunteers. The IAF organizers worked hard to codify 
Alinksy’s universal principles of organizing into practical guidelines that 
communicate what organizing is all about. Among other things, emphasis is put on the 
dues base system and the “iron rule:” never do for others what they can do for 
themselves. These practical guidelines are then mixed with organizing stories and 
                                                
16 I use ‘him’ on purpose. Most organizers were men, as Alinsky did not believe women would make good 
organizers (Horwitt 1989, 288-289). 
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role-plays to give rookies a sense of IAF organizing. Second, senior organizers will 
mentor and train the young, rather than just “sending somebody out there and hoping 
they’re still alive” (interview, IAF national co-director). Young IAF organizers receive 
substantial mentoring throughout the years, making the profession for many very 
attractive. Organizing is considered a long-term career, rather than a matter of solving 
one issue and moving on. It does occasionally happen that organizers are assigned to 
another IAF chapter, but thanks to the spread of IAF organizations, people no longer 
have to move geographically as often. For example, in the Maryland area there are 
now five IAF organizations. Organizers can build experience in another organization 
without needing to move with their families (interview, IAF national co-director).  
 
Table 2. Key differences between Saul Alinsky’s early IAF and the modern IAF 
 Saul Alinsky – Early IAF Modern IAF 
Degree of Engagement Issue-based 
Short-term 
Volunteer leaders lead & 
organizers follow 
Relational 
Long-term 
Balanced decision-making  
between organizers & leaders 
Degree of professionalism Vagabond lifestyle 
No training; no mentoring 
Career path 
Training; mentoring 
 
In the next chapter, I examine the diffusion of IAF community organizations to 
Boston, London, and Berlin. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DIFFUSION TO BOSTON, LONDON, AND BERLIN 
 
 
Every organization has to adapt … there's no point taking the American 
model … and trying to plunk it down in England. Some of the basic 
principles will work, but you have to understand the context in which 
you’re doing it, and you have to do your power analysis, and you have 
to see what worked in that place may not work here, and you have to 
think again, … the same way as the Germans have to think how it will 
work in Berlin and do it in a different way,… that’s the whole point of 
it. 
 
(Interview with a London Citizens trustee) 
 
When and how has IAF organizing diffused to Boston, London, and Berlin? To what 
extent does the historical-institutional context, as well as specific dynamic processes, 
play a role in explaining the emergence of broad-based organizing in these three 
cities?  
During the 1970s-80s, the lead IAF organizers left Chicago and decided to 
build regional anchors. By that time there were over 100 community organizations in 
Chicago; many had become too bureaucratic, and a real turf war was taking place.  
Moreover, the organizations were not having any impact on the city policies 
(interview, IAF national co-director). As a result, the cadre of IAF organizers – 
Ernesto Cortez, Arnold Graf, Larry McNeil, and Michael Gecan – split up and went 
off to Texas, Maryland, California, and New York. In San Antonio, for example, 
Ernesto Cortez set up Citizens Organized for Public Service (COPS) – arguably one of 
the most successful IAF affiliates to date – giving a voice to the forgotten working-
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class Mexican Americans in the Southwest and establishing moreover an innovative 
job training program. In Baltimore, Arnie Graf started the IAF organization BUILD 
(Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development), winning the nation’s first living 
wage bill in 1994. Finally, in New York, IAF’s East Brooklyn Congregations (EBC), 
under Mike Gecan’s leadership, built over 2,000 homes for low-income families in 
formerly devastated parts of Brooklyn, part of the so-called Nehemiah Plan. The 
successes of these first IAF organizations have been well documented, as they grew 
organically and spread through the regions (e.g., Gecan 2002; Luce 2007; Osterman 
2002; Rooney 1995; Warren 2001). 
 
A brief sketch of my case studies 
The Greater Boston Interfaith Organization (GBIO) was launched in 1996 by the late 
IAF organizer Jim Drake and long-time Massachusetts’ community organizer Lew 
Finfer. The presence at that time of important clergy in Boston, such as Rev. John 
Heinemeir and John Doyle, enhanced the diffusion process. Currently, GBIO consists 
of 53 member institutions, the majority of which are Christian, Jewish, and Muslim 
faith-based organizations. The organization comprises no more than six paid 
organizers of a total staff of 11. It is typical for an IAF organization to rely on only a 
small number of paid organizers while at the same time work with a large pool of 
active, volunteer leaders of the member institutions. Among GBIO’s accomplishments 
is its role in the passage of Massachusetts’ Health Care Reform. During 2005-2006, 
GBIO was one of the principal members of the coalition “ACT!,” Affordable Care 
Today, ensuring that Massachusetts’ universal health care legislation would become 
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law. Another example is the statewide campaign concerning affordable housing. In 
2000, organizing and legislative advocacy led to the creation of a $100 million 
Housing Trust Fund. Their main goal, however, to build affordable houses failed. In 
2003, GBIO was involved in a nursing home campaign to improve the working and 
living conditions of (mostly Haitian) nurses, leading to the creation of a bill of rights 
for the mostly immigrant nurses throughout the state (GBIO 2012). But again, the 
main goal of unionizing the nurses was not achieved. 
London Citizens (LC), launched in 1995 by Neil Jameson, is the oldest and 
largest broad-based community organizing association in Britain, a unique alliance of 
over 130 institutions such as religious congregations, schools and student associations, 
and trade unions. One of LC’s greatest achievements is the living wage campaign. 
Targeting hospitals, banks, and universities, the campaign resulted in huge gains for 
the city’s low-wage workers.  Compared to GBIO and DICO, London Citizens is a 
huge organization with about 30 paid organizers; the organization expanded from the 
original East London Citizens to West, South, and recently North London Citizens 
networks. In addition, it is setting up new organizations in other cities across the UK. 
 Finally, IAF community organizing diffused to Germany through the efforts 
of Leo Penta, a long-time American IAF organizer. In 1999, “Organizing 
Schöneweide” (OS) was created in the southeast borough of Berlin, representing 16 
groups consisting of schools, community gardens, a senior center, and a group of 
“independents” or people who are not affiliated with any group. One of its successes 
has been to bring the main campus of the University for Applied Sciences to 
Schöneweide. In 2008, with over 40 organizations, the community organization “Wir 
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sind da” (we are there), encompassing the northwestern inner cities localities of 
Wedding-Moabit, was created. A third community organization in Neukölln, 
representing over 30 institutions, held its founding assembly on the 22nd of January, 
2012. These three community organizations, supported by DICO (Deutsches Institut 
für Community Organizing) and led by Leo Penta, are still relatively small, with only 
one paid organizer for each. DICO is expanding to other cities, such as Hamburg in 
the north and Wuppertal in the west of Germany. 
 
Community Organizing in Boston 
It wasn’t until the 1990s that an IAF organization was set up in Boston. According to 
an IAF organizer, this was partly a matter of capacity: IAF organizers couldn’t be 
everywhere at the same time. So only after the IAF established itself more deeply in 
the regions of New York, Texas, and Maryland could a decision be made to spread the 
model further. Other factors, however, played a role as well: Boston’s long-time 
history of organizing and the presence of skilled organizers and clergy. 
During the 1970s and 80s Boston was an example of a “progressive city;” 
rather than answering to the business elite or be run by “political machines,” Boston’s 
City Hall, under mayor Raymond Flynn, focused on redistributive policies and opened 
up government to wider public participation. Drawing upon the legacy of strong social 
movements in Boston since the 1960s – a powerful student movement, antiwar 
movement, and a tenant movement – Flynn’s administration was able to create an 
alternative vision for the city. Key leaders, such as the African American 
neighborhood activist Mel King, and activists belonging to, for example, the statewide 
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organizing group Massachusetts Fair Share, had a major influence in the 
administration.17 In the early 90s, however, many activists had left the administration, 
and when Flynn left office in 1993, the new mayor, Thomas Menino, shifted back to a 
more traditional “growth” agenda, focusing on bankers and developers to attract 
capital. According to Clavel, “what remained was a milder version of urban populism, 
complemented by the increasing role of nonprofits” (2010: 36). One of the fastest 
growing and most important non profit organizations was the Massachusetts 
Association of Community Development Corporations (MACDC), thanks to the 
financial support from the state and the city.  
During the 1990s, when it seemed the logical next step to organize in a major 
city in the Northeast, like Boston, IAF leaders argued it could not be done: Boston was 
still over-organized. Too many cooks in the kitchen! The key person involved in 
community organizing at that time was Lew Finfer, who had been organizing 
neighborhoods and communities in Massachusetts since the 1970s and, as director of 
the Organizing and Leadership Training Center (OLTC), had set up community 
groups in Brockton, Lynn, and Worchester, all cities around Boston. Finfer’s goal, 
however, was to start a city-wide group in Boston across denominational, class, and 
racial lines, something that had never been done before.  Early in the 1990s, IAF 
organizer Jim Drake was sent by IAF national director Ed Chambers to Boston to see 
what could be done.  For about one year, Drake acted as a consultant for the several 
community organizations around the Boston area. 
                                                
17 Since the 1960s, Mel King has been a political leader for Boston’s black population. King ran for mayor in 1983, 
losing to Ray Flynn. The elections, however, were considered unique as both candidates ran on pro-neighborhood 
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In 1994, Drake took the decision to work with Lew Finfer and to set up an IAF 
organization, later known as the Greater Boston Interfaith Organization. This decision 
was quite unusual in the history of creating IAF affiliates: the IAF would usually act 
alone rather than team up with an already existing organization. In this case, however, 
it made sense to collaborate with Finfer, given his already existing network of 
relationships throughout the state. Furthermore, the presence in Boston of the Rev. 
John Heinemeier and Father John Doyle, clergy leaders with previous community 
organizing experience, was critical as well in triggering the process. Between 1996 
and 1998, countless one-on-one meetings were held, “assemblies” across 
neighborhoods were formed, and finally, in November of 1998, these efforts 
culminated in a founding Assembly attended by almost 4,000 people (Finfer 2004).  
Drake’s background as a union organizer made him rather unusual compared 
to the other IAF organizers. Jim Drake had worked with César Chávez for the United 
Farm Workers union for 16 years, had gone on to Mississippi to organize the 
woodcutters, and was eventually hired early 1980s by Ed Chambers as an IAF 
organizer. Under IAF, Drake started off in Texas, organizing the Valley Interfaith 
Organization; was then dispatched to the Bronx, setting up the South Bronx Academy 
of Leadership and the Bronx Nehemiah housing; and finally, headed to Boston and set 
up the GBIO.  
When Jim Drake unexpectedly died in 2001, IAF national organizers Mike 
Gecan and later Arnie Graf were sent in to supervise GBIO. The relations, however, 
between the traditional IAF staff and Lew Finfer went sour and, as a consequence, 
                                                                                                                                       
platforms, “out-lefting” each other (Clavel: 58). During my interviews, GBIO leaders would still refer to King as a 
 53 
Finfer was pressured to leave the organization in 2002. Finfer is still the director of the 
OLTC, which became affiliated with the PICO national network of community 
organizations. According to a former GBIO member, “Lew was from outside the 
[IAF] network and really from a whole different organizing methodology. But he’s 
been around Boston forever and had a lot of relationships and everybody knew Lew 
and liked Lew. And so they [Jim Drake and Lew Finfer] were a really good team and 
Jim [Drake] was also, you know, he was IAF but he was not orthodox IAF.”  
GBIO’s current lead organizer, Sheri Andes, started off as an organizer for 
Lew Finfer in Brockton during the mid-1990s. During her time in Brockton, she built 
up a relationship with the IAF and decided to make a career within that network. 
According to Andes, “The opportunity to be mentored by people who had done this 
kind of work for 20 years, the track record that IAF had in making change, the 
intellectual stimulation I found from being around other IAF organizers, I would say 
those were the factors that really attracted me.” By the end of the 1990s, Andes had 
joined the IAF staff and been dispatched to Chicago for about four years to help build 
a new IAF organization. In 2000, she came back to Boston and worked as an organizer 
for the GBIO under Lew Finfer and Jim Drake. Eventually, in 2005, Andes became 
GBIO’s lead organizer. 
In sum, an opening in the institutional context as well as the strategic 
capacities of the founder and key organizers encouraged the diffusion of IAF 
organizing to Boston. Boston had such a strong organizing culture that the area 
seemed oversaturated. IAF organizers decided therefore to set up a new IAF 
                                                                                                                                       
key figure trying to unite people across neighborhood and race lines.  
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organization only when the populist movements of the 1970s and 80s began to 
dwindle. In addition, in the early 1980s, Jim Drake, after almost two decades of 
working as a union organizer, was recruited by Ed Chambers, then national director of 
the IAF. Drake began community organizing in Texas, then went off to the Bronx, and 
finally, in the mid-90s, ended up in Boston, setting up the GBIO. The presence of 
long-time Massachusetts organizer Lew Finfer, as well as clergy leaders with previous 
community organizing experience, was critical during this founding process. 
Eventually, in 1998, their synergistic efforts culminated in GBIO’s founding 
assembly.  
 
Community Organizing in the UK 
 
In Britain, broad-based organizing didn’t fully develop until the late 1980s. If we go 
back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the British trade unions were based in the 
communities, playing critical roles in shaping those communities. Communities were 
“places in which people could walk to and from work, … places where work, home, 
leisure, industrial relations, local government and home-town consciousness were 
inextricably mixed together” (Hobsbawm, 1987: 40). The urban and industrial areas 
displayed a distinct working-class culture, and trade councils were established in all 
the major towns and cities. In 1868, activists of the trade unions, grounded in local 
communities, formed the Trade Union Congress (TUC). This period of “community-
based trade unionism” evolved into a “representational community unionism” during 
the 20th century, when the Labour Party was formed in 1901 (Wills and Simms 2004). 
The trade unions, through the Labour Party, were represented in local and national 
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government, working on issues of public policy and the redistribution of wealth.  The 
trade unions were able to shape community life directly through worker representation 
or indirectly through the political power of the Labour Party. Historically, the labor 
struggles in Britain, such as the London Match-girls’ strike of 188818, the London 
Great Dock Strike of 188919 and the Poplar Council revolt in the 1920s20, promoting 
workplace-based solidarity and community support, were key events leading to the 
first Labour Party majority in the House of Commons in 1945 (Weinbren 1998). 
Labour-controlled councils, a new form of local governance, mushroomed.  
During the 1960s and 70s, although it was a period of remarkable social 
movement activism, ‘no mass community … developed’ (Twelvetrees, 2002: 6). 
According to Miller (2001), this failure was linked to the institutionalization and/or 
bureaucratization of community organization. Lowe (1986) argues that the local, 
grassroots mobilizations became bureaucratized either once they had met their 
demands or when the campaigns turned into organizations. Furthermore, in the 1970s, 
the trade unions’ legitimacy greatly weakened: the transformation of the economy, 
such as the de-industrialization and rise of global competition, and eventually, in 1979, 
the electoral victory of the Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, were part of 
the blame. And although the Labour Party tried to use its control of the local councils, 
its struggles failed, most spectacularly in London where Thatcher abolished the 
                                                
18 Due to poor working conditions at the Bryant & May’s match factory in Bow, London, women and teenage girls, 
led by socialist activist Annie Bensant, went on strike. This led to the establishment of the first trade union for 
women in Britain. 
19 The dock workers, mainly unskilled, poorly-paid and casual workers, of the port of London went on strike. This 
resulted into a strong trade union among the dock workers. 
20 During the 1920s, in Poplar, one of the poorest neighborhoods in London, a major tax protest took place. This 
revolt received wide support from the general public as well as from the trade unions. 
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Greater London Council in 1986 (Livingstone 1988).21  
The arrival of community organizing in Britain during the 1980s was thus 
energized by several factors. First, Thatcherism dismantled the safety nets of the 
welfare state, eroding the representation of the working people. The policies of the 
New Right were directed towards economic regeneration at the expense of community 
or social welfare. Second, the Church of England, acknowledging that it was failing as 
an institution to support the neighborhoods, became a major initiator of community 
organizing projects. Its “Faith in the City” report documented the political and 
economic deterioration of the urban areas, leading to the formation of the Church 
Urban Fund. The main task of this fund was to assign resources to city-wide broad-
based to support projects responding to the decline of these urban areas and to the 
powerlessness that people felt.  
Finally, recognizing the seriousness of the situation, social workers, Neil 
Jameson and Alan Twelvetrees, and senior clergy were critical in the LC’s creation. 
Jameson had read Saul Alinsky’s work and decided to go to the US, attending the IAF 
training course to learn more about community organizing. Even though the American 
IAF organizers were not interested in hearing Jameson’s plans to implement a similar 
model in the UK – he was granted a mere ten minutes with one of the national 
directors – Jameson decided to go back to the UK and start a similar organization. It 
became clear that the American model of building power and doing politics through 
the community was not only viable but also necessary. In 1989, the Citizens 
                                                
21 Not all the local councils were abolished, but they were combined with other councils. The Conservative Party 
had pure political motives, since by doing so, they robbed the more radical inner-city councils of much of their 
power. 
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Organising Foundation (COF) was launched by Anglican clergy and Community 
practitioners such as Neil Jameson and Alan Twelvetrees with the goal of coordinating 
and promoting community organizing projects. In 1990, Neil Jameson formed the first 
broad-based organization, Communities Organized for a Greater Bristol (COGB).  
Neil Jameson, the founder and lead organizer of Telco has been an active agent 
in adopting the practice of IAF organizing in the UK. According to The Guardian 
survey of 2003, Jameson is one of the 100 most ‘Influential Public Servants’. He has 
extensive experience in community organizing, starting in Bristol and later London. 
Jameson’s leadership, thanks to his past experience and his personal contacts with 
important clergy and funders, is a major factor in London Citizens emergence and 
success.  
 Thus, the political opportunity structure – the dwindling of the labor movement 
and Thatcherism – created an opening for LC to emerge. In addition, the background 
and experience of Neil Jameson enhanced the actual organizational formation. 
 
Community Organizing in Germany 
In his classic study Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society), the 
German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1887) juxtaposes two social systems, the 
Community (Gemeinschaft), an “organic” system based on ties of kinship, communal 
ownership and custom, versus Society (Gesellschaft), a “mechanical” system based on 
individual identity, self-interest, and commercial contracts. While treated as binary 
opposites, the two co-exist and interact in the “real” world. Tönnies’ interpretation of 
the concept “community,” however, is much broader than the Anglo-Saxon meaning 
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of  “community” in community organizing, complicating its daily use in Germany. 
Furthermore, since the term Gemeinschaft was too closely related to the infamous 
Volksgemeinschaft, used by the Nazi Party as propaganda for German national 
identity, it had largely gone out of use. 
While the term “community organizing” has gained familiarity since former 
community organizer Barack Obama became president of the United States, it was 
quite a foreign concept on German soil and rather hard to translate. Some might refer 
to Gemeinwesenarbeit, or community work, while others might employ 
Bürgerinitiative, or citizens group, when rendering the English term. Both German 
concepts, however, have quite different roots and might explain different things; while 
the former points towards professionalized social work, the latter is more in line with 
what we might call a social movement.  
Three “waves of reception” of community organizing in a German context can 
be identified (Szynka 2002). First, after World War II, the profession of social worker 
became very important in helping to reconstruct the educational and social system 
within German society. Gemeinwesenarbeit – community work – became one 
subdiscipline under the study of social work but was often discredited as an 
unnecessary American model. It wasn’t until the late 1960s or early 1970s, however, 
that Alinsky’s books were translated and brought to Germany, representing the second 
wave. These books were published by Burckhardthaus, one of the most important 
training centers for community workers. In addition, German scholars conducted 
extensive research on community organizing in the U.S. and developed it further as a 
field of study (C.W. Müller 1971; Karas and Hinte 1978; Oelschlägel 1982). Germany 
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was still a divided country under the cold war regime, but political awareness was 
growing, and West Germany saw the rise of the student movement, the peace 
movement, and the ecology movement. Community work, however, became 
institutionalized under municipal programs and was declared dead (Szynska 2002). 
The third wave started in the early 1990s, when a group of scholars from 
Freiburg, in the south of Germany, undertook a comparative study of community 
organizing in the US and Germany, leading to the publication of the book Let’s 
Organise!: Gemeinwesenarbeit und Community Organization im Vergleich. While 
intellectually they were very strong and had a deep understanding of the theory and 
works of Saul Alinsky, they did not have the practice. As one of the authors states, 
“We did an internship [in Germany], but that was watered down. We wanted to know 
how it could be done right. In Germany it was not as political, not as changing. I felt 
compelled by the theory, so we went to Chicago and it was totally different.” The 
authors visited different cities in the US, meeting numerous community organizers 
during their journey. According to one of the scholars, “the IAF was seen as the 
‘Mercedez-Benz’ of the [community] organizations, they had it more together…but 
when we asked Ed Chambers to come to Germany to give a training, he said we 
should have our act together; there was this arrogance, but he was right.” Upon their 
return, they invited long-time US organizer Ed Shurna, whom they had met in 
Chicago, to come to Frankfurt and teach an organizing seminar. Shurna immediately 
asked Don Elmer, a former disciple of Alinsky, to come along. These two experienced 
organizers went to Germany and taught a seminar on the principles of community 
organizing, which eventually led to the creation of FOCO (Forum of Community 
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Organizing). In the mid-1990s, FOCO signed a contract with the IAF and with 
organizer Prof. Leo Penta. After about a year, however, the two organizations decided 
to go their own ways.  
 Penta, a professor and Catholic priest, has a long history of IAF organizing in 
the US, starting with the East Brooklyn Congregations (EBC).  In 1978, Penta had 
been ordained a Catholic priest and sent to a parish in East New York.  With one of 
the highest crime rates in the country, and in the middle of the crack epidemic, this 
part of Brooklyn was decried as an ungovernable wasteland.  “It was a survival issue,” 
Penta tells me. Rather than operate an “emergency room” for the people who were 
beaten up, it made sense to try to change things systematically by going to the roots of 
the problem.  The churches in East Brooklyn began to organize, and IAF organizer Ed 
Chambers came in on a regular basis. Eventually, the churches decided to go with the 
IAF model, formed a “sponsoring committee,” and built up the organization, with 
Penta and the Rev. John Heinemeir as co-chairs.  Consisting of about 36 churches, the 
EBC worked on issues such as public safety and education and was mainly a poor and 
working-class organization. Their biggest victory was the building of over 2000 
affordable homes, the Nehemiah houses.  
 Between 1982 and 1985, Penta pursued his doctorate in philosophy in the war-
torn city of Berlin. Heavily influenced by the work of the German-Jewish political 
theorist Hannah Arendt, he learned how to put her ideas, such as the notion of power, 
into praxis. In 1996, Penta returned to a unified Berlin and decided to start organizing.  
He began experimenting with the idea of IAF organizing in the borough of Neukölln.  
Located in the southeast of Berlin, part of the borough was engaged in a new 
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countrywide welfare program, “Soziale Stadt” or “Socially Integrative City:” an 
intervention strategy to counter the growing social segregation in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods. The idea was to create democratic structures by electing local people 
to a “Quartiersmanagement,” or neighborhood management.22 Each neighborhood 
receives a certain amount of money from the city and the state and must then 
democratically decide which projects to take on. Penta decided to get on board with 
Neukölln’s neighborhood management, but this experience did not work out. Penta 
soon realized the limitations imposed when taking government money and being part 
of a state-like structure; indeed, “Organizing is something you have to do 
independently.” 
 Next, Penta went to Schöneweide, another southeastern borough of Berlin that 
was struggling. Public life had come to a standstill, and the unemployment rate was at 
an all-time high. Schöneweide used to be a very strong industrial municipality.  Ever 
since the late 19th century, East Berlin factories such as AEG (General electricity 
company) and an electrical power plant had supported a bustling district of just under 
30,000 people: busy traffic in the streets, lively bars and restaurants, and people proud 
of being part of the neighborhood. This all came to an abrupt end. Once the Wall came 
down, many companies moved to the West, and the population declined by about half, 
leaving an image of empty buildings with broken windows behind.   
 In sum, the IAF principles of community organizing were virtually unknown in 
Germany. The diffusion was therefore encouraged by the strategic capacities of the 
                                                
22 In some cities in Germany during the 1990s, a more institutionalized form of public participation was introduced. 
These “neighborhood managements” receive funding from the city and the state and were set up to promote 
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founder as well as an opening in the institutional context. Prof. Leo Penta, an 
American IAF organizer, decided to come to Germany and set up IAF organizations, 
tailoring it to the needs of the local communities. Penta first organized in Brooklyn 
and then decided to implement a similar model in Berlin. In Berlin, once the Wall 
came down, after a period of excitement, hope was replaced by fear as the economy in 
the former East collapsed. The movements from the 1960s and 70s in West Germany 
were spent, and during the 1990s, in a unified country, new government-tied structures 
such as “neighborhood managements” were put in place, leaving place for a new 
community organization to be created. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I described how and when the IAF organizations were formed in 
Boston, London, and Berlin. While in each case the founders and organizers were 
confronted with different challenges, there are important underlying similarities that 
should not be overlooked. The institutional context, as well as the strategic capacities 
of the founders, provide some clarity (Table 3). First, an opening in the institutional 
context allowed the organizations to emerge. This differs from the “classic” political 
opportunity structure theory, in that for each case the political context had actually 
become quite hostile when the organizations emerged. At the same time, the present 
forms of civic engagement started to dwindle or prove ineffective and space was 
carved out for the IAF organizations to emerge. Arguably, the late arrival of these IAF 
organizations is due to the fact that the “community organizing space” was already 
                                                                                                                                       
citizens’ engagement in socially “disintegrated” neighborhoods. They offer structural solutions to local problems, 
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filled by the labor movement or social movements, but once these movements lost 
some of their energy, an opening was created for the new organizations to emerge. 
Thus, shifts in the political settings led to a reconfiguration of the civic engagement 
sphere.  
Secondly, while the organizations were able to carve out a niche for 
themselves, this would not have been possible without the explicit strategies of the 
organizers to diffuse this model across different settings.  
 
Table 3. Emergence IAF organizations in Boston, London, and Berlin 
 Boston London Berlin 
Political 
Opportunity 
Structure 
Transition from 
progressive mayor 
to machine politics; 
dwindling populist 
movements 
Thatcherism; 
dwindling labor 
movement 
After hope from 
reunification: 
desperation; 
government-tied 
structures put in 
place 
Strategic Capacity 
(dependent on 
biography, 
network, and 
organizational 
context) 
Jim Drake: union 
and community 
organizer; builds 
on the presence of 
skilled clergy and 
long-time 
community 
organizer Lew 
Finfer  
Neil Jameson: 
social worker; took 
IAF training in the 
US; received 
critical support 
from clergy in 
England  
Leo Penta: Catholic 
priest; was an IAF 
organizer in New 
York; pursues 
doctoral degree in 
Berlin; sets up 
similar IAF 
organization there 
 
The next chapters will cover each case study in depth, followed by a 
comparison of the cases. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
such as cleaning up the streets or investing money in the neighborhood school. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ORGANIZING IN BOSTON: STICKING TO THE MISSION 
 
On the 22nd of May, 2010, more than 1,100 Muslims attended a public action at a 
mosque in Roxbury, Boston. The 68,000 square foot mosque is a critical member of 
the Greater Boston Interfaith Organization (GBIO). Massachusetts’ Governor, Deval 
Patrick, was invited to the mosque and asked to give “yes” or “no” answers on a range 
of issues. In the aftermath of this action, however, then Massachusetts’ treasurer, Tim 
Cahill, released a press statement accusing the governor of “pandering to special 
interest groups” saying that “Governor Patrick should stop playing politics with 
terrorism and focus on protecting all the citizens of this Commonwealth.”23 As one of 
GBIO’s member institutions was attacked and labeled as a special interest group, a 
handful of GBIO’s organizers and leaders got on the phone and discussed how they 
should react. GBIO has had a strong relationship with Governor Patrick for a long 
time, but the organization also worked closely with then treasurer Cahill. They 
decided, however, to hold Treasurer Cahill accountable, meet with him in private, and 
have a public press conference. GBIO showed once again its mobilization capacity: 
within the span of 24 hours, 25 Jewish, Christian, and Muslim leaders had sat down 
with Cahill and over 400 Muslims had attended the press conference.  
The Greater Boston Interfaith Organization is not, however, your typical 
successful organization. From its inception, GBIO has encountered a rough pathway: 
                                                
23 Press Release Tim Cahill. May 27, 2010. 
http://www.masscouncilofchurches.org/Cahill%20Press%20Release.pdf 
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important campaigns have failed and internal challenges have caused near-to-death 
rifts within the organization. But even though GBIO has lost members over time, the 
organization manages not just to survive, but also to maintain a broad, active 
grassroots base. In crucial moments like the one described above, the organization is 
able to mobilize hundreds of members overnight. How can I explain its sustained 
mobilization capacity? 
In this chapter, I illustrate the context in which the organization is embedded as 
well as the organization’s intentional development of a culture of commitment and 
accountability. Furthermore, when the organization begins to drift away from its 
original goal of mobilizing members, I show how corrective mechanisms – in the form 
of reflection and deliberation between the members and organizers – come into play 
that push the organization back in the right direction.  
  
Allies and Enemies in Boston  
The context structure, or, the organization’s access to policymakers, its relationships 
with important allies, and the presence of potential “enemies” help in part to explain 
how GBIO has been able to remain dynamic, organize its members, without deflecting 
from its original mission.  
Founded by the English Puritans in 1630, and soon thereafter considered a 
gateway for Irish, German, and Italian immigrants, Boston has always been one of the 
most diverse cities in the United States. According to the US Census bureau (2008), 
Boston is only the 21st largest city in the US, while having the sixth largest proportion 
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of foreign-born residents.24 Since the 1970s, however, the composition of the 
immigrant population has changed dramatically. Rather than from Europe, the 
majority comes from Latin America and Asia.25 Furthermore, due to immigration 
patterns, Boston has always had a strong Roman Catholic culture. The 2008 American 
Religious Identification Survey, however, showed a dramatic decline in the Catholic 
population in Massachusetts from 54% in 1990 to 39% in 2008.26 The reason, 
according to the researchers, might be found in the general secularization of American 
society, as well as the sexual abuse scandal at the turn of the millennium.27  
In terms of racial and ethnic diversity, GBIO’s membership roughly reflects 
the demographics of the area: 40% of the member institutions are mainly White, 27% 
mainly Black/African American, 10% mixed in race and ethnicity, and 3% Hispanic 
(McClenahan 2010). In terms of religious diversity, GBIO is unique among IAF 
affiliates. Although at its founding, GBIO had considerable Catholic support, Jewish 
and Protestant participation grew stronger over time. On the one hand, GBIO has been 
intentionally strengthening Jewish and Black/African American membership by hiring 
moreover young organizers across the religious denominations. On the other hand, the 
internal crisis caused by the sexual abuse scandals led many Catholic congregations to 
drop out of GBIO (interview Catholic member).  
The geographical space in Boston offers contrast. On the one hand, it is seen as 
                                                
24 The cities with a larger proportion of foreign-born population are Los Angeles, San Jose, New York, San 
Francisco, and Houston. 
(http://www.cityofboston.gov/Images_Documents/BRA%20Briefing%20Book%20Demographic_tcm3-16615.pdf)  
25 According to the American Community Survey the largest immigrant groups come from China, Haiti, 
Dominican Republic, Vietnam, El Salvador, Cape Verde, Colombia, Jamaica, Brazil and Mexico (2005-2007). 
26 http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org/reports/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf  
27 Boston Globe. March 9, 2009. “Number of N.E. Catholics Tumbles” by Michael Paulson. 
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a very compact city that you can get your arms around. In comparison to Chicago, for 
example, the territory is not huge. On the other hand, Boston is a neighborhood 
oriented city, historically divided across class and racial lines. The school busing crisis 
of the 1970s only exacerbated these divisions, pitting neighborhoods against each 
other.28 GBIO was unique in its intent to organize on a metropolitan level. According 
to Father John Doyle, GBIO founder Jim Drake would state “how to make greater 
Boston greater” as one of his main goals (interview John Doyle). Given Boston’s 
historic divisions, it was a first attempt to bring people together across 
denominational, racial, and class lines. This innovative vision of creating a “greater 
Boston,” transcending spatial and socio-economic boundaries, appealed to many 
(interview GBIO member). 
In terms of access to the administration, GBIO has a very close relationship 
with the current Massachusetts Governor, Deval Patrick. This positive relationship 
began very early and has grown only stronger over time. In 2006, when GBIO held a 
gubernatorial action, inviting all the candidates for governor, Patrick was the only one 
who showed up. According to GBIO’s lead organizer, Patrick was impressed when he 
saw the power of some 1,200 people and realized the concerns they had in common. 
While he was campaigning for office, GBIO advised him on healthcare issues, and 
although the law hadn’t passed yet, Patrick liked it and made it part of his platform. In 
addition, two key clergy leaders, one Jewish and the other Christian, have maintained 
close relationships with the governor, guaranteeing GBIO good access to his 
                                                
28 On June 21, 1974, Federal Judge Arthur Garrity issued an order to desegregate Boston’s schools. Through 
busing, children from the all-black Roxbury neighborhood would be integrated with the all-white South Boston 
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administration.  
Whereas the relationship with the governor of Massachusetts is considered 
positive, GBIO experienced quite a rocky start with Boston’s “lifelong” mayor, 
Thomas Menino.29 An IAF leader recalls, “we used to have a very rotten relationship 
with Mayor Menino. He called us the Greater Boston Idiots Organization”. In 2001, 
GBIO started an ambitious campaign to bring the Nehemiah30 strategy of affordable 
housing from Brooklyn to the Boston area. IAF leaders had a vision of replicating that 
model in Boston, without, however, fully considering the city’s geographic and 
political space. GBIO was still relatively young as an organization and, according to 
the lead organizer, had not done a good internal power analysis before entering this 
arena: first, Boston does not have the amount of available land that New York has; in 
addition, Boston has a long standing tradition of Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) focusing on the precise issue of affordable housing. The CDCs 
and the Mayor considered the Nehemiah strategy a model from New York infiltrating 
into the Boston context and creating unnecessary competition. Furthermore, GBIO had 
the support neither of the targeted neighborhood (Mattapan), nor the other key 
political actors, such as state senators, so it decided to pull out of the process (Harvard 
Business School Publishing, 2004) . 
The failure of the Nehemiah campaign brought important lessons. Rather than 
targeting the mayor in an adversarial way, GBIO began to build a relationship with 
                                                                                                                                       
high schools. The desegregation by busing, although aimed at creating equality, brought enormous controversy, 
with violent anti-busing demonstrations still vivid in the memories of many. 
29 Thomas Menino has been mayor of Boston since 1993, for five consecutive terms, taking over from “city hall 
activist”, Raymond Flynn. 
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him, working on issues that were also part of his agenda, such as better healthcare for 
the residents of Boston. GBIO also started to work with other power players, such as 
Citizens Bank, and to engage in state-wide action on Healthcare reform. According to 
GBIO’s lead organizer, the mayor began to hear from other key leaders that GBIO was 
a reasonable and productive organization. Today, as a result of continuing 
conversation and close relationships with key clergy, the mayor is regularly attending 
GBIO actions, recognizing the organization as an important power player in the 
greater Boston area.  
In terms of alliance structure, GBIO has been able to tap into the availability of 
Boston’s intellectual capital. For example, the Jewish Community Relations Council 
(JCRC) and Harvard University have been important. The JCRC of greater Boston, an 
agency that aims to pursue social justice through advocacy, organizing, service, and 
partnerships, has been both a member in its own right as well as a major force in 
encouraging synagogues to join GBIO. Certain organizers have been bridge builders 
between the JCRC and the GBIO, hired half time by JCRC and half by GBIO. In 
addition, a tremendous amount of intellectual wealth is located in Boston. Top 
universities such as Harvard have pulled people from places like New York City to 
study, with some remaining after college. For example, the community oriented 
Harvard Divinity School, as well as classes by the well-known union and community 
organizer Prof. Marshall Ganz, have had an important impact on Boston’s organizing 
environment and on GBIO. The organization’s most recently hired organizer came 
                                                                                                                                       
30 Since the 1980s, the East Brooklyn Congregations, an IAF affiliate in New York, has built 2,900 new houses as 
part of their ‘Nehemiah’ housing campaign. Nehemiah (of the Old Testament) was the key figure in rebuilding 
Jerusalem. 
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through Marshall Ganz’s class on community organizing. 
Finally, since community organizations are almost by nature turf war oriented, 
not only their allies, but potential enemies as well must be considered. According to 
many of the interviewees, Boston has a very strong charity or social justice culture, 
resulting in the culmination of thousands of nonprofit organizations across the city, 
competing for funding and members. The database Guidestar, for example, lists over 
10,000 nonprofits in the greater Boston area. In addition, there is a plethora of 
Community Development Corporations in Boston; the Massachusetts Association for 
Community Development Corporations (MACDC), a coalition of over 80 member 
organizations focusing on affordable housing, is one of the biggest players. Even 
though there are significant differences between the CDCs and GBIO31, there has been 
a certain degree of competition between them. At GBIO’s start, many CDCs were part 
of the organization. Some tensions, however, during the Nehemiah campaign came to 
the forefront: many of those CDCs were deeply involved into community development 
but were doing it in a different way. In addition, the CDCs became members of GBIO 
under Jim Drake’s leadership. During that period, the organization was more like a 
social movement and brought in a wider variety of organizations than the IAF had 
traditionally attempted. Once the leadership shifted, however, most CDCs drifted 
away and the organization became less of a social movement organization and more of 
a traditional IAF organization. 
                                                
31 The CDCs have a different funding mechanism, as most of their resources come from the city, the state, private 
businesses, or foundations. GBIO, however, does not accept government money and gets funded through 
membership dues or foundations. As a consequence, only a few CDCs engage in the type of organizing GBIO does, 
as they are less likely to target the city or the state (interview MACDC organizer). CDCs are moreover mainly 
single-issue organizations, focusing on economic development through housing.  GBIO is a multi-issue 
organization, in which housing is not the central mission.  
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Furthermore, what if we look at similar congregation-based community 
organizations in Massachusetts? In the US there are at least four national networks of 
congregation-based community organizing – the IAF, PICO national network, DART 
(Direct Action and Research Training Center), and Gamaliel – which virtually never 
collaborate. The IAF is the oldest, and the founders of the other three had ties with 
IAF or with Saul Alinsky before starting up. Of the four national networks, PICO has 
a presence in Massachusetts. Three of the four PICO affiliates are located not in 
Boston but in other counties (Lynn, Brockton, and Framingham) and the fourth one is 
in Boston, in Dorchester. Even though GBIO is spread out over the greater Boston 
area and created its own space “to do its thing,” there is a sense of constant 
competition between the organizations. As one of the Jewish leaders mentioned,  
It’s a pain in the neck because you could have in one community…an 
area where it’s PICO and an area that is IAF. The Jews don’t care, they 
just want to work… so one Rabbi says to another Rabbi are you in this?  
So you know, I think 20 years from now some of these differences need 
to disappear. I understand why now, for turf reasons or politics, but it’s 
hard, it makes it challenging. And it’s not so simple to say ‘oh they 
should work together for a variety of reasons’ that just isn’t going to 
happen. It would be like, you know, why [aren’t the] AFL-CIO, Unite-
HERE and SEIU working together? Well, that’s hard. 
 
In sum, GBIO’s direct access to city and state authorities and its strong alliance 
structure have strengthened GBIO’s position as an important power player within the 
greater Boston area. At the same time, however, the organization faces competition 
from other non-profit organizations as well as from similar congregation-based 
networks that have weakened its potential to grow over time. 
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Creating a culture of commitment and accountability 
Following Pettigrew (1979), who writes that the concept of organizational culture, “ 
[a] system of … publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a given 
group at a given time” (574), must be examined across its many dimensions, I will 
show how the use of rituals, faith-based identity, and language are fundamental in 
creating GBIO’s culture of commitment and accountability. This culture, resulting in 
intense feelings of member commitment and ownership, is what impels members to 
act (Lawler 2001; Lawler, Thye and Yoon, 2009).  
Rituals provide a “shared experience of belonging and express and reinforce 
what is valued” (Pettigrew, 576). Within GBIO, the one-to-one meeting, storytelling, 
and roll-call, are important rituals, delineating the social relationships. First, the one-
to-one meeting is the fundamental building block of every IAF organization. A one-to-
one is a face-to-face conversation between a GBIO organizer and a member with the 
aim of exploring or strengthening the ties between the community organization and 
the particular institution. The aim of these conversations is to build a relationship, to 
understand the other person’s reasons and motivations, and to build trust. These 
relational meetings are considered the backbone of the organizations and vital for all 
the member communities. As an organizer explains,  
One of the critiques people make is they say, ‘that 30 minute thing 
[one-to-one meeting] that you people do, it’s so artificial, that’s not 
how it should work, relationships should be organic and natural’. Yes, 
in the world it should be, in the ideal situation it happens naturally on 
it’s own. In our culture…it doesn’t....It takes a little work. And this 
[IAF organizing] has created a context for that work to happen. 
 
Another important practice is storytelling (see, for example, Ganz 2010). 
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Stories are a significant part of every training, action, or delegate assembly, fueling 
anger as well as hope among the participants and reinforcing the urge to act. Although 
the stories come from the members’ personal lives, the organizers will often coach 
them before the event and go over the lines, pressing them to make the details very 
specific and asking them “to speak from the gut.” The stories are powerful tools, 
allowing members to be experts, since they have “lived” the experiences.   As one IAF 
leader states, “a story makes something human,” and its aim is to move from private 
pain to public action.  GBIO does not want to be portrayed as a professional advocacy 
organization, talking for the poor or uninsured. But GBIO is those families, which 
through the telling of their personal stories bring an authentic voice to the table. 
During a GBIO event, “From Debt to Assets,” that I attended, Julia told her 
story.   She came to the front of the room with a large empty water bottle.   For a long 
time, she told her audience, this bottle represented her savings.  It was empty. She told 
us how she cried at night, not knowing how to put her children into school. Now, 
however, thanks to GBIO’s financial education program, she opened, for the first time, 
a savings account, has realistic goals, and doesn’t feel like a failure anymore.  Her 
personal testimony was emotional but encouraging, showing how she had been able to 
change what had seemed a hopeless situation. This story told us much more about 
power than any organizer’s speech ever could.  
Finally, before every action, leaders from the member institutions will write 
down the precise number of people they can turn out. According to one GBIO 
organizer, setting realistic quotas – rather than broad goals – enhances feelings of 
achievement, accountability, and concrete commitment. This act is ritualized in the 
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form of a “roll-call,” emphasizing its value. Members go on stage and publicly 
announce how many people they will bring to the next event. Usually, within each 
institution, one or two people will take the lead to make sure that the number is in fact 
an attainable target. As one leader explains, “What we are accountable for is not our 
inputs, it’s our outputs. So when I work with this team, it’s not how many calls did 
you make, it’s how many people committed to come.”  
The organizational culture is fostered, as well, by the presence of a strong 
faith-based identity.  Tajfel defines social identity as “the individual’s knowledge that 
he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value 
significance to him of this group membership” (Tajfel, 1972: 292). Studies have 
shown that a strong feeling of social identity with the group will increase the 
probability of social action and collective protest (Brewer and Silver, 2001; Stürmer 
and Simon, 2004). The majority of GBIO’s member institutions are faith-based 
groups, institutions built around certain sets of religious values.  
On the one hand, being an interfaith organization has meant that the members 
agree to disagree on certain issues, which then cannot be taken up by GBIO. For 
example, in 2003, a controversy surrounding the legalization of same-sex marriage 
unfolded in Massachusetts, almost causing a rift within the organization.32 Other 
issues, such as the Israel-Palestine question, remain very sensitive as well and will 
never become GBIO’s focal point.  
On the other hand, their faith-based identity has pushed the members to act.  
During campaigns, the congregational leaders will often refer to their sacred texts to 
                                                
32 For more details, see the dissertation of Ann McClenahan (2010). 
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re-affirm what they stand for, legitimizing and reinforcing their engagement. In 
meetings regarding GBIO’s anti-usury campaign, for example, in which the 
organization targeted big banks to get them to lower their interest rates, religious 
leaders would refer to the Bible, the Torah, or the Quran, explaining to their members 
that their scripture states that usury is wrong, or that taking advantage of the 
vulnerable by charging exorbitant interest rates is unacceptable.  According to one 
GBIO organizer, “It was incredible to see the reaction of people who were like, oh 
yeah, that seems like a legitimate argument to me, that makes sense, that grounds it for 
me.”  
Finally, language, or the system of vocal signs (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), 
is an important factor in cultivating GBIO’s culture of commitment and 
accountability. These processes of typification provide “seed beds for human action” 
(Pettigrew: 575).  Like every IAF affiliate, GBIO puts great emphasis on member 
development and training. During these sessions, IAF organizers will focus on key 
concepts that determine the organization’s ethos. The naming and conceptualization of 
the terms “power,” “leadership,” and “organizing” are at the core of the sessions and 
are the means of combining the people’s deep religious values with a strategic 
pragmatism.  
Bringing the message of power, however, is hard work. At first, many 
members feel uncomfortable with the notion of power, feeling this word has negative 
connotations.  During training sessions, at least one whole day is devoted to explaining 
the difference between “power over” and “power with,” and the importance of making 
a “power analysis” of every situation. Recognizing the importance of power and 
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learning how to do a power analysis shows the amount of thoughtful strategy and 
planning that goes into organizing. 
 Another concept instrumental to the organization’s well-being is that of 
“leadership,” strongly emphasizing that leaders are not born but made.  In IAF 
organizations, the organizers are part of the paid staff, whereas the “leaders” are 
volunteer members from the member institutions. As Nicholas von Hoffman, an 
Alinsky disciple, wrote in the 1960s, “organizers train leaders and leaders organize” 
(1965). The ideal is thus for leaders to take control and ownership of the actions and 
campaigns. It remains a challenge for IAF, however, not to become too organizer-
driven and to make sure the leaders maintain sufficient ownership (Osterman 2002).  
Relational meetings and training are the main tools to identify potential leaders, and 
often when an action is planned, IAF organizers will give “young” leaders the chance 
to take on an important role, for example, chairing a session, as a way to develop their 
leadership skills. 
In addition, a philosophy of shared leadership makes member engagement and 
commitment more sustainable.  According to one IAF leader,  
It is not a life sentence,…when my father-in-law passed away, I was 
kind of a couple of months engaged with that, …people said ‘what can 
I do for you?’ and I said get petitions signed, because I do not have 
time to do it and that would really make me feel better… And people 
did. It helps, it feels like it is not all on any one person’s shoulder and 
yet you can bite off as much as you can chew. 
 
Finally, IAF puts great emphasis on the meaning of the term “organizing.”  An 
important rule of thumb is that “organizing is reorganizing and disorganizing.” There 
is a need to continuously keep rebuilding the organization; otherwise there is a danger 
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that the institutions will get solidified, locked-in and exclusive (interview national IAF 
director). To enhance this dynamic organizing process, IAF affiliates usually don’t 
have large staffs, relying almost completely on voluntary leaders. Leaders need to 
keep meeting new people and developing new people; in other words, the work is 
never done.  According to one organizer,  
We started organizing five years ago; now we’re getting thin again. 
They [the leaders] have to go back to the house meetings again and 
build their base again, go back to their roots. And it’s important for me 
to help them, not view that as a failure but actually view that as a 
success; they’ve gone through this whole cycle now, it’s time to start at 
that stage over again. 
 
As a result, although from the outside there is not much noticeable change, internally 
there is a constant awareness of renewal; new relationships develop, new institutions 
are recruited and member institutions that have become less engaged are being ‘re-
recruited’; and the flexible leadership positions allow new people to emerge.  In 
training sessions, organizers and leaders emphasize that maintaining a dynamic and 
vital organization is challenging and extremely labor intensive.  But when the 
organizers clearly articulate what organizing is and what it is not, and break the 
organizing process down into digestible pieces, members acquire a sense of 
practicality; they are involved in the different steps, develop a feeling of ownership 
and are prone to mobilize in actions or campaigns. 
In sum, rituals, a faith-based collective identity, and the use of a certain 
language have created a culture of commitment and accountability, encouraging the 
members to act. In this final section, I show how corrective mechanisms come into 
play when the organization starts to drift away from its original mission. 
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Corrective mechanisms   
Kriesi (1996) argues that as a social movement organization ages, it is likely to 
undergo one of the following processes of goal transformation. Processes of 
institutionalization (becoming a party group), commercialization (a service provider), 
or involution (a club or voluntary group) will automatically occur, and member 
mobilization will dwindle. According to Kriesi, when trying to understand the 
direction of the goal transformation, one must consider the organization’s sources of 
revenue. The smaller the share of membership dues, the greater the autonomy the 
organization will have with respect to its members, and thus the greater the likelihood 
that the goals do not reflect the concerns of the members. In addition, the greater its 
share of public subsidies, the more the organization will become entrenched in the 
established interest systems.  
In 2009, GBIO’s operating budget was just under $800,000; about 58% came 
from foundation grants, 20% from corporate donations, 20% from membership dues, 
and 2% from individual donations (internal documentation GBIO). Furthermore, IAF 
affiliates, as a principle, do not take any money directly from government agencies, 
precisely to avoid being co-opted.   
Kriesi adds, however, that these structural data explain the goal transformation 
only to a limited extent. In this section I will demonstrate how GBIO has been tempted 
towards commercialization and involution, but when the pendulum has swung too 
much in one direction, corrective mechanisms have brought the organization back into 
place. 
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Avoiding commercialization 
In 2005, GBIO launched “Moving from Debt to Assets,” a financial education 
program for individuals from GBIO’s member institutions. Each course consists of 
four components: classes in financial education, a peer support group, sessions with a 
professional financial counselor, and a grant of $500 at the end of the course. By June 
2010, 552 participants, representing 28 institutions, had graduated from 29 classes. 
Classes are offered in English, Haitian Creole, Spanish, Cape Verdean Creole, and 
Somali (GBIO 2012). GBIO staff member Joel Schwartz, the Debt to Assets program 
manager, told me the story of how the program was created. 
In 2004, GBIO held a series of house meetings to hear which issues people 
were concerned about. From the inner city to the suburbs, from Christian to Jewish 
congregations, or from the working to the middle class, GBIO organizers heard the 
same thing: many people were drowning in debt, could not pay their bills, and needed 
to know how to save money. The idea therefore arose to create a program that would 
help people deal with these issues. This program, however, would not assist everyone, 
but only the people in GBIO, creating, in other words, a service program as part of 
GBIO.  
Although GBIO is not the only IAF affiliate that provides services to its 
members, tensions arise. First, IAF is about organizing, not about running programs. It 
could be dangerous if resources – time, money, or personnel – are taken away from 
organizing and being put into servicing members (Fine 2006). At GBIO, however, 
only one person is in charge of the program. Furthermore, among the “graduates,” new 
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GBIO leaders have emerged; ties to new sections of the Boston area, such as the 
Haitian community, have been strengthened, because the program has become the 
“entry point for real involvement into the GBIO.” As a result, the program has actually 
increased GBIO’s public visibility and key policy makers have attended the so-called 
“graduations.”  
Having in mind the “dangers” of running a service program, its future was 
discussed during a strategy meeting between the organizers and “primary” leaders. 
GBIO’s lead organizer stated that there were at least two choices: the program 
becomes an affiliate of GBIO, in which case GBIO maintains the control, but GBIO 
can be accused of taking public money (some funding for the program comes from the 
Attorney General of Massachusetts), or the program becomes something completely 
separate, in which case GBIO has no control over it, and when the program manager 
resigns, someone else, with whom they now have no relationship, might take it in a 
completely different direction. After some deliberation, the team talked about the 
possibility of making Debt to Assets GBIO’s affiliate, but keeping the budget and 
books completely separate and giving up the public money.  
While only a small part of GBIO’s activities revolve around servicing the 
members, at the strategy team meetings key leaders and organizers reflect on the 
dangers and advantages of providing these services. Over the years, Debt to Assets 
became very successful and, as a consequence, a decision had to be made as to how to 
incorporate this program within the framework of IAF organizing.  
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Avoiding involution 
According to Kriesi (1996), a social movement organization can become a self-help 
group, a voluntary organization, or a club, in which case the organization focuses 
more on intra-group interaction than authority-oriented action. Movements with a 
strong collective identity, Kriesi argues, are particularly prone to involution, as they 
tend to focus more on the (re)production of their identity than on collectively acting.  
The majority of GBIO’s member institutions are faith-based groups, fostering 
within it a strong faith-based identity. As a result, the goal of the organization could 
easily turn into interfaith dialogue, rather than public action. Wary of this potential 
development, GBIO’s mission states, “our primary goal is to develop local leadership 
and organized power to fight for social justice. We strive to hold both public and 
private actors accountable for their public responsibilities, as well as to initiate actions 
and programs of our own to solve community and economic problems” (GBIO 2012).  
GBIO leaders and organizers consciously combine nurturing deep faith and 
democratic values with building a powerful organization that has the ability to act. 
This combination of moral values with pragmatism is what makes the organization 
work, what makes it effective and sustainable (interview GBIO organizer). As a GBIO 
organizer states, “I’ve also worked for an organization that pretty much eliminated 
power from [its] consciousness. So their mode of improving the community was by 
holding barbeques and other kinds of events… They were situated in between the 
white part of town and the black part of town and [this organization] kind of thought 
that the barbeques were going to solve that situation. So I was frustrated with what felt 
like immature action without strategy.”  
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Although organizers and leaders emphasize acting, temptations to drift towards 
becoming a club or a self-help group arise as well. During a strategy meeting, the 
organizer and primary leaders reflected on the following issue: one of the leaders 
asked whether GBIO would be willing to have a fundraising table at this leader’s 
fundraising event. According to the strategy team, however, this could create a 
dangerous precedent, because many member institutions hold fundraising events, and 
this is not part of GBIO’s mission. The team decided therefore that the leader will 
send invitations only to the institutions he personally knows, and they will not be sent 
through the GBIO list-serve.  Related to this issue, the team discussed what the criteria 
would be for accessing GBIO’s list-serve. After a discussion, the group agreed on two 
criteria for accessing the list-serve. First, only member institutions from GBIO can use 
the list-serve; second, it can be used only “if it conforms to GBIO’s mission and fits 
within the relational strategy.” In the example above, the leader could ask only those 
institutions he knows personally to join the fundraising event. In addition, the team 
decides that GBIO’s lead organizer will assess each case and decide whether the 
criteria for using the list-serve are met. If, however, the lead organizer is not sure 
whether the criteria are met, an appointed leader will be asked to decide, and finally, 
in case the leader is not sure, the strategy team as a whole must make a decision.   
These examples show how GBIO could have changed over time into a 
dialogue organization, a self-help group, or a service provider. Organizers and leaders, 
however, are aware about these potential drifts and therefore take time to reflect and 
deliberate on past and future actions. By doing this, corrective mechanisms come into 
play when the organization focuses too much on within-group servicing, rather than 
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outwards acting. Organizers and leaders refer back to the organization’s mission, 
promoting, in other words, a culture of relationship building combined with concrete 
action.  
 
The impact and challenges of community organizing in Boston 
Since its creation, the GBIO has encountered many challenges. Critical campaigns at 
the outset, such as the Nehemiah affordable housing campaign, failed; a change in 
leadership shifted the organization from a social movement to a traditional faith-based 
IAF organization, resulting in a loss of membership; and, political issues, such as the 
legalization of same-sex marriage, almost depleted the organization. Nonetheless, the 
organization is not just surviving, but has been able to develop a broad, committed 
active grassroots base. Thus, even though the organization has declined in membership 
over the past two decades, it is still able to mobilize a large number of people. As the 
lead organizer states,  
We are able to mobilize on a day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-
month basis…We can do 500 to 1000 pretty well. The difference is we 
can’t do 4000 we can do 2000. Our biggest turnout is about 2000. That 
is the capacity of the organization whereas before we could do 4000. 
But it is rare that you need 4000. 2000 is a pretty good turnout for 
Boston. And we pretty consistently can turnout 1200, 1300. 
 
In this chapter, I have shown that the organization’s embeddedness in the 
Boston context partly contributes to this outcome. The GBIO has developed strong ties 
to policymakers and has an important alliance structure. On the other hand, however, 
the organization does encounter competition from other nonprofits and IAF-type 
networks, making it more difficult to retain members and grow over time. Therefore, I 
 84 
argue it is critical to examine the organization’s intentional creation of a culture of 
commitment and accountability: the rituals, the faith-based identity, and the language 
they use encourages members to act. Finally, when the organization starts to drift 
towards greater conservatism, I show how corrective mechanisms in the form of 
reflection and deliberation come into place, enabling the organization to steer itself 
back into the direction of its mission: building a powerful organization through 
relationships and public action.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ORGANIZING IN LONDON: SCALING UP THE EFFORTS 
 
In 2005, after four rounds of intense voting, London won the bid to host the 2012 
Olympic games. These were the world’s first Living Wage Olympics: Everyone 
employed on the site was paid the London Living Wage, or £8.30 an hour, which is 
about $13 an hour, or $4 more than the country’s minimum wage. For London, one of 
the most unequal cities in the world, trailblazing the first Living Wage Olympics is a 
small but important step towards the ideal of a more equitable, sustainable society. 
Policymakers did not take this decision as an act of good will; it was the result of 
fierce and consistent organizing by London Citizens (LC), Britain’s largest community 
organization. London Citizens, a broad-based organization at the time comprising over 
80 diverse local institutions such as churches, schools, and mosques, worked hard to 
convince the then Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, and Sebastian Coe, the 
chairman of the 2012 bid, to include an appendix with the bid guaranteeing the living 
wage, a construction skills academy, investment in local schools and healthcare, and 
affordable housing on the available land for local people after the games. “If you are 
well organized, everything is an opportunity, and if you are disorganized, most things 
are a threat,” states Neil Jameson, London Citizens’ lead organizer. London Citizens 
turned these games into a triumph: the living wage was guaranteed, two new 
construction training academies opened in 2009, two new schools and a health center 
have been built on the site, and negotiations to construct affordable housing after the 
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games are underway. Indeed, in the words of a London Citizens’ organizer, 
“Democracy and politics really do work – if you’re organized.”33  
In 1996, about 1,300 people from over 30 organizations attended the founding 
assembly of the East London Citizens Organization (TELCO).  Over the past 15 years, 
the organization has grown exponentially, comprising over 200 organizations and 
representing over 200,000 people. At the same time, British citizens are becoming 
increasingly alienated from traditional institutions such as faith organizations, trade 
unions, and political parties (Wills 2012), and scholars have deplored the demise of 
social and community life in places like London (Putnam 2007). At a time when civic 
engagement is at a low point, how has the organization managed this extraordinary 
growth, and what are some of the challenges related to this growth? In this chapter, I 
will show the importance of the institutional context in which the organization is 
embedded, as well as the organizers’ particular strategies, focusing on membership 
diversification and national as well as local campaigns.  
 
Extraordinary growth 
More than any other IAF organization, London Citizens has shown a tremendous 
capacity for growth in terms of membership and number of organizers, as well as 
budget. Between 1996 and 2012, the number of member organizations increased from 
under 50 to over 200.  Its fastest growth has been in schools, with over 70 schools 
signed up as members, or more than one third of its total membership.  Over the past 
                                                
33 The New York Times. March 21, 2012. “ Before Games, Workers Win a Big Event” by Michael Powell. The New 
York Times. April 3, 2012. “The Games Help Londoners” by Neil Jameson. London Citizens. 2012. 
http://www.citizensuk.org/campaigns/london-2012-olympics/  
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few years, a handful of synagogues has joined as well. Furthermore, the organizers 
have built chapters in South, West, and North London, as well as in other cities across 
the UK, such as Milton Keynes, Nottingham, and Birmingham, and they are currently 
in the process of setting up chapters in Cardiff and Glasgow.  The aim is to become a 
truly national organization by 2015.  London Citizens has also expanded in terms of 
paid organizers, from a handful when I joined them in 2008, to about 30 today. 
Finally, its budget has increased more than ten fold, from  just over £100,000, or about 
$150,000, in 2002 to about £1,250,000, or about $2 million, by 2012 (LC Annual 
Report 2012). The bulk of its income, about 85%, comes from donations or grants 
from external foundations, and the remaining 15% comes from its membership dues 
(Figure 1). 
Over the past decade, London Citizens has been transformed from a small 
organization working with poor, lower class communities in East London to a million-
dollar organization encompassing large parts of the middle class across London and 
the UK.  To discover the factors underlying LC’s amazing success, I first examine the 
political landscape of London, the organization’s access to policymakers, and its 
relationship with the trade unions. Next, I explore the strategic dimensions that have 
contributed to its growth. 
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Figure 1. London Citizens’ growth over time 
 
Source: LC Annual Report 2012 
 
London: The Quintessential Global City  
London is a strategic node in the world economy and politics. With over eight million 
people, a growing international population, and about $450 billion in GDP, London is 
the quintessential global city (Sassen 2001; Holgate and Wills 2007). While its 
manufacturing industry has been in decline, London’s finance and business services 
are burgeoning; the city consistently ranks first on the Global Financial Centres Index 
(GFCI 2012). The process of economic transformation and globalization, however, 
came hand in hand with growing inequality.  London has been referred to as a “dual 
city:” two increasingly separate economies contained within the same geographical 
area. The city has become extremely polarized, with the highest proportion of 
households in both the top and bottom income deciles nationally and a poverty rate 
greater than that of any other region in England (Gordon et al. 2009; MacInnes and 
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Kenway 2009; Fainstein et al. 2011). Furthermore, London’s unprecedented economic 
growth in the past decades has been built largely on new communities of low-paid 
workers – often migrants from Eastern Europe, South America, Africa, and South and 
East Asia – working as cleaners and hotel workers, taxi drivers and laborers. These 
vital workers are frequently exploited, lacking decent working conditions, a living 
wage, or trade union representation.  Union density in London is amongst the lowest 
in the UK and declined from 25% in 2001 to just over 20% in 2011 (Brownlie 2011). 
This number drops into the single digits for the private sector, the retail sector, and 
even  in the public sector due to the widespread use of subcontracting for jobs such as 
cleaning, maintenance, and catering. In addition, over the past few years, London has 
had an unemployment rate of over 8%.  
 Since 2011, white British people were for the first time in the minority in 
London (ONS 2011). Furthermore, since 2001, there has been a sharp decrease in the 
number of people identifying themselves as Christians, an increase in atheists, and an 
upsurge in the Muslim population (over one million people in London identify 
themselves as Muslim). This burgeoning ethnic and religious heterogeneity, while 
characteristic of an advanced, modern society, comes with great challenges, with the 
poorest wards being the most diverse.  As Putnam (2007) argued, this growing 
diversity makes it particularly challenging to forge bonds or build social capital across 
the communities.  
  One way to counteract this tendency has been the government’s push for a so-
called Big Society.  David Cameron’s “Big Society” was intended to contrast with 
New Labour’s big state by promoting volunteer work and social enterprise to enhance 
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social inclusion. Even though the concept of “Big Society” did not gain much traction 
on the campaign trail, when the new coalition government of Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats was elected in May 2010, the Big Society agenda was adopted 
again. In December 2010, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government, Eric Pickles, announced the Localism Bill, intended to shift power and 
control from the central government to councils and communities. He argued that, “By 
getting out of the way and letting councils and communities run their own affairs we 
can restore civic pride, democratic accountability and economic growth -- and build a 
stronger, fairer Britain. It’s the end of the era of big government: laying the 
foundations for the Big Society.” The plan includes setting up a Big Society Bank to 
encourage social enterprises, promoting civic service for 16 year olds, and training 
5,000 community organizers in Saul Alinsky’s tradition.  The Big Society idea has 
evoked the criticism, however, that the increased responsibility laid on the 
communities and the voluntary sector might disguise the dismantling of the state, 
budget cuts, and privatization (Alcock 2010; Taylor 2011).  
London Citizens, on the other hand, has been successfully organizing these 
communities for almost two decades. It is a powerful alliance of churches, mosques, 
synagogues, schools, universities, trade unions, and migrant groups, developing the 
leadership capacities of its members and working on small local as well as large 
national campaigns. Its groundbreaking work on the living wage has attracted the 
attention of the trade unions, as well as policy makers such as the former and current 
Mayors of London and the leadership of the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal 
Democrat parties.   
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Allies and Enemies in London 
To be based in London, the capital of a very small country with a centralized 
government structure, has clear advantages, as LC has been able to influence policy at 
a city-wide and national level.  London Citizens prides itself on the fact that it is the 
only player in town. Community organizing is indeed a rather new phenomenon in the 
UK, and so far the organization has not encountered strong competition from other 
groups. As one of the organizers said, “It is gloriously open in the UK; the ground is 
fairly fertile, we have an amazing team, people with a raw kind of hunger and energy. 
If we can keep the show on the road, hopefully by 2015, we can expand, have 5,000-
10,000 people in a big assembly with party leaders.” As LC has grown, however, the 
organizers have become increasingly solicitous of their brand in terms of the 
profession and craft, guarding, for example, the intellectual property over their 
teaching material and ensuring that the organizers of the chapters outside London are 
being trained through their so-called “Guild of Community Organizers.”  
LC can take advantage of the enormous intellectual wealth in the city. Many of 
the young organizers come with a university degree from Oxford or Cambridge, and 
over the past three years a new Masters in Community Organizing has been 
established at the Queen Mary University of London. The Masters’ director, Prof. Jane 
Wills, has been a bridge building figure, as many of the Masters’ participants have 
interned or worked with London Citizens.  Furthermore, through the department of 
Geography, Prof. Wills has provided the organization with critical research material 
regarding the Living Wage.  
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Access to Policymakers 
London Citizens’ access to key policymakers at the city as well as the national level 
has grown significantly over the past decade. Starting in 1996 as The East London 
Citizens or TELCO, it represented a little known small alliance, mainly of churches, 
mosques, and migrant groups, fighting hard in local campaigns such as supermarket 
pricing in poor communities or fixing street signs and potholes in local boroughs. 
Since the launch of the living wage campaign in 2001, however, it has gained 
considerable traction, capturing the attention of key policy makers.  
Drawing from the experience of its sister organization in Baltimore, and 
especially after hearing of the low pay and dreadful working conditions of their – 
mostly migrant – member communities, TELCO took on the fight for a living wage to 
improve the abysmal pay and working conditions for cleaners and janitors in the 
hospitals in East London; at big financial companies in Canary Wharf; in art galleries, 
universities, and luxury hotels; and in the 2012 Olympics. London Citizens has used a 
full battery of tactics, including public assemblies with up to 1,000 people, occupying 
a branch of HBSC in Oxford Street, attending National Health Services Trust board 
meetings, and holding big, colorful marches and rallies across the city. Indeed, by 
mobilizing its diverse membership it is able to confront and pressure key policy 
makers, gather momentum, and engage in a renewed kind of politics that has brought 
genuine positive change in the working and living conditions of thousands of people. 
LC was able to convince then Mayor Ken Livingstone, as well as current Mayor Boris 
Johnson, to grant a living wage to all Greater London Authority (GLA) staff and 
contractors. In addition, more than 100 businesses from different sectors, both local 
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and global firms, have signed up, among others, Barclays, the first Canary Wharf firm 
to sign up; HSBC,; KPMG; Queen Mary University of London; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers; and Deloitte.  As a result, since 2001, the campaign has 
benefited over 45,000 employees, adding over £210 million to some of the lowest-paid 
workers (for more details on the living wage, see Wills 2004; Holgate and Wills 2007; 
Holgate 2009).  
In line with other IAF organizations, London Citizens has held Accountability 
Assemblies, in which it holds the incumbent and candidate policy makers accountable 
for their past actions and presses them for new commitments.  Since 2000, LC has 
organized four Mayoral accountability assemblies, each one more diverse and with a 
larger turnout than the one before.  In April 2012, for example, over 2,500 people 
gathered at the Methodist Central Hall, giving the current Mayor, Boris Johnson, as 
well as the candidates, Ken Livingstone, Jenny Jones, and Brian Paddick, often just 
two minutes to respond to questions.  These are spectacular events, streamed live 
online, with a lot of show, music, and dance, but also with emotional testimonies of – 
often migrant – workers telling how they barely make ends meets, of children growing 
up in overcrowded and molded houses, and of mothers, whose sons have been stabbed 
to death, asking for safer streets. As described in one of the leading newspapers, 
“There was a moment on Wednesday night when the eyes of the three leading 
candidates for London's mayoralty simultaneously went moist. Barbara, a 34-year-old 
cleaner of Polish descent who lives in Wood Green, was describing her working day 
for the Hilton Hotel chain. She gets a net income of £3 for each room that she does 
and has to clean more than 17 rooms a day with no pay for overtime if she cannot 
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finish. She survives on just £5 a day for food, clothes and all the basics. ‘I can't afford 
to have children,’ she told a rapt audience, ‘but a Living Wage would change my 
life.’” These packed assemblies are a testament to London Citizens’ growth, power, 
and impact, or as Mayor Boris Johnson put it, “the brilliant and, may I say, ruthless 
way in which you [London Citizens] bend us politicians to your will, and get us to 
deliver on the good things that we both believe in.”  
London Citizens has developed close relationships as well with the leaders of 
the three main political parties, Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat. The 
current Conservative prime minister, David Cameron, praised Boris Johnson’s 
endorsement of the living wage, calling it “an idea whose time has come.” 
Furthermore, in 2010, three days before the national elections, then Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown, candidates David Cameron of the Conservative and Nick Clegg of the 
Liberal Democrat party, gathered on stage at London Citizens’ national assembly, 
pledging to work with the organization after the election and committing to issues 
such as the living wage, affordable housing, and ending child detention.  Even though 
Gordon Brown ended up losing that election, his speech at the LC assembly was 
widely acclaimed to be his best of the whole campaign, resulting in the highest hits on 
YouTube. 
Its ties with policymakers have facilitated its growth.  London Citizens is 
increasingly recognized as a powerful organization that can actually make things 
happen, receiving positive exposure in the press, so that when it recruits institutions, 
they are likely to join. 
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Red Tories, Blue Labour, and London Citizens 
Over the past three years, London Citizens has actually been courted by each of the 
major political parties. The concept and praxis of community organizing is “where the 
narratives of Red Tory, Blue Labour and Big Society meet.”34 The Red Tories, i.e., 
socially progressive conservatives that promote social enterprises and bottom-up 
community engagement, as well as Blue Labour, i.e., Labour party members that aim 
at reinvigorating local communities and strengthening local institutions, share a 
narrative in which community organizing is central.35 At the assembly, David 
Cameron told London Citizens, “I talk about the Big Society; you are the Big 
Society.”  Indeed, the empowerment of local communities is one of the core elements 
of the Big Society agenda. Ed Miliband, the current leader of the Labour Party, 
considering the organizing model of London Citizens to be the way to revitalize the 
dormant Labour Party, hired the American IAF organizer Arnie Graf to help with a 
voter registration drive, develop a grassroots network, and transform Labour’s 
bureaucratic culture into a more relational one by addressing the importance of one-to-
one meetings between people from the communities and Labour Party members.   The 
living wage was a centerpiece of Miliband’s campaign, recognizing the work that 
London Citizens has done over the past decade. His brother, David Miliband, has 
started the “Movement for Change,” a bottom-up initiative built on the insights of 
London Citizens, which aims to train and develop community organizers within the 
                                                
34 The Evening Standard. April 27, 2012. “People Power is the New Force Changing London” by Andrew Neather, 
and Amol Rajan.  
35 Philip Blond, regarded as one of the most significant thinkers courted by the Conservative Party, commercialized 
the term Red Tory and is on London Citizens’ board of trustees. Lord Maurice Glasman, who worked with London 
Citizens for many years, has coined the term Blue Labour. Glasman, a senior lecturer at the London Metropolitan 
University, has recently been appointed by Ed Miliband to the House of Lords. 
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Labour movement.  
 
Too Cozy with Policymakers? The looming threat of cooptation. 
While access to policymakers has given London Citizens significant recognition over 
the past several years, it has not come without challenges. Even though it would be 
illegal for LC to become partisan – it is a charity – in everything it does it is 
intentionally political. But if the organization gets too close to Mayor Boris Johnson, it 
might damage its relationship with the Labour party, whereas if it gets too close to Ed 
or David Miliband, it could damage its relationship with David Cameron.  The terrain 
is thus strongly contested, and LC tries to carve out a space in which to be considered 
independent.   
Being too cozy with policymakers, however, presents different challenges.  
Most importantly, when Prime Minister David Cameron sought advice from London 
Citizens on how to build his Big Society, LC suggested endowing a community 
organizing institute.36 As a result, Cameron promised a £1 million contract to train 
5,000 community organizers, later scaled down to 500.  After intense debate and 
hearing the recommendations of the trustees, a vote at LC’s annual general meeting 
was held, with a majority voting in favor of tendering a bid. Even though the 
organization was mentioned in the request for the proposal, it was “extremely 
fortunate not to win in this case” (Wills 2012, emphasis added). Indeed, London 
Citizens’ proximity to national politics, together with its growth and ambition, has 
brought the real risk of cooptation.  According to many of the interviewees, the 
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decision to tender for the bid was a very pragmatic one; the sentiment was “If we 
don’t do it, someone else will and will destroy the craft and the track record we have 
so far.”  The lure of large sums of money, as well as the chance to create a new 
generation of community organizers across the UK, seemed like a marvelous 
opportunity, but as one of the members argued, “It is different having a relationship 
with them or actually being captured by them.”  The bid was won by an organization 
with long government contracting experience, and while cost has been mentioned as 
one of the reasons LC did not win, according to Neil Jameson, the founder and 
director of LC, “We teach people to take power…that radical edge antagonizes some 
people.”37  London Citizens remains indeed much more powerful by putting pressure 
on the political parties from the outside, rather than being institutionalized and 
becoming a mere interest group. Keeping its independence in terms of money as well 
as relational ties allows the organization to build up a broad-based alliance, mobilize 
its members, and hold leaders of the political parties accountable for their actions, 
regardless of whether they’re Red Tories or Blue Labour.  
Furthermore, the organization doesn’t shy away from consultancy, helping to 
increase its budget and to strengthen its ties with policymakers. One of the lead 
organizers describes this decision:  “To withdraw or remain pure is not the right thing 
to do… it is limiting to think we’re completely independent or a pure model; what is a 
pure model?  Just churches, doing lots of congregational development campaigns, 
listening to each other and trying to tell the state to build a youth club in the area?  
                                                                                                                                       
36 LC suggested an endowment because one of the IAF principles is not to accept money directly from the 
government.  
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That is limiting.” However, the cleanest way to work with political parties is to focus 
on specific issues, such as getting people better jobs. The aim for all is to work 
towards the common good. But when the focus is on the method – organizing – it  
becomes more complicated. When an LC organizer works as a consultant for 
Movement for Change, or when LC offers a 2-day training on social action for people 
from the Conservative Party, the aim becomes much more explicitly to get members 
of those parties re-elected rather than to work towards the common good. 
Finally, their relationship with Mayor Boris Johnson is especially significant. It 
is not just a cozy and friendly one, but one in which both sides are able to deliver. 
Issues such as the living wage, jobs, affordable housing, and safer streets are part of 
the mayor’s agenda, so it has been relatively easy to find common ground.  However, 
LC will not go head to head with the mayor. For example, when LC embarked on an 
anti-usury campaign in conjunction with other IAF affiliates, the organizers quickly 
realized that Boris Johnson, a big defender of the City of London, would not be on 
board. As a consequence, the organization decided to drop the issue for the time and 
perhaps take it up again during the election campaign of 2015. The mayor is indeed 
considered a close ally where there is enough synergy and overlap between their 
interests, so it is not worth the risk of losing his support over this particular issue. 
 
Rocky relationship with the trade unions. 
“There’s definitely territoriality and jealousy, … South East Regional 
TUC for example through the whole period in which Ken Livingston 
was mayor, felt they had, you know hey had a right, this was their 
                                                                                                                                       
37 The Guardian. February 15, 2011. “Faith and fairy dust: Citizens UK was a shoo-in for a big society contract - 
until the urge to control overtook the coalition” by Madeleine Bunting. 
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relationship with the mayor. Did they do anything? No. Did they win a 
living wage for the Olympics? No. Did they convince Ken Livingston 
to introduce the London Living Wage? No. So when London Citizens 
did it, it shut them up… and so rather than saying Oh God we missed a 
trick here, let’s get on board with these people, they backed off, they 
undercut them, every chance they could get.” 
 
London Citizens has pioneered the living wage campaign in the UK. While essentially 
a key issue of the trade unions, the latter did not come on board until 2004, and the 
relationship between these two types of organizations has been fraught with difficult 
challenges. The success of the living wage campaign caught the attention of the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU, now Unite), which in 2003 had 
elected a new Secretary-general and decided to focus on membership growth through 
organizing new workplaces.   Building on LC’s success, the union engaged in a 
campaign to unionize the cleaners at Canary Wharf, culminating in the Justice for 
Cleaners campaign (for more details please see Wills 2008; Hearn and Bergos 2011; 
Adler et al. 2013).  
 While collaborations have occurred, these are often in the form of ad hoc, 
short-term event campaigns, rather than sustainable alliances, and are often dependent 
on the support of a few trade unionists rather than part of a comprehensive strategy.  
Ironically, LC has received more recognition from Unite-Here, the American union for 
hotel and restaurant workers, than from the UK unions.38 Hostility between the 
organizations has been identified along three different lines: territory, religion, and 
structure (Holgate 2009). First, unions have perceived the community organization as 
                                                
38 Between 2006 and 2009, London Citizens and UNITE-HERE worked together on the hotel workers rising 
campaign to take the living wage to London’s hotel sector by targeting the Hilton group. LC has received small 
grants from some of the UK unions, but these were dwarfed by Unite Here’s generosity. 
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stepping on their terrain. For example, one outcome of London Citizens’ hotel living 
wage campaign was the creation of the ‘London Citizens Workers’ Association’ 
(LCWA), a unique attempt to organize London’s low-wage migrant workers by 
providing a voice for this invisible workforce which fuels the city’s economic success.  
The LCWA, a copy of the  “worker centers” model in the United States, brought low-
wage immigrant workers together and sought to pressure employers for fair working 
conditions.  Although the main purpose of the LCWA was to eventually bring the 
workers into a trade union, tensions between these two organizations began to grow, 
as LC was considered a threat to the trade unions rather than an ally. As one of the 
interviewees argued, “They [the unions] decided that London Citizens had 
overstepped its boundaries by going off and starting to organize these people and that, 
you know, it was stepping on their toes.” As a result, London Citizens decided to drop 
this project and shift its focus again towards negotiations with management.  
Second, trade unionists have been suspicious of the many religious 
organizations that are part of London Citizens. However, while LC has many faith 
communities in its membership, it would argue that it is not a religious organization. 
Tapping into religious communities has been in part pragmatic, as these are already 
organized pockets in society. As one of the members argued, “You don’t have to 
believe in faith, you know, I don’t, I’m very secular… nonetheless I’ve hung out with 
lots of faith people over this period of time and I simply respect that that’s where their 
motivation comes from,… it’s a bizarre, bizarre position [being suspicious about 
working with faith communities] it really really is. Especially if you’re trying to talk 
about organizing people in the migrant communities.”  
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Finally, a very different structure comes to the forefront. LC, as an 
organization of organizations, has a dynamic structure, in which actions are taken up 
instantly and unsuccessful projects, such as setting up the LCWA, will be discarded. 
Attending staff meetings, I was impressed by the lively participation, the energetic 
brainstorming, and the flexibility that permitted immediate action. Trade unions, on 
the other hand, have a much more rigid structure, or, as put by a Unison officer, “We 
don’t have the mechanisms put in place… we’ve got so many layers of bureaucracy 
and committees and you know a million things that you’d have to get through to make 
something like that happen.” This spontaneity and direct-action of London Citizens 
has, however, heightened the tensions between the organizations, as LC is often 
perceived as taking a “hot shop” approach to organizing (organizing over an 
immediate grievance and leaving as soon as it is resolved) to get media attention. For 
example, during my stay in July 2008, a branch of the TGWU was working on a 
campaign disclosing unfair pay for waitresses.  As one of the restaurants was located 
in Canary Wharf, where LC has done a lot of work on the living wage, LC organized 
an internal meeting and quickly decided to target Carluccio’s restaurant.  Midway 
through dinner that evening, LC unfolded a big banner of London Citizens and the 
living wage, resulting in a short article and picture in the Independent newspaper.  
While LC’s flexibility allows for a meeting in the afternoon followed by concrete 
action in the evening, this type of organizing has not been appreciated by trade unions, 
which often lobby behind closed doors for months and plan out demonstrations and 
rallies a long time in advance. In situations like the Carluccio one, rather than being 
regarded as an ally, LC is perceived as trying to steal the union’s thunder. 
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 Trade unions have thus not always been London Citizens’ closest allies.  While 
these three points of contention are significant, they are not always enough to explain 
the lack of collaboration between the two organizations. While the head of the Unison 
branch in London, for example, is not very supportive of London Citizens, the 
opposite is true in Nottingham or Cardiff. In the latter cities, the unions have 
contributed £20,000 of seed money for setting up a new Citizens organization. The 
unions play an active role in the new community organizations, attending trainings and 
meetings, and are part of the core constituency.  According to one of the lead 
organizers, there is a much more constructive relationship between the union and the 
community organizations in those cities for the following reasons: the unions possess 
much more power and play a much greater role in Cardiff and in Nottingham than in 
London, so it would be hard to do anything without having the unions on board; in 
addition, there are fewer people active in faith-based groups there; and, finally, there 
are fewer young people in Nottingham or Cardiff than in London. As a result, these 
new community organizations focus less on schools and faith-based groups than 
London Citizens.  
 
Strategic factors explaining LC’s growth. 
While the external environment is important to LC’s success, I turn now to some of 
the internal organizational dimensions, as well as the strategic decision-making of the 
organizers, to further explain LC’s extraordinary growth. 
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Institutional and Relational 
To understand LC’s extraordinary growth, it is important to examine its internal 
organizational dimensions. First, in line with other IAF organizations, London 
Citizens relies upon institutional rather than individual members. The organization has 
a very broad and diverse membership list, including schools and universities, trade 
unions, Catholic and Protestant churches, and Muslim congregations. This institutional 
membership provides the organization with the necessary stability, resources, and 
legitimacy (Chaison and Bigelow 2002).  
Second, the aim is to build relational, institutional power. Their radical tool of 
the relational, or one-to-one, meetings is the backbone of IAF organizations and vital 
for all the member communities. The community leaders believe that without these 
conversations, the relationship with the individual members would be weak and 
superficial, and the institutions would as a consequence flounder and fail. Its 
institutional membership as well as its emphasis on relational meetings have been 
emphasized by Wills (2012) as the critical factor in explaining LC’s growth:  “a 
territorial but institutionally networked architecture allows the alliance [London 
Citizens] to connect islands of social solidarity, and to forge relationships between 
longstanding leaders within these institutions, creating a new community able to 
operate at the scale of the city itself” (115).  While this might explain part of LC’s 
growth, other IAF organizations have not been able to take advantage of their 
institutional membership and relational culture to the same effect.  
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Membership Diversification 
One element that stands out, however, is London Citizens’ focus on membership 
diversification. Membership growth is more likely when the organizers can tap into 
diverse types of organizations instead of limiting themselves to faith-based groups. In 
the UK, churches are much poorer and emptier than in the US. In addition, even 
though mosques have started to mushroom in London, they don’t have abundant 
resources. The British organizers, therefore, had to be creative concerning their 
sources of funding, making them highly diverse from the start. Over the past years, 
their fastest growth has been with schools, which represent over one third of the total 
membership.  London Citizens’ CitySafe campaign, striving for safer streets by 
promoting so-called safe-havens, has been instrumental in getting more schools 
involved, since it is in the interests of students, parents, and teachers. The campaign 
allows for great social action without being too political or controversial. Finally, 
schools have significant resources in money, staff, and energetic young people that LC 
can tap into.  
In the US, IAF organizations have not been able to engage schools to the same 
extent. Whereas in the UK, the head teacher has executive power and independence, in 
the US, the supervisors operate within the bureaucratic and political control of elected 
officials, and party politics often prevent schools from being involved. As a result, the 
supervisor will block the principal from any community involvement.  In the UK, 
almost the opposite occurs, with the government trying to push schools to organize. 
The Inspectorate for Education, for example, rates schools on issues such as 
community cohesion, student leadership, and parent involvement, making London 
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Citizens a natural ally. 
In addition to membership diversification, LC’s capacity and energy to engage 
in high-profile campaigns is an important factor in its success. 
 
A campaigning organization?  
Over the past decade, London Citizens has engaged in numerous victorious 
campaigns. Although the Living Wage Campaign can be considered a core activity, 
the organization focuses on other issues as well. The campaign ”Our Homes, Our 
London” called for affordable housing through community land ownership. Despite 
then Mayor Ken Livingstone’s 2004 pledge to develop Community Land Trust homes, 
after three years there was still little sign of progress. London Citizens augmented the 
pressure and pulled a major, highly visible stunt that was all over the mainstream 
media. In July 2007, over 100 families camped out in red tents by City Hall, urging 
immediate action. Even though the Mayor quickly announced a clear timetable for 100 
homes through the Community Land Trust in Bow, an area of East London, victory 
came only in 2012, when LC secured the first ever Community Land Trust housing 
development agreement.  
LC’s “CitySafe” campaign was still in the early stages during my visit in July 
2008, with many meetings taking place in different neighborhoods across London to 
discuss how to make inner cities safer for young people. This campaign originated in 
East London, then expanded to south London, where 16-year old Jimmy Mizen was 
the victim of a senseless murder in a bakery shop. Since then, LC has established over 
300 CitySafe havens (businesses that offer potential victims of crime a refuge) and 62 
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CitySafe zones, such as malls.   Following the 2011 Tottenham riots, North London 
Citizens (NLC) launched a listening campaign and produced a community-led 
response laying out the causes, such as high youth unemployment and fraught police-
community relations, as well as concrete recommendations to strengthen the 
community.  NLC listened to more than 700 people in the community and hosted three 
public hearings attended by hundreds of local community members, business leaders, 
and local councilors.  In a similar initiative, 50 days before the Olympics, LC 
established another 50 city safe zones in 19 London boroughs, reviving the ancient 
Greek tradition of an Olympic Truce before the start of the Games.  
One of the main reasons LC is so heavily involved in campaigning is funding. 
Although, according to the “IAF mantra,” all the money should be raised by 
membership dues, this has not been possible, given the poverty of UK churches and 
mosques.  Raising funds has therefore been a key activity over the past decade.  The 
organization must demonstrate its ability to win campaigns to gain legitimacy and 
recognition from the public and its funders. Since LC started off small, it needed to 
conduct high-profile campaigns in order to satisfy potential donors or foundations. 
The latter want to see concrete results, for example, winning a living wage campaign 
at the University of Queen Mary.  Much of the grant money LC receives is linked to 
carrying out specific projects or campaigns, rather than building the organization by 
conducting one-to-ones.  These actions come at a cost, since less time can be devoted 
to actual institution building. Although the relational culture underlies everything LC 
does, the campaigns are what identify it.  While I was in London, I noticed how hard it 
was to strike the right balance between relational power building and action planning.  
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As one of the lead organizers made clear: 
There is a tension in London Citizens. There is a tendency to dynamic 
action which seems to me often to deplete the organization more than 
to build it.  I need, as West London Citizens organizer, to be much 
more discerning about what actions we take, how many we do, 
constantly asking myself is it building the organization or is it depleting 
it, making it weaker. There is a real problem I think if we got a group 
of leaders in a church and say we’d like you to turn up for this hotel 
action [living wage campaign at Hyatt hotel]. They haven’t been 
engaged until now. Are we just using them? Do they then feel used as 
turnouts? I think that’s wrong. We mustn’t get to the point where our 
member institutions feel that they’re being used by London Citizens for 
the benefit of LC. And again it’s tail and dog. We are there to serve the 
institutions and not the other way around. 
 
According to IAF principles, the goal is to organize communities and build 
power. Working on issues through actions and campaigns is considered a means 
towards that end. Actions bring people together, give them energy, and make them 
realize they are not powerless but can actually make changes. But actions also involve 
time and energy; they must therefore be designed to build the organization and 
strengthen rather than deplete it.  Actions should consist of meetings, trainings, people 
getting together, forging links between different groups, and building long-term 
relationships. In addition, they should be followed by evaluation and reflection. Each 
action should therefore be a teaching opportunity. 
  London Citizens’ fervent engagement in almost daily actions and campaigns, 
however, sheds light on some of the challenges involved in striking the right balance 
between institutional development and action. As a way to recruit and retain member 
organizations, the strategy has been to get into action immediately. This philosophy, 
however, has come at the expense of organizing and developing the member 
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institutions internally.  As a result, according to one LC trustee, some of the 
relationships might be shallow. The need to develop leaders and strengthen 
institutional power through building relationships can be forgotten when the question 
becomes “when is the next action.”  According to one IAF mentor, every campaign, 
demonstration, or rally that does not develop leadership or that does not have any 
element of teaching is a total loss of opportunity, regardless of the material gains of 
the campaign.  
 
Mechanisms to counterbalance campaigning tendency 
If it hadn’t been for Jonathan Lange [American IAF organizer and 
mentor of LC], I think London Citizens would have spun off and would 
have become a campaigning organization…What Jonathan did was 
fundamentally kept it anchored to the principles of IAF…There is a 
basic principle that says ‘this is about leadership development’ and if 
you only do the spectacular razzle dazzle, you hollow the organization 
out. You got to constantly go back to those basic principles and so if it 
hadn’t been for that anchoring, it would have gotten off like a hot-air 
balloon in its own direction. 
 
Many organizers agree that they are involved in too many actions and therefore value 
the visits from Jonathan Lange, their American IAF mentor. Being part of a broader 
international network is critical for LC in terms of being reminded of the craft of IAF 
organizing and the need to build teams and develop leadership rather than get carried 
away by the glitter and glamour. It is a sort of external accountability that holds the 
organization true to its core principles and tradition. That way, the IAF institutions 
work as a ‘check’ on each other, guarding against becoming too bureaucratic or 
oligarchic, as this would undermine the organization’s movement ability, or against 
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becoming too much focused on action rather than institution building. According to 
one  LC member,  “When too much focus is on a certain action, to get a grant, other 
people may say ‘wait a minute, that is not our objective’ and steer it back in another 
direction.”  
The organization has strengthened, as well, its internal accountability structure.  
While the staff has grown over the past five years from a handful to about 30, the 
majority of the organizers have less than three years experience.  Over the past few 
months, LC has introduced a more systematic way of measuring the organizers’ 
performance, employing a model that comes directly from the IAF national directors 
and that consists of rules and procedures for advancing from a junior to a senior 
organizer. One of the critical elements is conducting a high number of one-to-one 
relational meetings per week. Indeed, as organizers can get lost in the midst of an 
action, these structures of internal accountability remind them of the fundamental tools 
of community organizing: building power through one-to-one relationships. 
Finally, there is a renewed focus on working at a local level. Smaller, more 
local campaigns are continuously ongoing in different neighborhoods on issues such 
as closing down local “crack houses,” improving security with increased police patrols 
and better lighting, putting up road signs near schools, providing a bursary scheme for 
students, guaranteeing that local councils adopt the living wage, and improving the 
services of local hospitals. This borough strategy – LC is currently active in 22 of the 
32 boroughs – focuses on rebuilding the teams, recruiting institutions, and local 
actions. Working at the borough level is important for fostering the relationships 
between institutions at that local level, which is often not possible when working on 
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national or city-wide campaigns.  Working at the level of the local borough is also 
politically important, as local councilors have enormous power over the borough and 
often get elected with just a couple of votes. Therefore, LC’s strategy is to build up a 
local political agenda for the local borough elections in 2014 and hold borough 
assemblies with a turnout of at least 500 people representing 10 to 15 institutions. 
 
The impact and challenges of community organizing in London 
Because it is located in a small country with a centralized government, LC has 
managed to build relationships with key political actors.  Its engagement with the 
political structure has enabled it to influence policy on a national level. For example, 
during one of the accountability assemblies, LC secured a commitment from the 
coalition government to end child detention for immigration purposes, to further 
encourage the implementation of the living wage, and to work on affordable housing.  
As it became more popular and received more media attention as well as recognition 
from key actors in society, LC became more appealing for other institutions to be part 
of.  In addition, in terms of strategy, LC has focused on diversifying its membership, 
adding at least 70 schools over the past few years; has been heavily engaged in big 
national as well as small local campaigns; and has put important external as well as 
internal accountability structures in place.  Finally, while it encounters little 
competition from other groups, since it is the largest and oldest broad-based 
community organization in the UK, it has at the same time been very protective of its 
brand and its craft of community organizing.  
Building a sustainable civic infrastructure has not come without challenges.  
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Especially in London, LC has a rather rocky relationship with the trade unions, 
resulting in ad hoc, instrumental collaborations rather than long-term, sustained 
alliances.  Furthermore, as a way to bring money in, LC has worked as consultants for 
the Conservative Party as well as the Labour Party.  The organization is aware, 
however, of the dangers of cooptation. As a result, these decisions did not come 
without any controversy, but were extensively discussed by the trustees. So far, LC 
has been able to remain nonpartisan while being courted by both political parties.  
Even though Margaret Thatcher used to say “There is no such thing as 
society,” London Citizens has proven over the past decades its ability to build a 
powerful civil society organization. From being a small organization in East London, 
it has grown to become an established power player at the borough, city, and national 
levels. The institutional context in which the organization is embedded as well as the 
organizers’ strategic decisions, focusing on membership diversification and high-
profile as well as small local campaigns, have contributed to LC’s success and growth. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
ORGANIZING IN BERLIN: FINDING THE RIGHT TRANSLATION 
 
 
As of May 2012, three IAF organizations had been built in Berlin, encompassing in 
total over 100 local member institutions.  In 1999, “Organizing Schöneweide” (OS) 
was created in the southeast borough of Berlin, representing 16 groups and now 
expanding to become “Berlin Südost.” In 2008, the community organization “Wir sind 
da” (we are there), with over 40 organizations, was built in Wedding-Moabit. A third 
community organization in Neukölln, representing over 30 institutions, held its 
founding assembly in January 2012. These three community organizations are 
supported by DICO (Deutsches Institut für Community Organizing) and led by Leo 
Penta and four paid IAF organizers, who are also setting up new organizations in other 
cities, such as Hamburg and Wuppertal.  Among these organizations’ substantial 
achievements have been:  bringing the main campus of the University for Applied 
Sciences to Schöneweide, improving job center services in Wedding-Moabit, and 
organizing successful mayoral accountability assemblies during election years, to 
which they invited the incumbent as well as mayoral candidates for the city of Berlin.  
As institutional theorists have argued, when organizational practices are 
transferred to a new environment, they encounter institutional pressures to 
isomorphically fit within that local environment, or, in other words, pressures to 
become similar to those institutions that already exist. Indeed, to achieve legitimacy, 
and eventually success and survival, novel organizations need to adapt to work within 
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the local cultural or market frameworks (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). In Germany, the civil society sector, already consisted of other 
(powerful) institutions, such as national and regional trade unions and local 
neighborhood managements, as well as a community organization called FOCO, or 
Forum for Community Organizing.  The IAF organization in Berlin, however, did not 
become similar to the already existing institutions, but remained rather unique. As a 
result, they were able to create a niche to survive in this setting and even grow. At the 
same time, however, the organizers had to be creative in making this unique model 
work in a German context.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first is an overview of Berlin’s 
political economy, illustrating how DICO is different from and/or similar to the other 
organizations in the civil society sphere.   Next, I zoom in on DICO and describe in 
greater detail the founding process of one of the organizations, explaining how, from 
its inception, it consciously produced a particular structure and culture.  Finally, I 
examine how the organization functions and some of the challenges it has 
encountered.  
 
Contemporary Berlin: “Poor but sexy” 
On 3 October 1990, East Germany, or the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
legally joined West Germany, or the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the 
newly united city of Berlin became a city-state, one of Germany’s sixteen federal 
states (Bundeslӓnder), with an elected Parliament that appoints a Senate. Berlin itself 
is subdivided into 12 boroughs, each governed by a borough council and a borough 
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Mayor. The West traditionally had a strong Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
presence, a major conservative party that mostly ruled in coalitions. The disclosure of 
a banking scandal at the end of the 1990s, however, put the power in the hands of the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD), mainly present in the West, which formed coalitions 
with left-wing parties based in the former East, such as the Party of Democratic 
Socialism (PDS) and the Left Party (Die Linke). The state elections of 2011, however, 
put the CDU back in play, and Berlin is again governed by a red-blue coalition, SPD-
CDU. The social democrat Klaus Wowereit has been the Mayor of Berlin since 2001.  
As Mayor Wowereit famously remarked in a television interview in 2004, 
“Berlin ist arm, aber sexy,” meaning Berlin is poor but sexy. Shortly after 
reunification, industry in Berlin collapsed, losing over 150,000 manufacturing jobs, 
with skyrocketing unemployment numbers. Industries of the former East couldn’t 
survive the exposure to outside market competition, while industries of the former 
West could not survive being cut off from special subsidies. Unemployment rose 
throughout the succeeding decades from about 10% in 1990 to 19% in 2006 and has 
only recently decreased to about 12% (Eures 2012). Even though the rate has gone 
down over the past few years, it is still well above the nation’s unemployment rate of 
about 6.5%.  Berlin’s annual gross domestic product is around EUR 101 billion, which 
is lower than that of most western European capital cities and many German cities 
such as Hamburg, Stuttgart, or Munich (Eurostat 2012).  
Berlin has not become the economic hub or the service metropolis once 
envisioned. Service sector jobs have not been able to compensate for Berlin’s low 
level of manufacturing activity, and it has only a weak presence of corporate 
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headquarters compared to other German cities. But, according to Krätke (2004), “new 
islands of economic growth have been developing in Berlin, particularly in so-called 
`knowledge-intensive' and innovation-driven activities like the software industry, 
biotechnology, medical engineering, the pharmaceutical industry, and research and 
development services; additionally, there has been significant growth in the Berlin 
media industry, which is based on the particularly strong ‘socio-cultural capital’ of 
Berlin” (515).  
While it is an affordable large city, attracting creative, well-educated young 
people, especially from Eastern Europe, not everyone has enjoyed an equal share in 
this development. With about 3.5 million inhabitants, Berlin is the largest city in 
Germany and has the second-highest percentage of immigrants, mostly from Turkey 
and Poland. The number of immigrants has been increasing over the years, currently at 
about 470,000 or 13% (Berlin 2012), mainly living in the West. During the Cold War, 
the West had “guest worker” agreements with Southern European countries, as well as 
with Turkey, while the East had temporary agreements with Vietnam, Algeria, 
Angola, Mozambique, and Cuba. After reunification, most of the contract workers 
from the East repatriated, except for a sizeable number of the Vietnamese, whereas in 
the West, the Turkish population mostly stayed. The immigrants have over twice the 
unemployment rate of Germans living in Berlin, and their children are more likely to 
attend lower division schools, resulting in a huge education gap (Silver 2006).  
Even after reunification, Berlin remains a very divided city, its divisions 
reinforced by spatial segregation.  Some neighborhoods are facing a process of 
gentrification in which the working-class is being pushed out as the area becomes 
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increasingly middle-class. This polarization has led to the development of programs 
that aim to enhance the social integration of the disadvantaged communities.  Most 
importantly, since the end of the 1990s, Berlin has participated in the so-called 
“districts with special development needs – the socially integrative city” program as a 
way to tackle social exclusion. As a consequence, in different neighborhoods 
throughout Berlin, “neighborhood managements” were created which are allocated  
certain amounts of resources to implement neighborhood specific projects on various 
themes, such as education, employment or housing.39 Based on resident participation, 
this program aims at alleviating poverty and reducing spatial segregation.  
In 2011, there were 34 areas in Berlin with active neighborhood managements.  
While established with good intentions, neighborhood managements have not been 
without their critics. Some scholars have argued that substantive issues such as 
poverty alleviation have not been touched upon at all; instead, many of these 
managements are preoccupied with the esthetics of their neighborhood, focusing on 
improving the physical environment and public space (Silver 2006). Others critics go a 
step further, showing how the social segregation has actually been reinforced by these 
managements, while meaningful grassroots participation has not been encouraged, 
undermining the potential for protest or civil disobedience (Marcuse 2006).   
In addition, Berlin suffers from a heavy fiscal deficit and has a growing debt of 
over 60 billion euros, leading to significant cuts in public welfare programs as well as 
the outsourcing of traditional state responsibilities to the non-profit, or so-called third, 
sector.  Many of the non-profits now heavily involved in urban development or 
                                                
39 Berlin’s Neighborhood Management is financed by the Federal State and by Berlin city-state, and receives 
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welfare programs arose out of the social movements of the 1970s and `80s, such as the 
squatter movement. While these movements were initially formed in solidarity with 
the underprivileged, the bulk of the nonprofits today, working as the extended arm of 
the local government, seem to reinforce their marginalization (Mayer 2006). Finally, 
Berlin has an active trade union scene, with a strong presence of the umbrella 
organization DGB, as well as the public sector union Ver.di and the metalworkers 
union IG Metall. While unions membership has gone down over the past few years, 
the unions remain powerful actors, especially, in driving labor market policies.  
How do the IAF community organizations in Berlin survive in this dense 
organizational landscape? To what extent do they build alliances with or encounter 
competition from other groups within the civil society sphere? 
 
Allies and enemies in Berlin  
While DICO has gained recognition from key policymakers, DICO’s access to 
policymakers and influence in the political sphere remains so far rather limited. 
Furthermore, even though the organization does not encounter a high level of 
competition, it does not have a strong alliance structure.  
In terms of access to policymakers, the organization is focusing more 
internally, on building its grassroots base, rather than externally, or strengthening their 
access to policymakers. That being said, DICO has gained important recognition from 
key actors over the past decade. In 2006, a first accountability assembly was held in 
the presence of four mayoral candidates from the local borough as well as nine 
                                                                                                                                       
financial support as well from the European Union (European Funds for Regional Development). 
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members of the Berlin Parliament. During this event almost 250 people from across 25 
member institutions and two local platforms turned out and worked together, making 
this event a huge success. Politicians remained perplexed by the turnout of IAF actions 
as well as by the diversity present in the room. In addition, over the past months 
smaller groups of five to six people representing the three organizations meet with 
politicians. By doing this, the local politicians are introduced to the idea and the 
functioning of community organizations and also the members might start to think 
about their participation not just within a neighborhood group, but part of a larger 
network.  
In terms of alliance structure, the civil society sphere consists moreover of the 
trade unions, the neighborhood managements, and the community organization 
FOCO. Trade unions could be a potential ally of the organization. “Never do for 
members what they can do for themselves,” the iron rule of IAF community 
organizing, can be read as well in IG Metall’s strategy report on organizing (IG Metall 
2008), which emphasizes the importance of a participatory rather than a 
representational model of organizing.  In addition, the IG Metall Youth section has 
republished Saul Alinsky’s work as a template for organizing. Even though Alinsky’s 
work has been emphasized by the German trade unions, however, most of the 
representatives I spoke with were not very familiar with the specific IAF organizations 
in Berlin; they learned about the IAF organizing principles through American trade 
unionists (mainly from the public sector union SEIU), trying to implement the 
organizing model in a German context.  Furthermore, while the IAF organizations in 
London and Boston have worked on labor-related issues, such as the living wage or 
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better working conditions for janitors and nurses, the organizations in Berlin have 
focused more on issues such as education and public infrastructure. Finally, each 
organization works at a different scale: the unions work mostly at a national or 
regional level, whereas the IAF organizations operate much more locally, at a borough 
or district level. Thus, given these distinct operating levels and the fact that they don’t 
work on similar issues, the attitude of trade unionists towards the IAF organizations 
has often been one of indifference.  
At the other end of the spectrum, the neighborhood managements work at a 
very local level. Each management encompasses a small residential area within a 
borough delineated by clear geographic boundaries, such as certain streets or a park. 
At first sight, their goals seem similar to those of the IAF organizations: these 
structures, run by people living in those neighborhoods, are intended to strengthen 
social cohesion and to promote social and ethnic integration. However, so far there has 
been virtually no cooperation between neighborhood managements and the IAF 
organizations. On the contrary, hostility between the two types is marked. The IAF 
organizers criticize the neighborhood managements for being too dependent on 
government funding and government experts, thereby impeding any real decision 
making by the residents. Some neighborhood managements, on the other hand, have 
accused primarily Leo Penta of running a sect rather than a community group.  As a 
result, there is little to no cooperation between the two types of organizations. 
Finally, the only organization at first glance similar to DICO that exists in 
Germany is called FOCO, or Forum for Community Organizing.  Set up in the mid-
1990s, FOCO came out of a comparative study on community organizing in the US 
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and Germany conducted by German scholars, who invited American community 
organizers to Frankfurt to hold a seminar on organizing, eventually leading to the 
creation of FOCO.  When Penta first came to Berlin he worked with FOCO but soon 
decided to go his own way. Currently, there are no signs of either collaboration or 
competition between the two organizations. The reasons are twofold: first, FOCO does 
not focus on Berlin, but operates in other cities across Germany such as Saarbrücken, 
Hamburg, and Uslar. As a consequence, the organizations don’t step on each other’s 
turf, thereby avoiding any competition. Second, and more importantly, FOCO does not 
actually build long-term community organizations; its representatives can be 
considered consultants or trainers, giving seminars on the principles of community 
organizing, rather than organizers. Thus, while FOCO brought the IAF principles to 
Germany, IAF organizers would argue that they adapted it too much, resulting in a 
watered down version. One of the reasons Penta left FOCO is exactly that: he wanted 
to do the work, rather than just teach it. According to one of the German scholars, 
“Penta is grounded in IAF, as an American organizer, it is part of his metabolism. 
Penta grew up in the States, trained in it [the States], has seen it work, and truly 
believes in it.” Indeed, the biography of the founder is important in shaping, at least 
partly, an organization’s survival and success (Ganz 2000).  
In sum, the IAF community organizations in Berlin have created a specific 
niche for themselves, working at the “meso” level. By operating mostly at the borough 
level, these organizations distinguish themselves from the big trade unions, since they 
are not working at a national or regional level, as well as from the very local 
neighborhood managements. The only other community organization, FOCO, 
 121 
functions more as a consultancy or training institute rather than a community 
organization. While DICO doesn’t encounter strong competition, it still lacks a strong 
alliance structure and access to policymakers. Nonetheless, the organization has been 
able to survive and grow in this rather hostile context. 
Next, I show how an IAF organization is built and how during the founding 
processes the organizers intentionally create a strong culture based on member 
commitment and accountability, contributing to the organization’s sustainability over 
time.  
 
The Founding Process of a New IAF Organization 
In order to survive and be successful, the organization, from its inception, adopted a 
hybrid logic of organizing, in which critical bureaucratic as well as social movement 
characteristics have shaped its structure as well as its culture.  
During my stay in Berlin, the Bürgerplattform “Wir in Neukölln” (WIN) was 
in its founding stages. The founding of an IAF organization is a long process, in this 
case taking over two years. Building up the organization from scratch, however, shows 
how the structure and culture come into place. First, decisions need to be made as to 
where to organize.  Once the geographic area is selected, enough organizations need to 
be on board, and a so-called internal action is held. The last phase is an external or 
public action, in which the members publicly announce the new organization. The 
importance of the founding process cannot be underestimated, as it builds the base for 
the organization. Most notably, during this founding process a specific culture and 
norms are created and reinforced.  
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In 2009, the lead organizers decided to expand and build another IAF 
organization, since the goal is to eventually build sufficient institutional power to run a 
united campaign affecting policies and making changes across the city. Building on 
the success of “Organizing Schöneweide” and the Bürgerplattform Wedding-Moabit 
“Wir sind da” the organizers decided to try it in Reineckendorf, an area that borders 
Wedding and Moabit. But after about three months of one-to-one meetings with 
various groups in the area, they concluded that it was not the right place. The area 
seemed too divided into little quarters, very different one from the others. In addition, 
there were many pockets of middle-class people who did not “have enough anger or 
energy to want to change anything.”  The area had had the same Mayor for the last 15 
years, and the majority of the inhabitants seemed content with her and did not feel any 
urge to fight on particular issues. 
 Next, the organizers shifted ground and had parallel meetings in Schöneberg 
and Neukölln.  After a period of about six months of talks with local leaders, such as 
pastors, school principals, and teachers, the organizers sat down together and 
unanimously agreed Neukölln would be the place to create a new Bürgerplattform.  
Schöneberg is a big district that merged with other areas.  The different quarters did 
not feel they were part of one district and had no interest in working together.  In 
addition, some of the pastors in the area were rather dismissive regarding the creation 
of a Bürgerplattform, seeing no potential in it. Neukölln presented a completely 
different picture.  
Even though the organizers were hesitant at first – Leo Penta had tried to 
organize in the same area ten years before– they argued that, this time, people were 
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ready to fight. The citizens complained mainly about high unemployment and the 
safety and quality of the public schools. In addition, with a large migrant population, 
some streets in Neukölln are perceived as dangerous; there is almost a sense of 
“ghettoization,” hostility, and division. In the words of one organizer “one spark can 
bring this volcano to erupt.”  Many of the migrants, however, felt discriminated 
against because no one ever asked them how they felt or what they needed to change 
the situation.  While there are local initiatives and groups working on some of these 
issues, they tend to cover only the northern or southern part of the borough. In that 
sense, building an encompassing platform to truly enforce some sort of change seemed 
attractive to many members.  
Once the decision was made to build a platform in Neukölln, countless one-on-
one meetings took place between an IAF organizer and leaders from the various 
community institutions. At the end of each conversation, the organizer would invite 
the leader to an info meeting providing a broader explanation of what the 
Bürgerplattform was all about, how the groups could benefit from it, and how it would 
work.  Over the course of one year they would hold about ten info meetings in which 
different groups would be present – ranging from 10 to 30 people in each meeting –
giving the different groups an opportunity to meet one another.  By September 2010, 
these one-to-one and info meetings ultimately culminated in a so-called 
Gründungskreis, or founding committee, represented by 18 groups. At the same time, 
IAF organizers canvassed medium and small business owners in the area to see 
whether they would be interested in funding the platform. 
The next step was to hold a first internal action. For these groups, to actually 
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show how it works, the task is to bring enough people together, explaining in their 
own words what community organizing is about and why they decided to join the 
platform. Here the exercise is really to show the importance of turnout and, at the 
same time, the difficulty of mobilizing.  Every group was asked to bring ten of its own 
members as well as people from organizations that were not yet part of the founding 
committee. The goal was to gather at least 180 people, but the organizer pushed for 
more than that. In the end, 268 people showed up, turning their first internal action 
into a huge success.  
During that action, leaders – rather than the IAF organizer –went on stage and 
explained what had been done so far and what the platform was planning to do.  
Intense coaching by the IAF organizer precedes this form of leadership development. 
The organizer and leader will sit down, go over the notes, and practice the lines. 
Indeed, the organizers will often closely guide the members throughout the process. In 
addition, a voting system was set in place. Leaders would vote on topics such as when 
the founding assembly would take place: whether they would wait until they got to 50 
groups or hold it regardless of the number but within a certain time frame. Another 
important topic was whether groups that came to the meetings but had not officially 
decided to join could continue to come every time and watch without really engaging.  
Another issue was how to deal with groups that officially joined but whose members 
would not show up. It is clear that important parts of the culture and the norms were 
created during these initial stages.  During the founding process, the significance of 
member participation, decision-making, commitment, and turnout is emphasized 
through voting procedures as well as certain rituals. 
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Furthermore, during this process it was critical to aim for a diversified 
membership. The group existed so far more or less of half German and half non-
German groups, half religious and half non-religious groups. The members wanted to 
get more schools on board, and the organizer argued, “If of all these 70 schools which 
I know in Neukölln, we get two, three, five, that is fine. We don’t need to get them all. 
We don’t want only schools… they will dominate a discussion about a certain topic.” 
Finally, on January 25th 2012, the founding assembly took place. Over 1,000 
people gathered in Villa Müzikhol, a ballroom in Neukölln where Turkish weddings 
are often held, and over 30 groups introduced themselves as official members of  “Wir 
in Neukölln” or WIN.  As is typical for IAF founding assemblies, a member of each 
organization went on stage and explained why they had decided to join the platform. 
As one of the members stated, “We don’t want to live in a ‘parallel society’… we are 
German Muslims who finally want to show what [we] can do. That can be done only 
[when we live] in one community.”40 The platform is, for many, considered an 
opportunity to bridge ethnic and religious divisions in the community. Two strangers, 
such as 35-year old Tom Hansings, the chairman of a local clothing design shop, and 
42-year old Ercan Yilmaz, a member of the Islamic community Milli Görüs, while 
living less than a quarter of a mile apart, would probably not have met without the 
platform.  Hansings argues “I was for the first time in a Mosque thanks to the 
Bürgerplattform” and for Yilmaz the Bürgerplattform gives the Evangelical, Catholic, 
and Muslim communities a chance to build  bridges between their worlds, which 
otherwise would not happen. In addition, according to some participants, WIN doesn’t 
                                                
40 Berliner Zeitung, January 26, 2012. "Wir wollen nicht in einer Parallelgesellschaft leben" byAndrea Beyerlein.  
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exist just to link non-Germans with Germans, but also to encourage and promote 
closer connections between northern and southern Neukölln. While a large Turkish 
and student population is present in the North, there is a scary growth of support for 
the far-right national democratic party NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands) in the South.  An encompassing platform could promote unity and 
resist a push to the right.41 
In sum, the initial process of building up the base, selecting topics, and trying 
to come up with a concrete plan to take action takes a long time and is hard work.  
Many meetings (group meetings as well as one-on-one meetings) must take place to 
work through this process in a democratic way. The emphasis on teamwork and shared 
responsibility enhances feelings of group commitment, ownership, and accountability 
among the participants. Clear solidary as well as developmental benefits come out of 
this process (Polletta 2002). The members get a stake in the decision-making and 
therefore a stake in the success and the survival of the organization, heightening their 
sense of solidarity and commitment. 
 
First Power, then Program 
In IAF organizations, groups decide to join the community organization before they 
even know what topics they will work on. First they build the power, then they work 
on the program. Indeed, only after this two-year founding process did discussions start 
regarding potential issues WIN might work on. Between January and May, three so-
called Themenfindungsabende took place, in which between 200 and 250 people 
                                                
41 Berliner Morgenpost, January 22, 2012. “Bürgerplattform Neukölln: Ein Netzwerk für die Großstadt” by Jürn 
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participated.  These meetings are critical, as they are opportunities for everyone to co-
decide which issues the organization will work on. The participants split up into 
smaller teams of six to eight people, each team moderated by a volunteer, and minutes 
are taken. Typical for an IAF organization, these meetings take place in a very 
disciplined fashion. There is indeed a structure in place with certain rules and 
procedures.  
As one of the members stated,  
The meetings are quite short. They have this rule that meetings are not 
longer than 90 minutes. We always have a very full schedule and we 
have lots of organizational things to discuss, so it’s rather sometimes 
run as a business meeting. In the sense that it is very strict: we start on 
time, people pay attention, we go through the agenda, and we usually 
don’t go for drinks afterwards…it is easier, say for people with kids or 
so, ‘I will be gone for 90 minutes and then be back home,’ instead of 
these really long, two, three, four hour meetings like with other 
political organizations. 
 
 
 The participants were asked to state their most urgent concerns regarding 
Neukölln. The organizer gathered the minutes and discussed the long list of issues 
together with the steering committee, turning it into the following short list of topics: 
education, a job center, housing, local authorities, public space, and lack of doctors. 
After each team was asked to identify the three most important topics, a general 
assembly was organized by two volunteer groups (one group in charge of the technical 
issues, the other in charge of the program and guests) to take a final vote. Finally, at 
the assembly, the participants voted to work on issues around “public space” and 
“education.” Once the topics were selected, the participants split up into so-called 
Aktionsteams, or action teams, examining and discussing the different layers of 
                                                                                                                                       
Kruse. 
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concerns and trying to put together a proposal for concrete action.  
It is thus quite unique for an organization to work together for at least one year, 
before even deciding which specific issues they will tackle. Building this grassroots 
base takes time and is part of an enormous effort, but it is key for the IAF organization 
to remain sustainable in the long run. The emphasis on leadership development, one-
to-one relational meetings while having a certain structure with rules and procedures 
in place is what makes the organization effective. However, as I show next, certain 
challenges specific to this model come to the forefront. 
 
Too organizer-driven? “The Grey Eminence” 
During the founding stages of WIN, some members became rather skeptical of the 
democratic process. As one of the members remarked,  
When things become a little bit difficult, or when the organizing team 
thinks, ‘this will be an important meeting,’ Leo Penta [director of 
DICO] comes in. He comes in, listens for a while and then says 
something like: ‘You should pay attention to this, and therefore you 
should do it like this.’ He has this authority. In German we say, he has 
the Graue Eminenz, the gray brain behind everything. By the end of the 
day, they say it is all on us, we can vote on anything, but they try to 
push it in a way they want it.”  
 
Being too organizer-driven is not a complaint only in Berlin, but can be heard across 
the IAF organizations; tension indeed exists between building an organization based 
on participatory or grassroots democracy and, at the same time, having in place a 
hierarchical structure.    
In this German case, the organizers proposed it would be more efficient to 
focus on one or two issues, rather than three as initially suggested. They reasoned that 
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focusing on three issues might take too long, and they argued, in addition, that they 
had tried this with the Bürgerplattform Wedding-Moabit and it didn’t work. While at 
the end of the day, a majority voted in favor of just two issues, some groups felt 
betrayed. As one of the members argued, “Maybe Neukölln is different, we should try 
it anyway.” This model of participatory democracy has indeed a strong “guided” 
character and is based on tutelage (Polletta 2002). While the organizers don’t force 
any decisions on the members, they do try to guide the members in certain directions 
towards winnable issues.  
Next, I examine how the organization has been able to overcome specific 
challenges related to the German context. 
 
A German translation of the IAF organizing principles 
 Germany doesn’t have a legacy of community organizing. In order to set up an IAF 
organization in Berlin, challenges in terms of re-defining the role of the state, finding 
the right funding channels, attracting member institutions, and coming up with the 
appropriate translation, had to be overcome.  
When the director Leo Penta illustrated during a training session that IAF 
organizing is part of the civil society, or the so-called “third sector,” which is separate 
from “the state” and “the market,” confusion arose among the participants. “Isn’t civil 
society part of the state?,” one of the participants asked.  In Germany, there is a very 
strong notion of “the state” and the idea that the government is responsible for shaping 
civil society. Even though, according to the organizers, this social-democratic welfare 
system is quietly crumbling, many people hold on to the idea that the state is taking 
 130 
care of its citizens.  Furthermore, the state seems to be always there. One organizer 
illustrated this with the parable of the hare and the hedgehog running a race, in which 
the hedgehog – even though slower – outsmarts the hare and wins. The hedgehog 
represents the government; “wherever you go, government is already there.” Even in 
those places, like Schöneweide, that seemed completely abandoned by the 
government, “you have a sleeping government, which as soon you want to do 
something, you obviously wake up.”  
In addition, Germany’s strong welfare system is provided not only by a public 
or private system, but also by a strong intermediary, non-for-profit sector. Germany 
has a highly institutionalized third sector, closely tied to the state and the market. The 
main umbrella associations, such as the Catholic German Caritas Federation 
(Deutscher Caritasverband), the Service Agency of the Protestant Church in Germany 
(Diakonisches Werk der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland), the German Red 
Cross (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz), and the German Welfare Association (Deutscher 
Partitätischer Wohlfahrtsverband), comprise numerous decentralized agencies and 
organizations all over the country. Between the 1970s and 1990s, these non-profit 
welfare organizations have grown faster than the manufacturing and services sector, 
employing over one million full-time workers.  The bulk of their income comes from 
public funds, contracts and grants, and about a third of their revenue comes from 
private fees and payments directly from the customers (Bauer 2003). These non-
profits focus mainly on delivering services and in most cases are highly dependent on 
the state. As a consequence, when Penta first came to Berlin most citizens were 
unfamiliar with a type of organization that  acts independently of the state. 
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A big challenge in those beginning years was therefore to find the right 
funding. As a principle, in order to retain independence, IAF organizations are not 
supposed to accept government funding.  During the mid 1990s, however, when Penta 
first started to organize in Germany, he accepted money from a so-called 
“Quartiersmanagement,” or neighborhood management, in Neukölln. Penta’s 
experience with the neighborhood management ended up being a “disaster” so he 
decided never to take funding from it again. According to Penta,  
Nothing constructive could take place because there was a 
constant battle over, you know, what we should do and what we should 
not do… I had … a meeting with the person who is in charge with 
neighborhood management at the time and literally she asked the 
question: ‘Why are you meeting with all these tenants?’ And I was 
ready to say - I bit my tongue - but I was ready to say, ‘well would you 
like to have maybe a scholarship to our training so you can come and 
understand what neighborhood work is all about.  
 
Traditionally, IAF affiliates receive the majority of their funding from member 
institutions and foundations. In Berlin, the situation is different. The community 
organization runs on a budget of only $75,000 (or 50,000€), primarily from small and 
medium businesses located in the community, which provide about 75% of the budget, 
the member institutions providing the remainder. These businesses, however, have no 
say regarding the issues the community organization takes on or the strategy it pursues 
(interview organizer). Having businesses fund the organization is an innovative 
approach compared to other IAF affiliates. 
Another challenge arose in terms of member institutions. In line with the IAF 
mantra, these organizations have institutional membership. The organizers, however, 
did not just consider the IAF principles as the Ten Commandments; implementing 
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them in a new institutional context required creative adaptation. Two specific 
differences come to light. First, not only institutions are encouraged to become 
members; individuals can participate as well if they form their own group. This was a 
strategic choice of the organizers, because they believed people in Germany, 
especially within the former East, are reluctant to join institutions. Giving “people 
without a group” a chance to join the community organization could circumvent that 
initial lack of connectedness.  Second, there is much more diversity among the 
members – racial and ethnic diversity on the one hand, religious/non religious 
diversity on the other. Traditionally, IAF organizations started off with strong support 
from the Catholic church. But again, in Germany the situation was different and, soon 
enough, Penta and his organizers realized this was not possible in Germany, where the 
role of religion is much smaller. The country is much more secular. Berlin, a relatively 
young city, rather than being founded on religious pillars, has been known as the 
cradle of the industrial revolution for its innovativeness in electricity and the invention 
of the S-bahn.  
The oldest organization “Organizing Schöneweide” is located in the former 
East. Its membership consists of evangelical and catholic churches, senior centers, 
kindergartens, and community gardens and is represented by a majority of white, 
middle-class Germans. Even though the organization displays some generational 
diversity, with young Germans as well as older men and women part of it, the group is 
much more homogenous compared to the organizations set up in the West.  Indeed, 
since the postwar, there has been a much greater presence of immigrants in the West 
than in the East, which is reflected in the composition of each organization’s 
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membership.  
Located in the West, both “we are here” in Wedding-Moabit and WIN in 
Neukölln are composed of migrant associations, mosques, evangelic and Baptist 
church communities, as well as kindergartens, non-profit neighborhood associations, 
and groups of individuals. This membership diversity in terms of German and non 
German groups as well as religious and non religious organizations, while a reflection 
of the specific areas, is exceptional and has been part of a deliberate effort of the 
organizers. As a member from Neukölln states,  
The diversity of people participating is extraordinary…this is what I 
like most about the Bürgerplattformen [community organizations] and 
what is also different from all neighborhood organizations I know in 
Berlin. They bring together groups and individuals who usually would 
not talk to each other if they met in the streets.  
 
The lack of diversity in the organization in Schöneweide has more to do with the lack 
of racial or ethnic diversity in the greater borough than with the strategic choices the 
organizer made, or, as she would tell me, “you work with what there is.”  
Their outreach towards Muslims and migrant associations has especially been 
noticed by American IAF organizers. In the US, one of the national directors of the 
IAF showed me a picture of a community organization’s action. A majority of the 
people in that picture wore headscarves or Islamic clothing. He asked me, “Do you 
know where that has been taken?” “Berlin,” he answered. He shows the same picture 
at IAF trainings across the US to show the diversity and the importance of going 
beyond church-based groups in setting up new organizations.  
 Furthermore, the difficulty with getting churches on board can be partly 
explained by the following: Christian churches are closely linked to the state through 
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the so-called “church tax.” This tax, of about eight percent, is automatically collected 
from citizens of religious communities by the state and is then distributed to the major 
denominations to support their activities.  Christian churches are thus maintained and 
survive mainly through the automatic collection of taxpayers’ money, rather than 
through donations. As a consequence, few people see the need to be involved in 
community organizing (interview organizer). When DICO’s mentor Tom Lenz came 
over from Chicago to Berlin and attended the founding assembly of Südost, he told 
me,  
Two moments were shocking to me: when we were evaluating [the 
founding assembly] one of the members said, ‘We are over-represented 
by religious institutions, that’s a problem.’ I said ‘What?!’ But yes, 
only under 5% of the population are active in religion. The second 
moment was when I asked one of the lay leaders of the church, ‘How 
big is your church?,’  He said ‘5000 members.’  ‘Wow that’s big.’   
‘How many come to service?’ ‘30’! 
 
Indeed, relying only on faith-based groups would be organizational suicide in a 
German context.  
Finally, the question arose of how to translate key concepts such as leadership, 
relational meeting, or community organization into German words that made sense. 
The IAF strongly emphasizes the role of leaders. In its history, Germany has known 
one leader or “Führer,” and no one wants to be reminded of him. As a consequence, 
rather than using the literal translation of leader, “Führer,” the organization uses the 
words “Multiplikatoren” (disseminators) or “Schlüsselpersonen” (key people). The 
relational meeting, or one-to-one meeting, has been introduced as “Einzelgespräch,” 
or one-to-one conversation, and community organization has been loosely described as 
building a “Bürgerplattform,” or citizens platform. While the first organization 
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“Organizing Schöneweide,” created under Leo Penta still retained some of the English 
names, it has been a conscious decision to leave out the English terms in the more 
recently built organizations such as Wir Sind Da (We are there) in the boroughs 
Wedding-Moabit and Bürgerplattform Neukölln. 
Beyond these issues of literal translation, however, it has been even harder to 
make the concepts resonate within the German context.  During the IAF training in 
Berlin, participants were wary about the role of leadership. Not just the term “leader,” 
but why the organization would need a leader in the first place, was questioned. Again, 
Germany’s history, and its infamous leader, remain vivid in the memories of many. 
Even organizing in the former East versus the West of Berlin displays the effect of 
different historical memories. The older members of “Organizing Schöneweide” 
especially, many of whom grew up in the former East, had experienced decades of a 
different form of socialization. An organizer from the West described the following 
scenario. She attended a very successful action in the former East led by “Organizing 
Schöneweide.” The organization managed to procure EUR 150,000 of funding to 
revitalize the economically devastated neighborhood of Schöneweide. Representatives 
from the organization went on stage and handed over, as a symbolic gesture, a huge 
check to the local mayor. The organizer continues,  
The people were just sitting there and I thought, ‘My goodness! 
150,000 Euros!’ The Neukölln and Wedding-Moabit people would say, 
‘Yeah, great’! 
 
But according to the organizer, people living in Schöneweide come from a very 
different cultural background, in which they have been trained to go to organizational 
meetings, and they are fed up with it. They don’t want anybody to tell them to do 
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things in a certain way anymore and are very suspicious of having to say “Oh yeah! 
Great!.”  
Indeed, IAF community organizing consists of many rituals, bringing out 
strong emotions among the participants and leading to feelings of solidarity (Goodwin, 
Jasper, and Polletta 2004). The power of emotions has been long established by social 
movement scholars, who have shown how successful rituals produce positive energy 
and generate strong feelings of unity among the members (Collins 2004). For 
members from the community organization in the former East, however, while these 
rituals still occur, in a certain sense they are downplayed. The memory of obligatory 
collective action as well as the many rituals during the Cold War have left scars on 
many of the older members.  
In sum, the organizers had to be creative to adapt the IAF model to a German 
context. Challenges in terms of re-defining the role of the state, funding, membership, 
and translation had to be overcome. 
 
The impact and challenges of community organizing in Berlin 
Even though the German IAF organizations have gained recognition from important 
political actors, such as the Mayor of Berlin, members of the Berlin Senate and 
Parliament, and mayors from several different boroughs, concrete policy outcomes 
have remained modest.  So far, the organizers’success lies mainly in developing the 
organizations, connecting people that were previously unconnected, and building up 
institutional power. The value of these processes cannot be underestimated, though. 
As Putnam (2000) has argued, civically engaged communities are more likely to have 
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better outcomes in terms of education, control of crime and drug abuse, urban poverty, 
unemployment, and even health than communities that are not engaged. In this era, 
marked by an erosion of social capital – in Germany, people are less likely to be active 
in church or members of a trade union than decades ago – these community groups 
attempt to counteract that trend by developing new networks, norms, trust, and 
engagement, facilitating coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. These IAF 
organizations don’t rely on so-called “checkbook membership” (Skocpol 1999), but 
represent a novel way to enhance civic participation in Germany. 
The IAF organizations in Berlin exist as a result of an American IAF 
organizer’s coming to Germany and trying to implement this model in a very distinct 
context. It is an American style of organizing with which not everyone has been 
comfortable.  The organizers have tried to creatively adapt it to make it work within 
this distinct historical and institutional setting.  In a dense German institutional 
landscape, the IAF organizations have found their niche, working at the meso-level, or 
the level of the borough or district. Importantly, the organizations have diversified 
their memberships, including immigrant associations as well as mosques. For many 
underrepresented groups, the community organizations have been an opportunity to 
actively participate and work together towards social change, rather than live in a 
parallel society. 
In the final part, I provide a comparative analysis as well as a brief evaluation 
of community organizing. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 
Despite being embedded in very different institutional and socio-economic contexts, 
the organizations have been able to mobilize their members over time, maintaining 
their vitality and sustaining their original goals of building power for social change. In 
this chapter, I examine what accounts for their similarities, in terms of their 
mobilization capacity, and what accounts for their differences, in terms of membership 
growth. I conclude with the broader implications of my framework. 
 
A Hybrid Logic of Organizing: Enhancing Member Mobilization 
The goal of IAF organizations is to improve the living and working conditions of local 
communities. As non-bargaining actors, their fundamental source of power lies in 
grassroots mobilization.  
The meetings, actions, and delegate assemblies that I attended spoke for 
themselves. Hundreds, sometimes thousands, of members were present, spanning a 
variety of religious, ethnic, and class backgrounds. Every member or organizer I 
approached, whether in Boston, London, or Berlin, mentioned the importance of 
turnout as a measure of success and regularly attended actions and meetings. 
Newspaper articles on these organizations invariably mentioned with awe the number 
of people the organizations were able to turn out. The organizations are indeed able to 
mobilize hundreds of members overnight. I argue that combining the logics of 
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bureaucracy and social movements in both the organizational structure and culture is 
likely to lead to strong mobilization capacity.  
 
Mobilizing Structure 
 
The IAF organizations have a hybrid organizational structure. On the one hand, they 
have offices and paid professional staff, but on the other, they rely heavily on member 
volunteers or so-called leaders to do much of the work, such as organizing assemblies, 
conducting research on the issues, and preparing action proposals. These hybrid 
organizations have a sufficiently robust structure, providing legitimacy and resources, 
while they are also able to take advantage of the informal networks connecting people 
and organizations. In line with social movement theory, while hierarchical 
organizations tend to become overly conservative, locked-in, bureaucratic structures, 
lacking any mobilizing capacity, the anarchist counter model, based on extremely 
loose ties, often lacks the necessary coordination to act (Tarrow 2011). A hybrid 
structure can therefore counter these tendencies.  
Tensions, however, can occur between building an organization based on 
participatory or grassroots democracy and, at the same time, having in place a 
hierarchical structure. Being too organizer-driven is a complaint among the members 
that can be heard across the IAF organizations. Indeed, while the organizers don’t 
force any decisions on the members, they do try to guide the members in certain 
directions towards winnable issues, or as Polletta (2002) described, this model of 
participatory democracy is based on tutelage and has a strong “guided” character.  
Finally, the organizations are affiliated with an international network, IAF. 
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Each organization, therefore, has a so-called supervisor/mentor, who will participate in 
the organization two to three times a year, attend meetings and actions, teach IAF 
principles, and closely monitor and train the young organizers. Being part of a larger 
network is important as it provides the organizations legitimacy and stability. Having 
organizers from the UK and US come over to Germany to attend a big assembly, for 
example, increases the power and legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the 
members, funders, and politicians that are present. This does not just hold for the more 
“remote” organizations in Europe, but even in the US, it has been critical for the 
organization in Boston to be part of the IAF. As the director of GBIO said,  
When I first started organizing in Brockton [Massachusetts], … [we] 
had essentially taken the principles of the IAF and attempted to institute 
them through Brockton Interfaith Community. I worked in Brockton, 
did my best, I went to IAF training, and did my best to, on my own, 
operate and create a culture that was similar to what I learned through 
IAF. I think I did a descent job, but it was very hard. It is very hard on 
your own.  
 
Being part of the IAF network provides the organizations with an institutional memory 
and a track record critical to their success and survival. Furthermore, the cross-
organizational dialogue, training opportunities, and mentoring sessions are a means to 
keep the organizations in line with the IAF core principles. The mentoring visits of 
Arnie Graph, Jonathan Lange, and Tom Lenz to Boston, London, and Berlin 
respectively, promote a form of external accountability, ensuring that the 
organizations remain true to the IAF core traditions.  In Germany, for example, the 
community organization FOCO – not affiliated with the IAF – does not actually build 
IAF organizations, but organizes mainly workshops, focusing on teaching the IAF 
principles. As such, the organization would not be able to affiliate with the IAF as it is 
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not in line with its core mission: building powerful organizations through organizing 
and mobilizing members. 
 The IAF network promotes therefore an important level of legitimacy, 
stability, and external accountability, enhancing the sustainability of the affiliated 
organizations. 
 
Mobilizing Culture 
IAF organizations combine a “relational” culture based on values and trust, fostering a 
sense of commitment, with a more pragmatic culture based on strategic decision-
making and negotiations, fostering a sense of accountability. Again, in line with social 
movement theory, cultural dimensions, which in turn produce solidarity, motivate 
participants, and thus encourage collective action (e.g., Goffman 1974; Snow et al. 
1986; Polletta 2006; Valocchi 2008). The fundamental building block of every IAF 
organization is the one-to-one, or relational, meeting, a face-to-face conversation 
between an organizer and a member with the aim of exploring or strengthening the ties 
between the community organization and the particular institution. These 
conversations can be considered important rituals and are the means of building and 
maintaining relationships by understanding the other party’s reasons and motivations, 
and of building trust.  Members become strongly committed towards the organization, 
develop a sense of shared responsibility and are likely to actively participate in the 
organization (Kanter 1968, 1972; Lawler et al. 2009). As a member in Boston told me,  
It is important to realize the depth of how real a one-on-one is, how real 
that is as a tool, how potent… Doing individual meetings up and down 
the organization and across… When I was in East Harlem, I could get 
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150 people out of 550. I’d get them. I had done my one-on-ones with a 
lot of people, I had enough moments of relationships. Sometimes they 
did it because they were convinced [in the issue] sometimes they did it 
because they were convinced in me. 
 
The organizations are not, however, merely about dialogue; IAF leaders and 
organizers consciously combine nurturing deep democratic values with building a 
powerful organization that has the ability to act. For example, during campaigns, the 
organizers rely heavily on member accountability and discipline. Turnout to events is 
critically important. In fact, one of the first questions in evaluating an action is about 
the turnout. As an organizer in London would argue, “We will often reflect that the 
success of the action is about 90% down to the turnout.” A full room at an 
accountability assembly, for example, is a clear demonstration of power, whereas if it 
is half empty, the organization won’t be taken seriously.  
In addition, there are written procedures in place on how to evolve from a 
tertiary leader to a primary leader or on how to develop from a junior to a senior 
organizer. These bureaucratic rules and targets promote a degree of professionalism as 
well as internal accountability between the members and organizers. The organizers, 
for example, keep track of how many new relationships they have made through one-
to-ones and how much money they are able to raise. Similarly, leaders are categorized 
as primary, secondary, or tertiary: primary leaders have 20-25 followers, secondary 
have 10-15, and tertiary have 5-10. 42 According to the IAF, the main characteristic of 
a talented leader is that he or she has followers, or strong relationships with people 
                                                
42 Primary leaders teach and give training; they raise money for the organization and their own institution, and are 
part of the Strategy team. Tertiary leaders are task and project oriented, whereas secondary and primary leaders 
think more broadly about building a powerful organization. The aim is to move people from secondary leadership 
into primary leadership and from tertiary into secondary.  
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who will therefore “follow” him or her to an event, or, in other words, according to the 
IAF, “A leader without followers is just someone going for a walk.” Breaking 
leadership down into concrete categories with numbers attached makes it clear to the 
members what leadership means and how it should manifest itself in practice.  
In sum, this hybrid model of organizing consists of a mobilizing structure – 
lying somewhere between a social movement and a bureaucratic organization – and a 
mobilizing culture – combining moral values and pragmatism – that enhances member 
mobilization and promotes the organizations’ effectiveness and sustainability. And to 
a certain extent, this hybrid model is flexible and dynamic enough to travel across 
distinct institutional contexts.  
 
Mechanisms of Creative Borrowing  
While important similarities are noticeable in the structure and the culture of the 
organizational model, the organizations do not simply copy the model, but apply 
creativity and resourcefulness to make the model work in each context. This is what I 
call the mechanism of creative borrowing: each organization must adapt to a new 
environment and will be challenged to overcome internal or external pressures in order 
to survive. The strategic decisions that the organizers make are bound by the realities 
of the external context in which the organization is embedded. In particular, 
differences in terms of membership growth come to the forefront: the community 
organization in London has grown immensely, doubling in membership over the past 
decade, the one in Berlin has had a much more moderate growth rate, while the Boston 
organization has actually declined in membership over the past 10 years. What 
 144 
accounts for these differences?  
Based on my three case studies, I argue it is important to examine the 
temporal, geographic, and strategic dimensions to understand the organization’s 
membership growth or decline. In particular, IAF organizations outside the US have 
been created much later and often have much more wiggle room to act. In addition, 
they were able to learn from the mistakes and try to be innovative in their approach. 
Second, the political structure or in a broad sense, the geography, is critical in the 
organizations’ development over time. A small country with a centralized government 
might make it easier for an organization to grow, compared to an organization created 
in a large, decentralized country. In addition, it is important to examine the level of 
competition the organization faces. Finally, the strategic decisions of the organizers 
are critical as well: is there an intentional decision to diversify the membership or not? 
Do the organizers allow for enough action among the members or are they focused 
more on internal organizational development? 
 
 
Membership decline in Boston 
 
In 1998, 4,000 people from about 80 organizations attended GBIO’s founding 
Assembly. Three years later, membership peaked at about 100 member institutions. 
Today, GBIO consists of 52 member institutions. Over the course of almost 15 years, 
GBIO’s membership has declined by nearly a half.43 What explains this decline?  
Even though GBIO was only created in the 1990s, it rides on the back of a 
                                                
43 Because the organization itself does not keep a detailed yearly record of its membership, these data are 
approximate and are reconstructed by analyzing virtually all the newspaper articles between 1998-2012 that 
mentioned GBIO, as well as interviewing the lead organizers. 
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decades-long IAF history and legacy. Nonetheless, whereas most American IAF 
organizations are primarily church-based, GBIO started off in a unique way, 
consisting of migrant associations, housing organizations, and youth groups as well as 
religious institutions.  This membership diversity was the result of its main founders, 
long-time union organizer Jim Drake and community organizer Lew Finfer. At the 
offset, GBIO was therefore quite different from the more traditional, faith-based IAF 
organizations, which allowed them to grow in membership. When Jim Drake passed 
away in 2001, the organization went through a leadership vacuum until national IAF 
directors came in and steered the organization back to its original faith-based model. 
The strategic decision of the leadership to shift the organization back to a “traditional” 
IAF model resulted in some non-faith groups leaving GBIO. Today, GBIO’s 
membership consists overwhelmingly of religious congregations, with Christian, 
Jewish, and Muslim participation.44 Only four member organizations – two trade 
unions (SEIU local 1199 and SEIU local 615) and two community development 
corporations (Dorchester Bay EDC and Somerville Community Corporation) – are not 
faith-based. The emphasis on faith-based groups without tapping into other pockets of 
society has partly made it more challenging for the organization to grow.  
Furthermore, as mentioned by many interviewees, Boston seems oversaturated 
with nonprofits. While it is hard to get comparable data across countries, certain 
databases, such as Guidestar, list over 10,000 nonprofits in the greater Boston area.  
While these data do not tell what kind of nonprofits these are (e.g., service versus 
organizing), they can give a sense of the density of NGOs in Boston.  In the 
                                                
44 In addition, in the early 2000s, due to the implosion of the Catholic scandal around sex abuse, GBIO lost a 
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interviews, members and organizers would mention the fierce competition when 
applying for funding or reaching out to new potential members. As so many “social 
justice type” organizations exist within the area, membership growth is not easy to 
attain. This rather competitive environment adds thus to the challenge of membership 
growth.   
Finally, in terms of the political geography, the Boston IAF has worked mainly 
on a local level. An important exception has been their campaign on healthcare, 
resulting in state-wide reform. As a result of the federal system, however, there is 
more power at the local level, with the municipalities and counties having a substantial 
degree of autonomy. This political structure reflects the level at which they organize 
as well as the policy changes they are able to achieve. In some instances, however, it’s 
been difficult to break through the power of this local structure. For example, GBIO 
has been looking to cooperate more with schools and tried to get them into 
membership. Each school, however, is tied to a school district with a school board. As 
a consequence, the schools become part of a political machine, preventing them from 
being actively involved as a member into community organizing. So far, “Austin 
Interfaith” in Texas has been the only American IAF organization that has worked 
extensively with public schools.  
In sum, for the Boston IAF, the lack of membership diversity, the competition, 
as well as the governance structure has contributed to its membership decline. As I 
will show next, the collaboration across the three religious denominations, however, 
might not be underestimated as it brings a certain power to the organization and its 
                                                                                                                                       
significant number of Catholic churches. 
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members. 
 
Opportunities of Faith-based Membership 
While having a diversified membership promotes membership growth, GBIO has been 
able to build a strong collective identity based on faith values, encouraging the 
members to act. Certain challenges, however, had to be overcome. Jewish leaders, for 
example, mentioned how in the beginning meetings would often be held on Saturdays, 
the Sabbath, or that everyone would be invited to pray in the name of Jesus. This has 
changed. Members learned to be more sensitive towards each other’s holidays and as 
opposed to collectively saying “let us all pray,” individuals pray according to their 
own tradition and language.  As one Jewish leader explains, “In the end they’ll say in 
the name of Jesus Christ; I don’t say that, but I’ll say ‘Amen’ because I understand the 
spirit of it.”  
Besides these challenges, the variety of religions brings a certain power to the 
organization and its members. A Jewish leader explains how she got up to speak in a 
black church. She was used to the synagogue, where people sit quietly and listen.  
Nervous but thrilled at the opportunity, she gets her first sentence out and the pastor, 
sitting in the first row, starts responding, “that’s right, aha, you tell them,” creating a 
powerful moment of merging traditions. Furthermore, during campaigns, GBIO’s 
faith-based identity can be an important trigger for members to act. As I mentioned 
earlier, in meetings regarding GBIO’s anti-usury campaign, for example, the 
congregational leaders referred to their sacred texts, stating that usury is wrong and 
pushing members to act. This collective identity based on faith is indeed considered a 
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powerful driver of member participation.  
 
Membership Growth in London and Berlin 
Community organizing has a long legacy in the US, whereas in Britain and Germany it 
only started about two decades ago. This temporal difference, however, has two 
important consequences: first, it allowed the organizers in London and Berlin to learn 
not only from US successes, but from the mistakes as well, promoting innovation 
rather than merely imitation.  As an organizer in London would say, “you can take and 
learn and use all the things you like, you can get to start things again, in a way you can 
never do once you’re decades into organizing.” They were indeed able to creatively 
borrow and adapt the model in their own context.  
Furthermore, in the UK and Germany, churches are much emptier than in the 
US and even though mosques have started to mushroom in London and Berlin, they 
don’t have abundant resources. The organizers, therefore, had to be creative 
concerning their sources of funding, making them highly diverse from the start. 
Membership growth is more likely when the organizers can tap into diverse types of 
organizations instead of limiting themselves to faith-based groups. According to an 
LC organizer,  
IAF is getting broader and more diverse, but it wasn’t. It was mostly 
Christian in membership and a few trade unions but not many…While 
we knew we couldn’t sustain this, nor was it attractive to build a 
sectarian alliance, it had to be civic in Britain, because faith is so small 
and effectively so insignificant…So [London Citizens] has always been 
more diverse in alliances because Britain is and London is very diverse, 
but then so is New York and so is Chicago. But we had the privilege to 
start off later and learn from it that if you don’t start diverse it is quiet 
difficult to go diverse. So that has been helpful. 
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Second, the IAF organizations in the UK and Germany are virtually unique, 
which have allowed them to establish a niche within the civil society landscape and 
grow over time. In the UK, while civil society organizations are growing – according 
to the Charity Commission, there are about 5,000 nonprofits in London – most of them 
are focused on delivering services rather than organizing. According to an LC 
organizer,  
They [American IAF affiliates] look enviously on the fact that we don’t 
have any competition. That is such a relief. In Chicago there are 5 
training institutes. There is some evidence that Gamaliel [another 
model of community organizing], which is one of them, has been seen 
in Manchester [UK]. In fact I know Gamaliel has been invited by some 
people… to come and train them in Manchester, which is very 
frustrating, because the last thing we need is another American network 
doing a slightly different sort of organizing here. I can’t stop it, this 
wouldn’t be appropriate, but it is unfortunate, because it will confuse 
the foundations from which we try to get the money out of, particularly 
if they suggest that they are the nice face of organizing and we are the 
nasty face. Because that is how sometimes people treat us. 
 
Similarly, since IAF organizing is a new phenomenon in Germany, the 
organizers have not encountered direct competition, whereas there have been 
occasions when other types of organizations, such as “neighborhood managements,” 
have tried to block IAF development by publicly criticizing the organization.  
Finally, organizers were well aware of the geographical differences especially 
between the US and the UK. Being based in London rather than an American city had 
some clear advantages:  
Because we are such a small and centralized country, we can do 
actions, which I know our American colleagues are very envious of. 
We can get to Westminster in half an hour from here, so we can reach 
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significant politicians, cabinet level politicians, we can reach 
corporations that are based in Canary Wharf and the City of London in 
20 minutes. We can reach the main media outlets in 10 minutes, so we 
have the benefit and privilege of working in an area in the country, 
which is like the center of media, business and politics, in some cases 
for Europe, in some cases for the world.  
 
This geographical advantage led to ambitious actions and campaigns fighting for 
issues at a national level such as the immigration system or asylum policy, something 
American IAF affiliates had never done before. As a result, conducting these high-
profile campaigns made it more likely for other institutions to join LC.  
 In sum, for the London and Berlin IAF, the membership diversity, the lack of 
competition, and the centralized governance structure (especially in the case of 
London) have contributed to their membership growth. Next, I illustrate some of the 
challenges, however, when dealing with a highly diversified membership.  
  
Challenges of Membership Diversity 
As scholars have shown, the formation of a strong collective identity will move people 
towards collective action. For the American IAF organizations, the collective identity 
is built around faith and faith-based values. The task in London or Berlin is to create 
such an identity for the organization in which the members are diverse, religious and 
non-religious. A member from Berlin described the following, 
For me it was interesting to see when we had this public event, when 
we celebrated the founding of the Bürgerplattform [community 
organization] … the people who came would dress in a traditional way, 
they wouldn’t do this during our meetings.  A priest would come out 
and say, “God is with us.”  We never talk like that in our platform 
meetings; God is not with us. It is very interesting, and I think it’s good 
in a way, everyone knows that people have all these differences, but 
people who are there have this openness and tolerance, otherwise they 
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would not be there.   
 
In a certain sense, therefore, the collective identity is built around shared values and 
mutual respect rather than faith alone.  Or as Leo Penta, the director of the German 
IAF, would describe it to me, it is about appealing to what people hold to be sacred. 
Many of these values are also religiously sacred, but they won’t call them that in 
Germany. Part of what the organizers do is translate or use different forms of 
expression among believers and non-believers. When speaking in the public arena, the 
language might be different from the language they speak inside the organization. 
One of the challenges in London has been on how to include the new Jewish 
communities. While Christian and Muslim groups have been part of LC since its 
offset, only recently synagogues have joined the membership. According to one of the 
organizers, LC needs to still figure out how to work all together, across religions. 
Jews, for example, don’t do public worship, “happy clappy, we’re going to call on the 
Lord.” It is not part of their practice and makes them feel cringe-worthy when going to 
LC assemblies and the other members do so. At the North London founding assembly, 
for example, the organizers blew the “shofar” or a goat horn to call for action. In the 
Jewish tradition, the shofar is considered an awakening call or a call for prayer, 
usually used in a private setting, for example, on Rosh Hashanah. According to the 
organizer,  
The Christians thought ‘that’s beautiful, I love it, so Old Testament, 
that’s gorgeous.’ The Muslims are like ‘yeah wicked, we are 
comfortable with that.’ The Jews wanted to die of shame: ‘why would 
you do this, it’s a weird squeaky noise, why would you ever blow a 
shofar at an assembly’. 
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In addition, it has been a challenge for LC to mobilize the Jewish community as Jews. 
According to the organizer, a former rabbi would have the phrase: “we are Jews in the 
home and Englishmen on the streets.” Contrary to the US, public action has not been 
that intuitive for the Jewish community in Britain. As a result, the organizer tries to 
build a mental landscape of what Jewish public action looks like, literally carrying a 
picture in her purse of Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel and Rev. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. at the historic Selma Civil Rights March of 1965. One way to bring out public 
action and build bridges with other membership groups has been through working on 
specific campaigns. Their campaign on social care, still in its initial stages, has so far 
been excellent at creating a collective interest around caregivers – often migrant 
workers from low-wage communities – and caretakers, such as many parents of 
Jewish members. 
 
Broader implications: Do these explanations hold beyond my case studies? 
What are the broader implications of this study? To what extent do my explanations 
hold for other IAF organizations? 
While I focused mainly on the IAF organizations in Boston, London, and 
Berlin, I have a general understanding regarding the other IAF organizations abroad – 
Canada and Australia – as well as in the US. The IAF trainings that I attended allowed 
me to have informal conversations with leaders and organizers from different IAF 
organizations across the globe and I rely on secondary sources, such as the work by 
Amanda Tattersall (2006) on the IAF in Australia, Paul Osterman (2002) on the IAF in 
Texas, and Michael Gecan (2002) on the IAF in New York. I argue that despite being 
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embedded in different contexts the development of a hybrid model of organizing can 
be found across the organizations. They have a similar structure, in terms of 
institutional membership, paid organizers, volunteers, and develop a mobilizing 
culture, with one-to-one relational meetings as their main tool. The rules and 
procedures come from the national IAF directors and are handed down to the different 
organizations.  
While each organization functions along the same principles, not every IAF 
affiliate has managed to survive. Some organizations started off as IAF affiliates but 
have drifted away from the original IAF mission towards becoming service providers. 
The most famous example is Saul Alinsky’s first organization, the Back of the Yards 
Neighborhood Council. As Alinsky even noted during the late 1960s, “ They [BYNC] 
moved into the nightfall of success, and the dreams of achievement which make men 
fight were replaced by the restless nightmares of fear: fear of change, fear of losing 
material possessions. Today they are part of the city’s establishment and are 
desperately trying to keep their community unchanged” (1969: xi). Even though it was 
the first organization set up by Alinsky, BYNC is not part of the IAF and focuses 
mainly on community service and economic development (BYNC 2012). Similarly, in 
2008, London Citizens disaffiliated Birmingham Citizens as it abandoned its mission 
to organize members and turned into a community development corporation. These 
examples show the difficulty and importance to keep the organizations balanced 
somewhere between bureaucratic organizations and social movements, developing a 
mobilizing structure and culture. When the organization shifts too much towards the 
bureaucratic side, it is likely to transform into a more conservative service provider. 
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Second, can this model be transferred to other organizations? As Osterman 
mentions (2006), organizing within faith communities is often just as challenging as in 
other parts of society. Many trade unions have lost their “social movement” roots and 
became rather bureaucratic structures. Developing a strong relational culture takes 
time and is never ending. Trade unions, however, can’t always afford to devote so 
much time to developing their membership and as a consequence find it harder to 
sustain member mobilization (Tapia 2012). Even though some unions in the United 
States have established a relational culture between the members and the union (see, 
e.g., John Hoerr 1997 on Kris Rondeau’s Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical 
Workers), they remain the exception. 
Conversely, for loose social movements, such as the Occupy movement, it is 
hard to remain sustainable over time. Arguably, not having enough of a structure in 
place contributes to their decline. As Verta Taylor (1989) illustrates, the women’s 
movement between 1945 and the mid 1960s was able to stay alive over time due to its 
“abeyance structure” in place. Based on archival data moreover from the National 
Woman’s Party and the League of Women Voters as well as interviews with female 
activists, she illustrates how this structure is characterized by temporality (or the 
length of time that the organization can hold personnel), purposive commitment of the 
members, its exclusiveness, the importance of centralization, and the development of 
an organizational culture. The IAF organizations have to a certain extent this 
“abeyance structure” in place, allowing them to remain sustainable between waves of 
actions and campaigning.  
In terms of membership growth, I argue it is important to examine the 
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mechanisms of creative borrowing that take place within the boundaries of the 
external context. Specifically, I point towards temporal, geographic, and strategic 
dimensions. These variables, however, are derived from three single case studies, and 
as such, they should be regarded as hypotheses for theory testing with respect to other 
cases. There could be other important factors, however, that help explain the growth or 
decline of the organization. First, member institutions might join because they are 
interested in a particular issue the organization is campaigning on. For example, in 
Boston many housing organizations joined as the GBIO started off with an affordable 
housing campaign, or, in London, many migrant associations joined as LC embarked 
on their “strangers into citizens” campaign. Once these campaigns come to an end – 
because they were won, lost, or dropped – it becomes challenging to retain these 
single-issue organizations and as a result, some will drop out of the organization. This 
happened across the organizations and can thus not explain the difference in growth 
between them. Similarly, when there is not enough action taking place certain member 
groups are likely to drop out. For member institutions that are externally focused 
without being interested in their internal organizational development, getting into 
action is critical. Again, member groups dropped out because of this reason across all 
three of the organizations and cannot explain the difference.45 In sum, these alternative 
explanations do not offer persuasive arguments to account for the differences in 
membership growth. 
 
 To summarize this chapter, the IAF organizations develop a hybrid logic of 
                                                
45 To counteract this drop-out tendency, the organizers in London often decide to carry out an action immediately 
upon member groups joining to show the potential and effectiveness of organizing. 
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organizing, accounting for their similarities in terms of member mobilization. The 
intentional development of a mobilizing structure and a mobilizing culture encourages 
member participation. Furthermore, this model is dynamic enough to travel across 
contexts. Nonetheless, differences, in terms of membership growth, come to the 
forefront as well. Here, I have shown that the organizers must creatively borrow and 
adapt the IAF model within each context. Temporal, geographic, as well as strategic 
dimensions in terms of competition, governance structure, and membership 
diversification, are likely to account for these differences. Finally, I argue that this 
hybrid logic of organizing can be found across the IAF organizations and could be a 
model for either trade unions or social movements to remain dynamic and sustainable 
over time. The factors explaining the differences in membership growth, however, are 
based on my three case studies and should be considered hypotheses to be tested with 
respect to other cases.   
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CHAPTER 9 
 
EVALUATING COMMUNITY ORGANIZING 
 
While community organizations might not be very well known, as Heidi Swarts 
argues, “they play a critical role in agenda setting, representation, and policy making 
from below” (2008: xiv). They are important actors in reinvigorating democracy, 
relying on an active grassroots base as they fight for social change. For example, 
among GBIO’s greatest accomplishments is its role in the passage of Massachusetts’ 
Health Care Reform, collecting over 100,000 signatures and pressuring policy makers 
to expand access to affordable health care to a half of million people without health 
insurance. One of London Citizens’ greatest achievements is the living wage 
campaign. Targeting hospitals, banks, and universities, the campaign resulted in huge 
gains for the city’s low-wage workers, or over £210 million living wages. The 
organizations in Germany also experienced important successes. Among others, they 
brought the main campus of the University for Applied Sciences to Schöneweide, an 
important effort to revitalize this devastated borough, they created important 
improvements regarding job center services in Wedding-Moabit, and organized 
successful mayoral accountability assemblies during election years in which they 
invited the incumbent as well as candidate mayors for the city of Berlin.  Indeed, the 
IAF organizations don’t have a revolutionary set of goals, such as overthrowing 
capitalism or eliminating private production. Their purpose is not to displace the 
established order of power but to incrementally change some of the policies. In line 
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with Gamson (1990), this “strategy of thinking small” is, however, more likely to lead 
to successful outcomes than radical demands. 
While these organizations have a long legacy in the US, they are quite a new 
phenomenon in Europe. In this dissertation, I compared a similar model of civic 
engagement in the US, UK, and Germany, and tried to identify the underlying 
processes that explain the mobilization capacity and development of these three 
organizations.  
To fully understand how the organizations function I start off by going back to 
their roots: Why were the IAF organizations able to emerge when they did? The 
institutional context as well as the explicit strategic decisions of the founders provide 
some clarity. First, an opening in the institutional context allowed the organizations to 
emerge. Here I emphasize a new interpretation of “opportunity structure,” differing 
from the classic political opportunity structure theory, in that for each case the 
political context had actually become quite hostile – rather than more open – when the 
organizations emerged. I show how because of a shift from an open to a rather hostile 
environment the traditional channels of representation were weakened or absent, 
allowing this alternative form to emerge. Secondly, while the organizations were able 
to carve out a niche for themselves, this would not have been possible without the 
strategic capacities of the founders to diffuse this model across different settings.  
I show how their similar organizing practice across countries is due to their 
development of a “hybrid logic of organizing,” or, in other words, the organizations 
combine practices and principles of bureaucracy as well as of social movements in 
their organizational structure and culture, enhancing the organizations’ mobilizing 
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capacity. Differences, however, come to the forefront as well, as organizers need to 
adapt each model to fit within a specific context. Indeed, while these organizations 
adhere to the same IAF model of organizing, at the same time, they try to be dynamic 
enough to work in different contexts. As a result, a process of creative borrowing 
occurs within the boundaries of the external context. Differences in strategies 
regarding membership diversification, as well as the different levels of competition 
and governance structure affect their membership growth.  
This dissertation builds moreover on the work of Heidi Swarts that compares 
the “mobilizing culture” and the style of organizing of secular and faith-based groups 
in St.-Louis and San Jose. Church-based community organizations, according to the 
author, develop a unique, innovative, and exemplary cultural strategy, mobilizing 
successfully across race and class. Drawing on religion and “a practical theory of 
power” these organizations are able to construct a strong collective identity. The 
secular organization ACORN, on the other hand, excels for its innovative 
organizational and political strategy. This poor people’s movement takes on a more 
instrumental and utilitarian approach, spending only little time on building a collective 
identity. In line with Swarts, I argue it is important to examine the mobilizing culture 
of the organizations. Especially in case of the Boston IAF, the organizers have 
intentionally developed a collective identity built around religious values. The London 
and Berlin organizations, however, are to a certain extent much more secular than the 
one in Boston. Here, I tried to show how the organizations still try to build a collective 
identity based around values of shared respect. While Swarts juxtaposes the two types 
of community organizing, faith-based versus secular, in terms of their organizing 
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strategy, my cases show that each organization takes on a rather mixed approach: 
building a relational culture as well as taking on innovative, tactical and pragmatic 
approaches. 
 
Theoretical implications 
With this cross-national comparison I contribute to the theoretical debates on the role 
of alternative forms of collective representation, the development of organizations, 
and the factors affecting their relative success.  In a narrow sense, these community 
organizations can be considered alternative forms of worker representation, whereas 
trade unions are often regarded as the traditional form of worker representation (Fine 
2006; Givan 2007). These IAF organizations, however, go beyond just representing 
workers in their workplace, but reach out to the community, offering a model of 
collective representation across race, class, and ethnicity.  
By bridging different theoretical approaches from industrial relations, social 
movement, and organizational studies, I emphasize the importance of the interaction 
between structure and agency, or, more specifically, the external environment, the 
internal organizational structure, as well as the organizational culture and the strategic 
capacities of the organizers to explain the emergence and success of the organizations. 
While I take on a comparative institutional framework, I draw attention to the agency 
or the specific strategies the organizations develop to mobilize their members and to 
remain dynamic and sustainable over time.  DiMaggio and Powell argued (1986) that 
as organizations compete for resources and legitimacy they adopt a homogenous set of 
practices and isomorphic tendencies become visible. Especially in case of the IAF 
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organizations in London and Berlin, I illustrate how the organizations were able to 
resist becoming similar to the already existing institutions. Instead, the organizers 
intentionally developed this rather new IAF model, cultivating a mobilizing structure 
and culture, within each context. As such, this study shows how strategy can partly 
trump the institutional context. 
My analysis challenges moreover the deterministic trajectories often described 
in the literature and shows how a social movement organization can retain its vitality 
and remain sustainable over time. According to Robert Michels’ “iron law,” over time, 
a social movement organization will transform into a highly bureaucratic, conservative 
organization.46 Many scholars have focused on structural factors such as the size of the 
membership or the amount of revenue to show whether this transformation does or 
does not occur. In this dissertation, I go a step further and reach inside the “black box” 
processes of a social movement organization, illustrating under which conditions an 
organization maintains its capacity to mobilize its members. I show how corrective 
mechanisms have been critical, enabling the organizations to steer themselves back 
into the direction of their mission: building a powerful organization through 
relationships and public action.  
Specifically, in the Boston case study I show how GBIO could have changed 
over time into a dialogue organization, a self-help group, or a service provider. 
Corrective mechanisms, in the form of reflection and deliberation between the 
members and organizers, come into play that prevent these potential drifts or risks of 
goal displacement. In London, the organization is aware of its closeness to key policy 
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makers. Decisions on whether to take on consultancy contracts or provide services are 
therefore intensively discussed by the board of trustees. In addition, the organization 
runs the risk of focusing too much on high-profile campaigns, losing touch with the 
members. As a consequence, internal as well as external accountability structures, 
such as the use of targets and performance measures as well as their linkages to the 
IAF network, and specific organizing strategies, such as LC’s strategy to organize at 
the borough level, are intentionally developed to avoid goal displacement.  In sum, I 
go beyond the existing literature and illustrate how social movement organizations can 
correct these presumed flaws and overcome goal displacement. 
Similarly, in Elusive Togetherness, Paul Lichterman (2005) examines mostly 
protestant, church-based community groups in the Midwest and their ability to build 
alliances across racial, class, and religious lines. However, while most groups fail to 
forge these ties across different social actors, Lichterman shows how the ones that did 
succeed engaged in a form of “social reflexivity,” or  “the practice of talking 
reflectively and self-critically about a group’s extant relationships to the wider social 
world of which they are a part” (15). More broadly, Lichterman argues that the way 
we talk, interact or engage with each other is a powerful resource for building robust 
societies. In my study, I found similar results, such as the importance of the language 
that is used as well as the critical moments of deliberation and reflection that happen 
within the organization.  
Furthermore, this study offers a contribution to the scholarship on political 
opportunity structure theory (Tarrow 2011), showing how a shift from an open 
                                                                                                                                       
46 As mentioned earlier, with the term “conservative” I refer to an organization abandoning its original goals in 
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towards a seemingly hostile political structure might still represent an opening for 
some,  and builds on theories of institutional logics to explain the success and 
sustainability of an organization (Thornton and Ocasio 2008).  
Finally, this analysis can be linked to the coalition literature on two levels. 
First, the IAF as an organization of organizations is in itself a coalition of different 
groups across race and class (Polletta 2002).  Furthermore, as shown in this 
dissertation, building coalitions between the IAF organization and other groups is a 
difficult task and has not always been successful. For example, London Citizens has 
not been able to sustain a long-term coalition with the trade unions.  
Social movements are not homogeneous social entities, but coalition formation 
is critical and plays a key role in understanding contemporary collective action (Van 
Dyke and McCammon 2010). According to Levi and Murphy (2006), a sustainable 
coalition is characterized by the following elements: the groups are able to define 
common framing or interests and have compatible tactics, there is the establishment of 
trust and credible commitments, they are able to resolve tensions, and, finally, there is 
some benefit to building a coalition. In addition, research has shown that the presence 
of so-called coalition brokers or bridge builders – activists with social ties across the 
organizations – will facilitate coalition formation (Obach 2004). Furthermore, 
McCammon and Campbell (2002) examine the circumstances that foster coalition 
formation between the women’s suffrage organizations and the Woman’s Temperance 
Unions in the late 19th and early 20th century. They show that the contextual factors in 
the form of threats to movement goals rather than political opportunities are likely to 
                                                                                                                                       
favor of organizational maintenance. 
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spur coalitions. In addition, they illustrate the importance of organizational factors, or, 
when groups have similar ideologies and are resource rich they are more likely to 
work together. In teasing out the interactions between the political context and 
ideology, Staggenborg (1986) examines the pro-choice coalition groups, suggesting 
that different ideologies can be overcome when there is a serious political threat, such 
as the creation of a countermovement, providing an even greater incentive to 
cooperate. 
As I have illustrated, the coalition building between the London IAF 
organization and the British trade unions have been fraught with challenges. Rather 
than building a sustainable, long-term coalition, their collaboration has taken the form 
of a short-term, campaign or event coalition (Tarrow 2005). While there have been 
key bridge builders between the organizations, the presence of these social ties was 
not enough to create a sustainable coalition. There has also been conflict concerning 
the different ideologies of the organizations, with the IAF considered too “churchy” 
and the trade unions considered too “left wing.” Arguable, there have not been any 
political threats against the IAF organization justifying the potential costs of forming a 
coalition.   
 
Policy implications 
In terms of policy implications, this study offers important insights regarding the role 
these grassroots organizations play in society. Even though they are relatively small, 
they have contributed to important social changes, such as bringing the living wage or 
improving the healthcare system, and have as well been a critical force in revitalizing 
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certain neighborhoods or cities. Indeed, this model of civic engagement should be seen 
as an important precondition for a well-functioning democracy. This study also 
provides practical value in terms of cross-national learning. When Leo Penta came to 
Berlin in 1996, his audience listened to his stories but was skeptical.  That’s all very 
well, “but it won’t work in Germany,” people said. As of today, three IAF 
organizations have been built in Berlin, encompassing in total over 100 local member 
institutions. 
This study also provides practical value in terms of cross-organizational 
learning. To a certain extent, social movements could profit from adopting some 
elements of the structure the IAF model offers, making them sustainable over time. 
With regards to trade unions, as early as 1964, James O’Connor argued, “the social 
base for working-class organizations will lie more in the community where today there 
is a political vacuum. Community unions clearly will be the appropriate mode of 
working-class organization and struggle” (O’Connor, 1964: 146). The unions, on the 
one hand, can take advantage of the geographical density and the mobilization 
capacity of community members to kick off an effective organizing drive. The 
alternative organizations, on the other hand, by allying with the traditional trade 
unions, can gain increased economic leverage. Going beyond just a functional role, 
building such coalitions are an important part of the fight towards a more equitable, 
sustainable society.  
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Future research 
In terms of future research, it would be fruitful to conduct a paired comparison of a 
successful and a failed IAF organization.  The organization in London was successful, 
while the organization in Birmingham failed. What explains the difference? To what 
extent does the context play a role versus the internal organizational dimensions? In 
addition, IAF organizations are present as well in Canada, Australia, and since 
recently France. Examining the whole universe of foreign IAF organizations would 
give us a deeper understanding of how the organizations function in different contexts.  
Finally, these case studies have generated hypotheses that could be tested. 
When are movements likely to correct their defects? One way to test it would be by 
examining organizations that function in a hostile environment or that develop highly 
bureaucratic cultures, and examine whether these corrective mechanisms are still 
triggered that mitigate organizational conservatism. One might hypothesize that an 
organization with a strong mobilizing culture operating within a hostile environment is 
more likely to radicalize in order to survive, whereas an organization with a highly 
bureaucratic culture operating within an open environment is more likely to 
institutionalize, commercialize, or become a voluntary group. 
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APPENDIX  
 
DATA COLLECTION 
 
Below I describe in more detail my data collection for each of the organizations. In 
general, the interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours, which I recorded and 
transcribed. Most of the interview selection was done through snowball sampling. 
During the process, however, I tried to make sure, to interview people from different 
layers within the organization and paid attention to capture the diversity in terms of 
gender, religion, and ethnicity. The interviews took place not only in the 
organizations’ office but often in the interviewees’ homes, in cafes, or restaurants.  
 
The Greater Boston Interfaith Organization (GBIO) 
In terms of the Boston IAF organization, I collected the data between 2010-2012. 
During the summer of 2010, I was closely involved as a participant observer in the 
activities of GBIO and was granted thorough access to the organization. I was able to 
attend internal meetings, such as the strategy team leadership meetings and internal 
staff meetings. I sat in on various training sessions and attended a Delegate Assembly, 
in which representatives of all the institutions come together, evaluate the past year, 
and decide on issues for the following year. I was involved in their anti-usury 
campaign and was part of their “action team” on that campaign.  Since that summer, I 
have attended on a more irregular basis internal and public meetings of GBIO. 
Furthermore, in May 2010, I participated in an intensive five-day IAF regional 
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training at the Theological School of Drew University, New Jersey. This led to many 
informal conversations with about 35 participants from six different American IAF 
organizations.  
Second, I conducted a total of 40 semi-structured interviews and obtained my 
first pool of contacts at GBIO’s internal leadership meeting. I interviewed GBIO 
organizers and staff (N=7), leaders of the member organizations (N=16), and IAF 
national directors (N=3). Furthermore, to better understand the “organizing 
environment” of the greater Boston area, I interviewed trade union representatives 
(N=2), organizers from other organizing networks (N=8), and scholars (N=4) from 
Harvard University, MIT, and Boston College as well. Finally, I used archival 
documents, such as internal organizational reports and newspaper articles to construct 
a historical record. In particular, I coded and analyzed over 350 local and national 
newspaper articles – from the Boston Globe, the Boston Banner, and the Jewish 
Advocate – that have been published on the organization between 1996 and 2012. 
 
London Citizens (LC) 
In terms of the London IAF organization, I collected the data between 2008-2013. 
During the summer of 2008, I participated in London Citizens’ Summer Academy 
Training. For about six weeks I was immersed in LC’s organizational structure; I took 
part in its campaigns, attended its meetings, and was involved in daily activities, work-
related as well as birthday parties and goodbye lunches. I was one of London Citizens’ 
student organizers on their hotel workers campaign and attended many team meetings 
mostly with other organizers. I took part in a two-day training event with leaders from 
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the different London chapters, participating in mock negotiations and roll-plays. 
During the summer of 2009, I conducted follow-up interviews with LC as well as with 
union representatives. While the organization was successful in 2008 and 2009, its 
membership had grown exponentially by 2013. Between 2010 and 2013, I was able to 
“attend” their mayoral and national accountability assembly meetings on-line, 
resulting in extensive notetaking. In the Spring of 2013, I returned to London to 
conduct another set of follow-up interviews; I sat in on an internal leadership meeting, 
and participated in the community organizing seminar at Queen Mary University of 
London.  
I conducted a total of 39 semi-structured interviews and obtained my first pool 
of contacts through my internship and close collaboration with LC staff and 
organizers. I interviewed LC organizers and staff (N=18) and leaders of the member 
organizations (N=9). Furthermore, to better understand the “organizing environment” 
of the London area, I interviewed trade union representatives (N=9) and scholars 
(N=3) as well. Finally, I coded and analyzed over 200 local and national newspaper 
articles – from the Guardian, the Morning Star, the Evening Standard, the 
Independent, the Observer, the Hackney Gazette, and the London Times – that have 
been published on the organization between 1990 and 2012.  
 
Deutsches Institut für Community Organizing (DICO) 
In terms of the Berlin IAF organization, I collected the data between 2008-2012. I 
have been in contact with DICO’s director Leo Penta since the summer of 2008 
mostly through email and phone conversations. During the Spring of 2009, I went on a 
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short trip to Berlin, attended an accountability assembly of the IAF organization in 
Wedding-Moabit and had informal conversations with the DICO organizers. I kept 
contact with the organizers through email. In the Spring of 2010, I spent 6 weeks in 
Berlin and participated in a three-day training on the outskirts of Berlin. This led again 
to many informal conversations with the 18 participants from the different Berlin 
chapters.  
I conducted a total of 31 semi-structured interviews and obtained my first pool 
of contacts through my contact with the Director Leo Penta. I interviewed DICO 
organizers and funders (N=9) as well as leaders of the member organizations (N=7). 
Some of the members and organizers I interviewed on multiple occasions. 
Furthermore, to better understand the “organizing environment” of the Berlin area, I 
interviewed trade union representatives (N=5), representatives from other organizing 
networks and from the so-called Quartiersmanagements (N=6) as well as scholars 
(N=4). Finally, I coded and analyzed about 75 local and national newspaper articles – 
from the Berliner Morgenpost, the Berliner Zeitung, and Der Tagesspiegel – that have 
been published on the organization between 1999 and 2012. 
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